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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes facets of US involvement in El Salvador, Colombia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq to demonstrate the value of using joint military training between 
host nation and US military personnel as a vehicle to establish intelligence sharing 
programs. Military-to-military relations already facilitate the distribution of logistical 
assistance, the exchange of technical expertise, and the teaching of advanced military 
capabilities. However, military-to-military relations are more than just a means to provide 
financial and technological aid. Within this thesis, military relations are presented as a 
way to develop the trust necessary to operate in areas of current and future US national 
interest, at a time when increased bilateral cooperation and intelligence sharing between 
the United States and coalition governments is desperately needed. Guidelines 
extrapolated from an analysis of political, military, cultural, and intelligence sharing 
characteristics in each one of these countries are presented to help the US and host nation 
personnel develop better intelligence capabilities through the training of host nation 
military forces; in effect, locally train an army of intelligence analysts. Based on current 
American intelligence shortfalls and elusive transnational enemies, the use of military-to-
military relations is proposed as a way to enhance US intelligence capabilities and 
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I. HOW TO TRAIN AN ARMY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
1. How a Lack of Training and Intelligence Triumphed in the Spring of 
2004  
In the aftermath of both the fall of the Taliban government and the regime of 
Saddam Hussein, the delay in training capable, indigenous security forces and developing 
an effective intelligence architecture hampered US operations in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.1 During the spring of 2004, the coalition’s inability to establish a professional 
relationship between US and Iraqi military personnel, the absence of a comprehensive 
intelligence architecture on the ground, and American failures to properly train a capable 
indigenous security element, converged with dire consequences in the town of Falluja, 
Iraq. Located approximately 35 miles west of Baghdad in an area commonly referred to 
as the Sunni Triangle, Falluja had long been known as the headquarters of anti-
occupation rebels and religious fundamentalists. Personnel familiar with the US 
military’s initial attempt to enter Falluja in early April have corroborated statements 
made by the Commander of the 1st Armored Division, Major General Martin Dempsey, 
concerning the refusal by members of a newly formed Iraqi battalion to participate in 
offensive operations.2 “About 50 percent of the security forces that we’ve built over the 
past year stood tall and firm,” Major General Dempsey remarked, “about 40 percent 
walked off the job because they were intimidated. And about 10 percent actually worked 
against us.”3 Among the reasons given by US officials for the military debacle in Falluja 
were the hasty integration of Iraqi forces to US battle plans, the lack of training and  
 
 
1 For purposes of this thesis, the term “indigenous” is not only used to refer to officially sanctioned 
military forces  within a host nation, but to also refer to any organized group, regardless of sophistication, 
which can be rallied to support US an coalition objectives. An intelligence architecture is defined as an 
organized intelligence apparatus, a structured environment in which intelligence disciplines, capabilities, 
and procedures are deployed in support of selected civilian and/or military requirements. 
2 Jim Michaels USA Today (22 April 2004), Bay Fang U.S. News & World Report (17 May 2004), Rod 
Norland Newsweek (5 July 2004 issue), Steven R. Weisman New York Times (20 May 2004), Eric Schmitt 
New York Times (24 May 2004), Daniel Williams Washington Post Foreign Service (7 June 2004). 
3 Michaels, J. (2004, April 22).U.S plans elite force for security. USA Today. Retrieved June 10, 2004, 
from http://printthis.clickability.com 
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proper equipping of Iraqi recruits, a dangerous security situation within the area of 
operations, insurgent intimidation of Iraqi soldiers, and the new battalion’s lack of 
combat experience.  
In addition to instances in which US military personnel were tasked with training 
Iraqi recruits just hours before the start of offensive operations, American officials ran 
into difficulties trying to identify, assess, and convince previously dismissed Iraqi 
generals to lead newly “trained” Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) troops.4 Officials such 
as Dan Senor, then the chief US civilian spokesman in Iraq, acknowledged the painful 
reality that without US knowledge of Iraqi politics or background on Iraqi military 
personnel, “you cannot pull generals out of thin air.”5 The public relations impact that 
followed the search by US officials for suitable Iraqi senior officers was severe. By the 
first week of May, amidst confusion by both Iraqi and American officials, US military 
commanders found themselves firing one Iraqi general, appointing another, and inviting 
Iraqi majors, colonels, and generals to apply for their old jobs, all within the span of a 
week. Prior to his departure from Iraq after spending a year in charge of the assembling 
and training of Iraqi army, police, and civil defense troops, US Army Major General Paul 
Eaton admitted that the US Army “had the wrong training focus-on individual cops rather 
than leaders.”6 More importantly, US Marine officers outside Falluja were going on 
record stating that they felt “a sense of grim foreboding about the prospect of joint patrols 
with Iraqis in the city.”7 According to the US Marines, beyond the limitations of the 
hastily trained Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the loyalty of Iraqi troops was seriously in 
doubt. With mounting pressure by US officials to enter Falluja, Iraqi combat skills and 
allegiances had not been fully examined. American strategic desires to turn over security 
responsibilities to Iraqi troops sooner rather than later were quickly evaporating.  
 
4 Chandrasekaran, R. (2004, April 27) Iraqi forces get crash course for patrols in Falluja. The 
Washington Post. Retrieved April 29, 2004, from http://washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?/admin/content 
ID=A47652-2004Apr27 
5 Fleishman, J. (2004, April 27) Ex Baathists offer US advice, await call to arms. Los Angeles Times. 
Retrieved June 10, 2004, from http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/e20040427279605 
6 Krane, J. (2004, June 10) Iraq’s Security Forces not Ready. Denver Post. Retrieved July 29, 2004, 
from http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/e20040610294251 
7 Kifner, J. (2004, April 27) In the Besieged City, The Marines Look Ahead Uneasily to Joint Patrols 
with Iraqis. New York Times. Retrieved June 10, 2004, from http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/e20040427279538 
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In addition to the US intelligence community’s difficulty in assisting military 
officials with the vetting of potential leaders of the Falluja Brigade due to a lack of 
ground-level information and background on the Iraqi military, analysts were unable to 
find anyone that could reliably inform them on activities within Falluja. The possibility of 
using the newly formed Falluja Brigade as a US-trained army of human intelligence 
sensors stalled in the outskirts of Falluja with hundreds of Iraqi soldiers refusing to fight. 
Unable to coordinate with indigenous assets inside or outside the city, analysts were left 
with intelligence gaps regarding the enemy’s current and future intent. In the absence of 
Iraqi military or civilian reference points, the US ability to glean intelligence concerning 
the origins and motivation of the insurgency within Falluja was reduced.  Without 
reliable information, intelligence was also limited regarding the insurgents’ location, 
identity, and the cultural dynamics developing within a city widely known for its 
religious piety. Based on a failure to establish capable and trustworthy indigenous 
battalions and effectively train Iraqi recruits to conduct joint security patrols with US 
Marines, the benefits of establishing human intelligence networks with experienced, Iraqi 
military counterparts never materialized. 
While coalition forces outside the city battled the confusion and uncertainties 
related to the establishment of the Falluja Brigade, insurgents within the city regrouped 
and cloaked themselves with the civilian population. By the time US officials in Baghdad 
had transferred sovereignty to the new interim Iraqi government in June, an initial desire 
to work through Iraqi military and civilian personnel in Falluja had been replaced by 
short-term goals to place an Iraqi face on the forces tasked to help avenge the death of 
American contractors.8 Approximately three months after the collapse of the US trained 
Falluja Brigade and the US Marines’ entry and exit from Falluja, the city was completely 
under the control of insurgent forces. The American attempt to stand up a competent Iraqi 
defense force in Falluja during combat operations in spring 2004 was gradually labeled a 
failure.9
 
8 Rubin, A., McManus, D. (2004, October 24) Why America Has Waged a Loosing Battle on Fallouja. 
Los Angeles Times.  
9 Zoroya, G. (2004, June 14) Fallujah Brigade Tries US Patience. USA Today. Retrieved July 29, 2004, 
from http://printthis.clickability.com 
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Even after the final full-blown American assault on Falluja eight months later, the 
city remained a glaring reminder of the consequences related to the absence of properly 
trained Iraqi forces, the realization of unnecessary training failures, and recurring 
intelligence shortfalls. During an interview in the weeks following the April debacle in 
Falluja, the senior US military officer in charge of arming and training Iraqi national 
forces, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, categorized efforts to train foreign troops on a 
reduced timeline as “building an airplane in flight.”10 Could the cautious development of 
military-to-military relationships between US forces and erroneously dismissed Iraqi 
military elements immediately after the fall of Baghdad have helped prevent the Falluja 
debacle? Could military ties between US units and Iraqi indigenous forces have been 
helpful in the establishment of a much-needed intelligence architecture? No one will ever 
know for certain. However, military and political setbacks like the one seen in Falluja 
demonstrate that a decreased American military presence and the conception of a 
democracy-based government in places like Iraq can be further insured through the 
security provided by a capable indigenous defense force and an effective intelligence 
architecture. Nonetheless, coalition forces involved in the training of Iraqis and Afghanis 
continue to “build an airplane in flight” amidst a dynamic security situation. Despite 
years of US military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Latin America, 
elements of the US military continue to have difficulties understanding the human terrain, 
relationships with local military members and the civilian population are tenuous at best, 
and essential elements of intelligence information continue to go unanswered. In the 




Issues such as those previously discussed concerning US operations in Falluja 
reflect many of the different factors involved in conducting combat operations on foreign 
soil. However, this thesis asserts that the issues also reflect the importance of proactively 
 
10 Norland, R. (2004, July 5) Iraq’s Repairman. Newsweek. Retrieved June 28, 2004, from 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5305713/site/newsweek/ 
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teaching internal defense skills to current and future allies whenever possible, while 
emphasizing the value of the military relationship to foster a long-term intelligence effort. 
The techniques and procedures developed and used by the United States to conduct 
intelligence collection and train foreign militaries have been generally documented over 
the years in publications, manuals, journals, and articles of varying academic caliber and 
security classification. Nonetheless, research of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
demonstrates that although US training of indigenous forces has been going on for 
several years, the process to improve US intelligence in the same places has been 
marginalized due to a lack of human intelligence. Moreover, a high threat environment, 
intelligence gaps, equipment and leadership shortfalls, local intimidation, cultural 
differences, and a lack of battlefield awareness are hampering the attainment of US 
strategic goals.  
This thesis will put forward facets of the US involvement in El Salvador and the 
ongoing conflict in Colombia as examples of the implementation of intelligence sharing 
programs by way of established joint military training. Both the Civil War in El Salvador 
(1979-1992) and the current civil war in Colombia (1964-Present) have presented foreign 
policy concerns for the United States and resulted in significant involvement of US 
military personnel in an advisory and training capacity.11 US strategy in these two 
countries made the establishment of an intelligence architecture, in the shape of regional 
and joint intelligence centers, a necessity. Preliminary research of these two conflicts has 
revealed that both the situation on the ground and the US desire to maintain hemispheric 
stability shaped US intelligence sharing policies and impacted the tactical and strategic 
interests of the countries involved. In Iraq and Afghanistan, reports continue to describe 
the difficulties encountered by US personnel in the areas of military training and 
intelligence collection. Recent failures by Iraqi and Afghani troops to engage insurgents 
in combat are summarized by many frustrated US service members who exclaim that 
 
11 For purposes of this thesis, the military coup conducted by Salvadoran officers in October of 1979 
and the signing of the UN sponsored peace accords in 1992 are considered to be the beginning and end of 
the Salvadoran civil war respectively. The founding of the Marxist insurgency group FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) in 1964 has been designated by the author as the start of the civil 
war in Colombia. 
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there is no blueprint for the training of new forces, much less the establishment of an 
indigenous intelligence architecture.12  
This thesis demonstrates the value of establishing future intelligence architectures 
by way of the ongoing training of military forces and the intangibles of a military-to-
military exchange. At the conclusion of this project, guidelines on how to use joint 
military training as a vehicle to build an intelligence architecture will be presented, based 
on a review of training and intelligence sharing policies. These guidelines have been 
extrapolated from an analysis of political, military, cultural, and intelligence sharing 
characteristics in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq and are presented to help 
the US and host nation personnel develop better intelligence capabilities through the 
training of host nation military forces; in effect, locally train an army of intelligence 
analysts.  
The current situation faced by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan differs in 
many obvious ways from the situation faced by the United States in El Salvador and 
Colombia. Nonetheless, the author of this thesis maintains that all of these countries have 
been united during one moment in time by: the mutual need to empower indigenous 
security forces amidst crisis, the need to establish or improve a bilateral intelligence 
relationship, and secure shared strategic interests. In addition, it is proposed that the 
training and intelligence shortfalls previously documented by US officials during the civil 
war in El Salvador and Colombia are comparable to those currently experienced by 
American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq since the fall of the Taliban government and the 
Saddam Hussein regime. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the United States military can 
avoid intelligence shortfalls in future conflicts by training foreign armies using aspects of 
the Salvadoran, Colombian, and Afghan military-to-military relationship. In addition to a 
review of ongoing events in the Middle East, a search for a model or guide within the 
case studies of El Salvador and Colombia has been conducted with an eye towards the 
future. By developing military-to-military exchanges in current and future potential areas 
of conflict, the United States can implement long-term security commitments through 
 
12 Kifner, J. (2004, May 3) On or Off? Odd U.S. Alliance With an Ex-Hussein General. New York 
Times. Retrieved June 10, 2004, from http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/e20040503281524 
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indigenous relationships that will facilitate the establishment of an intelligence 
architecture at the grassroots level, support US national objectives, and avoid reactive 
nation-building efforts. 
 
C. THESIS PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
Military relations can be fertile ground for the establishment of an intelligence 
architecture in areas where the United States is already providing or will provide the 
support necessary to ensure stability, train foreign military personnel, and/or provide 
humanitarian aid. Within the Global War on Terrorism, the proactive engagement of US 
forces with foreign militaries on their own soil can be useful in countering the spread or 
even the inception of insurgencies and terrorism in areas of potential future conflict. 
According to John Parachini, author of the article Putting WMD (Weapons of Mass 
Destruction) Terrorism into Perspective, sponsor states “not only enable terrorist groups 
to thrive but also enable their ability to acquire unconventional capabilities with sufficient 
scale for truly catastrophic attacks.”13  Recent hostilities in the Middle East have also 
clearly revealed the importance of securing and understanding a state or nation's internal 
security infrastructure prior to engaging in any significant combat and/or nation-building 
efforts.  
This project will demonstrate the difference between the execution of a short-
term, short- sighted commitment in a country engulfed in crisis and the use of bilateral 
military exchanges to develop a proactive long-term relationship in weak or failing states 
to secure mutual strategic, operational, and tactical gains. During an annual symposium, 
Joint Staff Director of Operations Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz asked his 
audience to “imagine the impact of an entire cadre of people with the specific ethnic 
connections, language and communication skills we [the United States] need -- targeted 
to key regions for the war on terrorism. Such a group of people, with unique ‘non-
commando’ capabilities and characteristics, might constitute a new and unusually diverse  
 
 
13 Parachini, John. (2003) Putting WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) Terrorism into Perspective. 
The Washington Quarterly. 26:44 pp. 47. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
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pillar of the special operations community-able to work in close concert with direct 
action, mobility, civil affairs and other forces to help prepare the battlespace to find and 
fix the enemy.”14  
Research reviewed for this project demonstrates that the well-established 
multinational relationships present in countries like El Salvador and Colombia have 
resulted in long-term security benefits for the United States. Therefore, an attempt will be 
made by the author to demonstrate that security agreements such as intelligence-sharing 
programs, when developed in conjunction with a military training relationship vice 
independent of such training, can improve future US national security in ways that go 
beyond the nation-building efforts currently underway overseas. The goal of this thesis is 
to further US security and national interests abroad, and improve US training of foreign 
militaries for current and future conflicts. The research in support of this project consists 
of an in-depth analysis of past and present training and intelligence-sharing models from 
El Salvador, Colombia and Afghanistan. In producing a thesis that is contemporary and 
yields applicable results, recent and ongoing US military training in Iraq will be studied. 
Based on available information, a modern application of the proposed relationship 
between military relations and intelligence agreements to current and future events has 
not been formally researched or documented. Finally, at the conclusion of this project, 
comprehensive recommendations on how to use strong military-to-military ties 
developed by joint training to build a mutually beneficial intelligence architecture will be 
offered.  
This research project is driven by the hypothesis that the US military can mitigate 
intelligence shortfalls in certain types of conflict by training foreign armies using lessons 
learned during the military training of indigenous forces in El Salvador, Colombia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. In addition, it is proposed that the US military can leverage the 
contributions of multinational partners through a military-to-military relationship to 
establish an intelligence architecture capable of providing battlespace awareness and 
 
14 Prepared remarks of the Joint Staff Director of Operations, Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz, 
for the 15th Annual National Defense Industrial Association Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
(SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C., 6 FEB 2004.  
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delivering fused and accurate intelligence to combatant units. A properly established 
intelligence architecture can enable future success in unilateral and coalition operations. 
Moreover, this architecture can provide policy makers with continuous, regional 
indications and warnings, and provide operators with the proactive intelligence support 
needed to plan and execute appropriate military options.   
There are many techniques and approaches used to train an army. The US military 
uses training vehicles such as Foreign Internal Defense (FID) military advisor programs, 
officer exchange programs and US embassy protocols in an effort to establish multi-
national military cooperation. The effectiveness, advantages, or disadvantages of these 
programs will not be addressed within this thesis. Rather than discussing the effectiveness 
of multinational training, efforts will be made to discuss the value of military-to-military 
exchanges, tailored intelligence networks, and the benefits of applying specific lessons 
learned to future American areas of interest. For decades, the United States has offered 
countries in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of operations effective 
training, discipline, and professionalism.15 US Southern Command and US Central 
Command policies at an unclassified level will be used to define the environment and 
boundaries in which military-to-military ties developed by joint training can facilitate the 
creation of a mutually beneficial intelligence architecture. This thesis does not focus on 
the effectiveness of counterdrug efforts in Colombia, but instead focuses on the origins, 
training practices, and results produced by US trained elements of the Colombian 
military. The past and current intelligence sharing practices between El Salvador, 
Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq and the United States will be qualified or evaluated at an 
unclassified level only to illustrate how the existence of joint training arrangements has 
facilitated or impaired intelligence sharing agreements.  
 
15  The United States Southern Command area of operations includes the land mass of Latin America 
south of Mexico, the adjacent waters of Central America, South America, and Mexico, portions of the 
Atlantic Sea, The Caribbean Sea, and numerous island nations and European territories.  
 10
D. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
In order to determine if the US military can mitigate intelligence shortfalls in 
certain types of conflict by using previous training and intelligence sharing models, a 
case study of the training and intelligence relationship between the United States, El 
Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan and Iraq has been conducted. The following aspects 
pertaining to the interaction of US personnel with counterparts in the above mentioned 
countries are discussed: the history and development of American and host country 
policies, the organizational structure and culture of the military and intelligence entities 
involved, the degree and type of US involvement, and when possible, information or 
intelligence sharing agreements. Both the boundaries in which military-to-military ties 
can be developed to achieve mutual intelligence goals and the circumstances in which a 
case study can be applied to current and future situations will be detailed. Any unique, 
positive, or negative warfare and conflict characteristics within the case studies will be 
identified in an effort to demonstrate how the establishment of an intelligence 
architecture based on military-to-military exchange is an approach from which present 
and future allies can benefit. The external validity of supporting material will be 
demonstrated through a review of available organizational documents and with the help 
of subject matter experts. 
Conclusions will be drawn after comparing the methods, information/intelligence 
sharing arrangements, and training programs used in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan 
and Iraq. As a result of this research, and at the conclusion of this project, applicable 
recommendations will be presented in an effort to support US military involvement in 
future areas of conflict. More importantly, it is hoped that this product will be used as a 
concept of operations in “the next country,” in order to establish a successful and 
appropriate intelligence architecture model that is based on a military-to-military 
relationship that has been nurtured over time, and can support operations at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic level.  
Why should the US military get involved in “the next country” right now? 
According once again to Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz, “Beyond [US] 
information needs, the quality and nature of our relationships will strongly influence our 
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ability to access the battlespace. We need better focus on building, maintaining and 
leveraging relationships with the security forces of our partner nations.”16 This research 
project is an effort to identify the elements within a sample of conflicts in order to help 
the US military establish an intelligence architecture in future weak and failing states 
using the proactive military-to-military relations. Any program that can help the United 
States and its allies moderate or prevent the inception of hostilities such as those seen in 
places like Iraq and Afghanistan must be examined. These recent conflicts have 
demonstrated how reactive diplomatic and US military policies can place American lives 
in danger and project strategic goals in an unfavorable and unpopular international light. 
However, deliberate, proactive, military-to-military exchanges can provide an insight into 
doctrinal development process in potential areas of future involvement. More 
importantly, it is hoped that an innovative approach that uses the training of military 
forces in potential areas of future conflict to protect vital strategic interests will also, by 
way of the same training, establish the foundation for an intelligence collection network 
where previously one was inadequate or did not exist.  
 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINES 
Chapter II: The Role of Military-to-Military Relationships in the 
Development of a New Intelligence Architecture 
The need for a new intelligence architecture is defined and put forth based on the 
emergence of enemies that are proficient in unconventional tactics and operate in 
unfamiliar battlespaces.  In addition, the value of establishing new intelligence 
architectures by way of military-to-military relations is presented as one way to improve 
current and future intelligence efforts, support military operations, and further American 
foreign policy. 
 
Chapter III: El Salvador: A Ghost of Intelligence Sharing Past 
In order to determine whether an emphasis on military-to-military relationships 
can advance future intelligence efforts, the involvement of the United States military in 
 
16 Prepared remarks during  the 15th Annual National Defense Industrial Association Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C., 6 FEB 2004 
 12
                                                
El Salvador has been examined using a discerning eye. This chapter presents several of 
the procedures and challenges encountered by US forces in El Salvador in an effort to 
provide guidelines for proactive, operational engagement of current and future military 
allies. The importance of defining the intelligence needs of the host nation, the value of 
proactively identifying a counterpart’s intelligence capabilities, and the benefits of a 
decent and open military-to-military relationship are lessons that survived this civil war, 
and in the future, can help secure a path to victory.17
 
Chapter IV: Colombia: Intelligence and Information Sharing in the Present 
American foreign policy, the quality of a host nation’s military force, and 
operational security are several key issues that must be considered, often concurrently, 
when evaluating any military-to-military relationship and/or information sharing 
program. This case study analyzes the role of military-to-military relations between 
American and Colombian personnel as a vehicle for information sharing, in the context of 
Colombia’s battle against insurgent forces. 
 
Chapter V: Afghanistan: An Intelligence Sharing Opportunity in Progress  
In this chapter, the benefits associated with sharing information and intelligence 
are explored in the context of  the military, logistical, and training challenges encountered 
by US forces in Afghanistan, both before and after the fall of the Taliban. Examples of 
US and Afghan intelligence efforts are discussed to identify how to improve current and 
future intelligence sharing relationships. This case study reveals that a failure to maintain 
military-to-military relations throughout a conflict and an inability to recognize that 
changes in strategy require changes in intelligence relations, can deprive US and host 




17 The term “host nation” is used throughout this text to generically describe the origins of foreign 
military and intelligence personnel. The use of this term does not imply that the United States should only 
engage in intelligence sharing relationships with officially recognized nations. Governing and opposition 
groups within organizations, states, non-states, and even failing states must be considered as potential allies 
in current and future conflicts and when necessary, actively sought as partners in intelligence sharing 
agreements. 
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Conversely, the establishment of committed and long-term military-to-military relations 
can be instrumental in building the confidence and infrastructure necessary to foster the 
successful sharing of intelligence.  
 
Chapter VI: Arguments, Counterarguments, and Iraq 
The purpose, scope, and methodology of this thesis are reviewed as a preamble to 
a final analysis of the hypothesis and research questions originally presented in the 
introductory chapter. Thesis arguments are also detailed as part of a discussion of the 
reasons in favor and against the use of military-to-military relations to improve 
intelligence capabilities. Both this chapter and thesis conclude with a re-assessment of 
US involvement in Iraq prior to the introduction of a set of guidelines that when applied, 
can improve American intelligence sharing capabilities by way of international military-
to-military relations. 
 
Guidelines: How to Train an Army of Intelligence Analysts     
This chapter provides a set of guidelines that, based on specific case studies, can 
establish or improve American intelligence sharing capabilities by way of international 
military-to-military relations, in effect, help the United States and host nations 
successfully and locally train an army of intelligence analysts. 
Throughout this thesis, it is asserted that military-to-military relations are more 
than just a means to exchange information. Military-to-military relations are presented as 
a way to develop the trust necessary to conduct coalition operations in areas of current 
and future US national interest, at a time when increased bilateral cooperation and 
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II. THE ROLE OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE 
ARCHITECTURE  
A. INTRODUCTION  
In October 1994, the signing and distribution of an official memorandum prepared 
for the newly appointed Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), marked the introduction of 
a new vision to the US naval intelligence community.18 Although the signing and 
dissemination of new objectives and guidance is expected by naval professionals 
following a change in leadership, this memorandum’s re-organizational foresight went 
largely unnoticed. Along with community-specific intelligence issues and goals, the 
prospective DNI declared a need “to redevelop the naval intelligence focus / ‘culture’ 
once applied against the Soviet navy problem.” Of note, this requirement was made by 
the eventual DNI approximately three years after the conclusion of Operations Desert 
Storm and Desert Shield in 1991, and preceded the beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
March of 2003 by almost ten years.  
In retrospect, the naval intelligence community did not adequately heed the call in 
1994 to discard the Cold War mentality. Along with thousands of analysts from the US 
intelligence community at large, most military intelligence professionals did not properly 
recognize the eviction of the Iraqi army from Kuwait as the engagement of an enemy in a 
new and adverse area of operations. US intelligence professionals repeatedly missed 
opportunities to redevelop their focus, redefine their culture, and reorganize the 
intelligence community in preparation for new and unconventional threats. Ten years 
later, the intelligence community was caught unprepared, like the majority of American 
military leadership, and forced to reap the consequences of operating in a conventional 
warfare paradigm.  
For purposes of this report, an intelligence architecture is defined as an organized 
intelligence apparatus, a structured environment in which intelligence disciplines, 
 
18 Memorandum for the record, by Captain R.B. Porterfield, US Navy, prospective Director of Naval 
Intelligence, 12 October 1994 
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capabilities, and procedures are deployed in support of selected civilian and/or military 
requirements. The decision to anchor US intelligence architectures to technological 
means following the collapse of the Soviet Union stifled the expansion of the indigenous, 
tactical level intelligence capability that is needed today. According to Lieutenant 
Colonel Lester W. Grau, “the military intelligence effort devoted to combating [Iraqi 
insurgency movements] has little in common with conventional intelligence operations in 
support of conventional maneuver war.”19 Previously reviewed case studies of the civil 
war in El Salvador, the battle against insurgent forces in Colombia, the war in Iraq, and 
US combat operations in Afghanistan make it evident that conventional, top-down 
intelligence architectures, although capable of supporting the conventional fight, have 
fallen short against asymmetric threats.20 In the following paragraphs, the need for a new 
intelligence architecture is defined and put forth based on the emergence of enemies that 
are proficient in unconventional tactics and operate in previously unknown battlespaces.  
In addition, the value of establishing new intelligence architectures by way of military-to-
military relations is presented as one way to improve current and future intelligence 
efforts, support military operations, and further American foreign policy. 
 
B. THE AREAS OF CURRENT AND FUTURE CONFLICT  
It is very difficult, and some analysts say even impossible, to identify with 
certainty the type and variety of threats that will challenge the United States in the 
future.21 However, it is certain that the manner in which US military and intelligence 
entities organize and plan for the challenges of the future will fail if decision makers 
prepare by reconstituting previous conventional battles. Areas of current and future 
conflict as they are described below, are meant only to provide a sample of the numerous 
 
19 Grau, L.W. (2004 July-August). Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and 
Intelligence Analysis. Military Review, 43. 
20 Asymmetric is defined by John T. Chenery, author of “Transnational Threats 101: Today’s 
Asymmetric Battlefield,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, (Jul-Sep 1999):2, as “any 
unconventional or inexpensive method or means used to avoid [US] our strengths, and exploit our 
vulnerabilities.”  
21 This statement is based on the author’s professional experiences during seven years of work in 
multiple strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence assignments.  
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environments and challenges that the US intelligence community is facing and will 
continue to face in the future. It is proposed that a general portrayal of current and future 
battlespaces and a subsequent discussion of how to build a new intelligence architecture 
is necessary to identify the procedures and protagonists needed to optimize US 
intelligence support in the future.  
 
1. State and Non-State Sponsors of Terrorism  
In the weeks following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United 
States, the administration of President George W. Bush made it clear that in the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT), the existence of terrorist organizations was facilitated by the 
logistical, ideological, and financial support provided by willing state sponsors and 
allowed by countries incapable of eradicating terrorism within their borders. The US 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism directly correlates the reduction of terrorist 
scope and capabilities to the need to locate and destroy foreign sanctuaries.22 Therefore, 
within American policy efforts to “deny, defeat, diminish, and defend” against terrorism, 
the verb deny refers to US efforts to stop state sponsorship and terrorist sanctuaries on a 
global scale. However, US measures to halt state sponsorship currently revolve around 
largely military, financial, and political alliances with affected countries. Current 
American policies against state sponsorship are vulnerable because they do not engage 
citizens living among terrorist elements in sanctuary countries. The United States must go 
beyond an impersonal policy of financial payments and diplomatic rhetoric and focus on 
ways to empower the inhabitants of state sponsor territories to voluntarily reject their 
state’s sponsorship of terror. 
 
2. Home Grown Insurgencies  
In the words of RAND analyst Bruce Hoffman, the inability of US political and 
military planners to prepare for operations following the fall of Baghdad reflected “the 
[US] failure not only to recognize the incipient conditions for insurgencies, but also 
ignore its nascent manifestations and arrest its growth before it is able to gain initial 
 
22 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, 11.  
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traction and in turn momentum.”23 In addition to the demonstrated complexity and multi-
dimensional aspects of an insurgency movement, the intelligence required to prepare for 
counterinsurgency situations must be collected using comprehensive intelligence 
architectures. According to General Rene Emilio Ponce, the defense minister at the height 
of the civil war in El Salvador (1979-1992), “90 percent of counterinsurgency is political, 
social, economic and ideological and only 10 percent military.”24 To date, combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the US military’s limited cultural 
awareness and its difficulty in containing a decentralized insurgent movement; facts that 
will undoubtedly encourage many US adversaries to develop or improve similar 
asymmetric capabilities. In order to defeat insurgencies in areas of future conflict, 
military intelligence assets must be operating on the ground long before the 
commencement of hostilities. The proactive development by intelligence professionals of 
the cultural, social, political, and military baselines determined critical in El Salvador but 
ignored in Iraq can not only identify the precursors of an insurgency, but also assist in the 
development of appropriate courses of action from the tactical to the strategic level.  
 
3. Nation Building Abroad  
A review of the missions conducted by US forces in Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan 
and Iraq can quickly illustrate the wide breadth of intelligence expertise and assistance 
necessary in any nation building effort.  Since the fall of the Taliban regime, US forces 
and their respective intelligence units have been involved in missions to support 
humanitarian relief, assist in provincial reconstruction, establish civil affair programs and 
apprehend High Value Targets (HVTs). In an effort to receive and act on intelligence 
within hours of its collection, US forces have been stationed in Afghan villages for 
extended periods of time, thereby “becoming a more permanent, familiar presence.”25 
Although efforts to establish a positive relationship with a native population take time 
and may not be completely intelligence dependent, parallel efforts to pursue dynamic 
 
23 Hoffman, B. (2004). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 3.  
24 Schwarz, B. C. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 22. 
25 Hoffman, B. (2004). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 8. 
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military objectives within a nation building environment constantly demand the swift 
analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence. In Iraq, deployed US Marine units 
have also been positioning themselves among the population in their areas of operation 
whenever possible, in order to “live and work with the Iraqi Police and the Iraqi Civil 
Defense Corps (ICDC).26 If current and future US nation building efforts are to continue, 
they must do so with the realization that human beings are key terrain and the conduits of 
transnational and transcultural issues. Likewise, intelligence professionals in current and 
future nation building environments must be ready to respond with both time and 
culturally sensitive analysis, and just as importantly, have the capability to fuse and 
disseminate the intelligence quickly and correctly.  
 
4. The Maritime Threat 
US Navy initiatives to recognize and reduce vulnerabilities to US military units 
deployed overseas, along with the ongoing execution of maritime and leadership 
interdiction operations (MIO/LIO) at sea, require the fusion and timely dissemination of 
intelligence to multinational allies. Moreover, US personnel operating within this global 
maritime environment must now possess a knowledge of vessels, cargo, crews, and 
passengers that extends well beyond traditional maritime boundaries.27  Intelligence 
efforts in this setting frequently depend on native language speakers, language 
interpreters and detailed, historical databases. US military and intelligence agencies 
operating in this maritime domain have been augmented through the extensive 
participation of coalition partners, resulting in an increased opportunity to cooperate and 
share intelligence in support of counter-terrorism, force protection, homeland security, 
freedom of navigation and counter-narcotic operations. From the Horn of Africa to 
Central Asia, embarked multinational forces have drawn on US and allied intelligence 
sources to impede the smuggling of oil from Iraq, deter the escape of terrorists from 
 
26 Ricks, T. E. “Marines to Offer New Tactics in Iraq: Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover 
from Army,” Washington Post, 7 January, 2004.    
27 The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. “Hearing on Maritime Domain 
Awareness.” 6 October 2004. Transcript on-line. Available from 
http://www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/10-06-04/10-06-04r; Internet; accessed 11 February 2005. 
 20
                                                
Afghanistan, and clear countless mines from the Arabian Gulf.28 Today and in the future, 
afloat and ashore US intelligence support elements will be required to surmount 
technological and linguistic barriers to support a wide variety of maritime missions. 
These commitments will range from humanitarian, to law enforcement, to military 
operations and involve the defense of US personnel and property at home and abroad.  
 
C. A NEED FOR A NEW INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE  
Independent of time and geographical space, maritime and shore-based scenarios 
similar to the ones mentioned above must be counted upon to test the very limits of US 
intelligence capabilities. Therefore, as new adversaries rise to challenge the US military’s 
way of war, intelligence professionals must find more efficient and effective ways of 
supporting a demanding operational tempo. During a time of unprecedented demands on 
the US intelligence community, conventional architectures will find it difficult to contend 
with increasingly complex intelligence requirements because national security no longer 
depends on stalking one enemy- the Soviet Union. With the return of decentralized 
enemies, the development of an intelligence architecture that fosters the production and 
dissemination of intelligence at the tactical level, where US forces are in contact with the 
enemy, instead of emphasizing support from distant and strategic-level intelligence 
factories is paramount. Furthermore, the deferral of bureaucratic intelligence 
requirements until after indigenous intelligence architectures are in place can allow US 
intelligence professionals to gain critical background knowledge and expertise prior to a 
demand for combat support. 
Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided the United States with 
documented proof of the value of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the important 
balance that must be struck between HUMINT and technical intelligence means within 
current and future intelligence architectures. The continued dependence on a technology-
based intelligence infrastructure is complicated by the sparse conditions of future areas of 
 
28 Lecture address by ADM. Walter F. Doran, Commander US Pacific Fleet, 9 September 2003, 18th 
Asialink Conference, Melbourne, Australia. Transcript on-line. Available from 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/speech/speeches/030909.html Internet; accessed 11 February 2005. 
 21
                                                
conflict and the need for long-term cultural, social, and religious immersion. According 
to Professor Kalev Sepp, a visit to Iraq in November of 2004 revealed the absence of 
American intelligence capabilities that acknowledged tribalism, transnational influences, 
and the multiple layers of an insurgent threat.29 Unconventional conflicts often generate 
intelligence at the tactical level that must then be conveyed to the decision maker at the 
strategic level, in effect, from “mud to space.”30 Therefore, the US intelligence 
community must consider stopping its exclusive reliance on detached intelligence 
architectures that operate from space down to tactical units on the ground. In order for the 
US intelligence community to stop being reactive in a combat environment, it must 
develop an ability to consistently produce intelligence from the battleground-up, 
disseminate it down to the lowest and most appropriate authority possible, and 
simultaneously support both military and political decision-makers.  
What would or should, this new “mud to space” intelligence architecture look 
like? The following section proposes a model for a new intelligence architecture in an 
effort to maintain the US intelligence community several steps ahead of future conflicts 
and more importantly, increase its ability to provide short and long term support to a wide 
variety of potential missions.  
 
D. HOW TO BUILD A NEW INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE  
Building a new intelligence architecture that can meet current and future threats 
goes beyond efforts to expand America’s HUMINT capability, increase the number of 
US Army Special Forces, or reorganize the structure of the US intelligence community. 
Building a new intelligence architecture requires the development of a proactive and 
open-minded approach towards new areas of intelligence such as civil affairs, 
counterinsurgency methods, and information operations. The US intelligence community 
must develop intelligence architectures that reside within areas of future conflict to 
 
29 Kalev Sepp, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 12 January 2005. Dr. Sepp is currently 
a faculty member of the Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  
30 USAIC & FH, Six Things Every “2” Must Do, The Intelligence Officer’s Battlebook: Operation 
Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned. 26 June 2003. Chapter 1, p.13. 
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collaborate with competing multinational interests, nullify future threats and analyze, 
instead of report, events. The thorough social-political understanding necessary to 
produce intelligence overseas has been complicated by an American ignorance of cultural 
issues, language barriers, a difficulty accessing the populace, and the lack of vetted 
intelligence sources. Based on a growing movement by the United States to mount an 
active defense against foreign enemies in the GWOT, areas of future conflict should be 
expected to offer similar or even greater cultural challenges.  
US intelligence architectures designed to fight emerging and prospective threats 
must be staffed and managed appropriately in order to produce useful intelligence. A 
need to fuse and disseminate specialized intelligence quickly while informing decision-
makers at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, demands the participation of 
regional experts and coalition partners that possess the necessary cultural background and 
experience. In addition, new intelligence architectures must be: 
 
• Tailored to support dynamic action within the United States or abroad 
simultaneously. The fluid organizational structure of current and future enemies 
demands that intelligence analysis compete with the 24-hour news cycle. 
Moreover, intelligence products must evolve and be refined continuously and 
quickly, upon an international stage. Intelligence products must be tailored to 
support broad as well as specific domestic and foreign policies, and defeat a 
transnational enemy that is no longer tied down by nationality or large orders of 
battle.  
• Geared to perform target development and analysis with greater detail, on 
multiple levels, and in collaboration with different intelligence disciplines. 
Terrorists are currently operating in decentralized groups and their ability to move 
and operate within multiple territories and populated areas can create dynamic 
targets of opportunity in a matter of minutes. This type of elusive targeting will 
require the sharing of US intelligence with other countries to conduct and fuse 
information quickly, mitigate political concerns, and prevent unnecessary physical 
damage. 
 23
                                                
• Aware that although timely and accurate intelligence is a necessary condition to 
defeat asymmetric threats, it is not a substitute for sound military planning that is 
based on known force capabilities instead of perceived enemy threats. In cases 
when military institutions may be inclined to fight unconventional enemies using 
attrition tactics that  focus on internal administration, logistics, and operations, 
new intelligence architectures must recognize an enemy’s unconventional 
capabilities and be prepared to support relational maneuver warfare which focuses 
on reconfiguring capabilities, manipulating social conditions, and exposing enemy 
weaknesses.31 
• Prepared to provide intelligence support that facilitates the efficient and effective 
use of special operations forces. In addition to providing the intelligence 
necessary to allow special operation forces to deceive and surprise the enemy, 
intelligence architectures must recognize that special operations are accomplished 
with the smallest number of personnel possible, and are dependent on thorough 
intelligence support to simplify mission tasks and objectives. 
• Staffed with US personnel that are trained to disseminate intelligence products to 
foreign military and civilian entities and embrace the unconventional methods 
needed to fight terrorism. The US intelligence community can help improve the 
level of protection for US troops on the ground and increase the relevance of 
intelligence products by training to work with indigenous forces. These forces 
possess valuable cultural knowledge and can be supported with the intelligence 
needed to carry out critical civil affairs missions. Producing specific intelligence 
products to maintain the peace is now as important as producing the intelligence 
products needed to triumph in war. 
• Capable of producing intelligence products that are accessible by not only US and 
allied forces, but also available to new, non-state customers and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Future threats to national security will 
originate from multiple regions, failing states, and non-states because most of the 
 
31 Luttwak, E. (1983 December). Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare. Parameters, 336. 
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people who threaten the American way of life plan, train, and operate in countries 
other than their own. Proper and timely dissemination of intelligence products to 
familiar coalition partners as well as unfamiliar governments will be essential. 
Based on an established need by the US intelligence community to redevelop its 
focus and introduce an intelligence architecture capable of fighting complicated and 
multinational threats, military-to-military relations between US and host nation personnel 
will be examined in the following section, and proposed as a key ingredient in future 
intelligence architectures. The analysis of US involvement in El Salvador, Colombia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq performed in support of this argument demonstrates that in time, 
military-to-military ties can provide US forces with the background and experience 
necessary to establish and maintain a superior intelligence architecture abroad.       
 
E. ONE SOLUTION: THE USE OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN A NEW INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE  
Without effective intelligence on current and future adversaries, the United States 
will have a difficult time recognizing the threats it is facing, and even less opportunities 
to focus the resources needed to combat and defeat the enemy. Readers should look no 
further than the US failure to build a coalition with the government of Sudan, based on 
the Sudanese offer to allow the extradition of Usama Bin Laden in 1996, as an example 
of the critical need by the US government and intelligence personnel to understand the 
language, history, politics, and culture of the area in which they work.32 Therefore, 
having established the need for a new intelligence architecture based on diffuse threats 
and elusive enemies, the use of military-to-military relations is proposed as a way to 
guide the United States into enhanced intelligence efforts, important multilateral 
operations, and the empowerment of allies in the war against terrorism.  
 
32 Gellman, B. (2001, October 3) U.S. Was Foiled Multiple Times in Efforts To Capture Bin Laden or 
Have Him Killed; Sudan's Offer to Arrest Militant Fell Through After Saudis Said No; [FINAL Edition], 
A1. Retrieved February 15, 2005, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/82945140.html. Grau, L.W. 
(2004 July-August). Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis. 
Military Review, 44. 
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Anyone considering the use of military-to-military relations as a vehicle to 
increased intelligence capabilities must first be warned. A review of available research 
reveals that these relationships, although capable of improving intelligence efforts, 
require a long-term investment of trained and experienced personnel, professional as well 
as personal patience, honesty, and rarely produce immediate gains. In El Salvador and 
Colombia, military-to-military relations, although initially difficult, proved to be fertile 
ground for the establishment of intelligence sharing agreements after several years. 
Moreover, these relations eventually supported US regional policy objectives and 
increased the counterinsurgency capabilities of the indigenous military forces.  In 
Afghanistan, the participation of indigenous Northern Alliance forces provided the 
indigenous forces needed by US Special Operations Forces to conduct efficient ground 
maneuvers and call for well-directed fires against the enemy.33    
Two years after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq remains an 
example of the consequences resulting from the absence of military relations between 
members of the US-led coalition and compliant Iraqi forces. Instructions given by the 
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to dissolve the Iraqi military 
infrastructure prevented US forces from fully incorporating newly trained Iraqi security 
forces into a comprehensive, long-term national security system.34 Meanwhile, the 
unsupervised introduction of coalition forces into the Iraqi tribal balance of power after 
the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime markedly upset native social-political patterns and 
irrevocably altered the security environment.35 In the post-Saddam era, US forces have 
been able to develop and maintain military-to-military ties with experienced and 
trustworthy Iraqi military personnel with mixed results. Arguably, the absence of a 
military-to-military relationship in Iraq following the fall of Baghdad proved to be yet 
 
33 Biddle, S. (2002). Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense 
Policy. Strategic Studies Institute. Pennsylvania: US Army War College, viii. 
34 McCallister, W.S. (2003 February). Integrated Security System: Requirement for a Well Reasoned 
Tribal Policy, 20. Paper forwarded by COL David S. Maxwell, USA, SF.  
35 McCallister, W.S. (2003 February). Integrated Security System: Requirement for a Well Reasoned 
Tribal Policy, 7. Paper forwarded by COL David S. Maxwell, USA, SF.  
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another lost opportunity for US forces in desperate need of greater situational awareness 
and better insight into complex social, political and tribal systems.  
Nonetheless, the Global War on Terrorism continues to be fought in socially and 
politically compromised countries similar to those found in the Middle East and Latin 
America, possessing inconsistent state, financial and military resources. Most of the 
countries in these regions are unprepared or incapable of effectively waging 
counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts, which under optimal circumstances, 
require extended periods of training and preparation. Proactive US efforts to seek out 
areas of future conflict in order to establish military-to-military relations can help US 
analysts identify key indicators of unrest, target the person or persons that threaten a 
peaceful way of life, and select appropriate courses of action prior to, or instead of, the 
onset of hostilities. Military-to military relations can help US forces in their need to 
expand their linguistic capabilities, develop necessary databases, and effectively 
participate with current and future coalition partners. Dedicated military ties in the form 
of an intelligence sharing agreement, a joint intelligence center, or an advisory program 
can help the US intelligence community establish local, ground to space intelligence 
networks that offer host nations increased intelligence capabilities in exchange for much 
needed regional expertise. In fact, the use of military to military relationships can guide 
the US intelligence community back to that overlooked but essential request to redevelop 
its focus. 
 
F. CONCLUSION      
The enclosed recommendations may seem intuitive and may, in one way or 
another, be already in place. However, over two years after the beginning of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, US news outlets continue to report that attacks against US 
troops deployed overseas occur on a daily basis. These terrorist acts should be seen as the 
successful culmination of the enemy’s plans and therefore, demand the implementation of 
more effective means in order to stop them. In this age of globalization, events such as 
commodity smuggling, terror sponsorship, insurgency movements, and humanitarian 
catastrophes are not just a host nation or state problem. The development of new 
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intelligence architectures and the use of military-to-military relations can enable partner 
nations, nullify future threats through the use of proactive instead of reactive efforts, and 
will do more than paint a visually pleasing picture of the area of operations; it will 
prevent the enemy from eventually defining the global battlespace. 
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III. EL SALVADOR: A GHOST OF INTELLIGENCE 
SHARING PAST  
A. INTRODUCTION  
In order to determine whether an emphasis on military-to-military relationships 
can advance future intelligence efforts, the involvement of the United States military in 
El Salvador has been examined using a discerning eye. Situations encountered by US 
military personnel in El Salvador offer both positive and negative examples of how to 
successfully implement intelligence-sharing programs through established combined 
military training. Consequently, this case study presents many of the procedures and 
challenges encountered by US forces in El Salvador in an effort to provide guidelines for 
proactive, operational engagement of current and future military allies. There are 
numerous and obvious differences between the situation in El Salvador and more recent 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, in principle, there are several similarities. 
The author of this case study considers the civil war in El Salvador as an earlier attempt 
by the United States to pursue three goals sought in Iraq and Afghanistan: the support of 
a new democratic institution, the successful training of capable indigenous forces, and a 
desire for increased intelligence capabilities.  
The outcome of US military involvement during the civil war in El Salvador has 
been described as nothing more than a lucky accident, a fortunate outcome accomplished 
by a core group of people amidst a deplorable situation.36 Although numerous anecdotal 
examples regarding the use of intelligence techniques by both US and Salvadoran forces 
were encountered during the compilation of this case study, only examples validated as 
unclassified through published open media sources have been included. As demonstrated 
in the following text, US strategy in El Salvador made the establishment of an 
intelligence architecture through military collaboration a necessity.37 Placing the 
 
36 Cesar Sereseres, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 6 May 2004. Mr. Sereseres is 
currently a Political Science Professor at University of California Irvine.  
37 For purposes of this thesis, an intelligence architecture is defined as an organized intelligence 
apparatus, a structured environment in which intelligence disciplines, capabilities, and procedures are 
deployed in support of selected civilian and/or military requirements. 
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American involvement in El Salvador within the context of current and future US 
military commitments can expose significant parallels and more importantly, offer 
valuable lessons learned. The importance of defining the intelligence needs of the host 
nation, the value of proactively identifying a counterpart’s intelligence capabilities, and 
the benefits of a decent and open military-to-military relationship are lessons that 
survived this civil war. Subsequently, the value of training and establishing a military-to-
military relationship with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) will be explored as a 
way to avoid intelligence shortfalls in future. 
 
B. US POLICIES IN EL SALVADOR  
Since its inception, the civil war in El Salvador presented a great foreign policy 
concern for the United States. In 1979, the overthrow of the Somoza government and the 
subsequent victory of the Marxist-oriented Sandinista movement in Nicaragua was seen 
by the United States as a threat to the development of democracy in Central America. 
After years of oligarchic rule and social crisis, a subsequent military coup in October of 
1979 left the leadership of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces divided, but in control of the 
civilian government. By 1980, a bloody civil war between government forces and the 
Marxist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was underway. The end of 
the civil war was marked by the signing of a peace accord in 1992 and, based on 
subsequent records, claimed an estimated one hundred thousand lives.38 Relative to the 
political climate of the 1980’s, US strategic concerns in the region became significant 
enough to commit US economic assistance and military personnel to the Central 
American conflict. According to the authors of Lessons for Contemporary 
Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experiment, between 1980 and 1990, the United 
States spent more than $4.5 billion in El Salvador ($1.3 billion in the form of direct 
military assistance, and over $850 million dollars in unsubsidized credits). In addition, 
author Bruce Hoffman, reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent an 
 
38 Corum, J.S. (1998, Summer). The air war in El Salvador. Aerospace Power Journal, 1. Retrieved 
February 1, 2005, from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/sum98/su98.html 
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estimated $500 million dollars to support the Salvadoran government, promote 
democracy, and prevent the establishment of a communist regime. 39
Prior to President Ronald Reagan’s commitment to provide financial and 
logistical assistance to the government of El Salvador in 1981, ignorance and denial 
among US government officials had shaped American policies without the fidelity 
needed to address El Salvador’ unique counterinsurgency problems.40 In the years that 
followed and aside from the stated objective to contain the spread of communism in 
Central America, US policies in El Salvador continued to lack well-defined, 
comprehensive objectives due to ideological differences between the US administration 
and elements within the Salvadoran regime.41 For example, the United States often saw 
the Government of El Salvador’s tacit adoption of counterinsurgency policies and 
acceptance of diplomatic and financial aid as a willingness to reverse decades of 
undemocratic rule.42 In reality, American policies to modernize the Salvadoran 
institutions often clashed with diplomatic efforts to reform the country’s social 
infrastructure, and antagonized local political factions eager to gain or maintain political 
control.  Through an apparent sin of foreign policy omission, the United States did not 
sufficiently consider the character, culture, and political structure of Salvadoran society, 
which, after decades of rampant corruption and violence, had become habituated to 
subsist within an authoritarian state. Consequently, US military personnel initially 
struggled to help secure a military and social victory for El Salvador due to the lack of a 
comprehensive plan of action by the US government, and the congressionally mandated 
pairing of counterinsurgency strategies with American foreign policy mandates.43  
 
39 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
Counterinsurgency. Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 61. 
40 US Department of State, Central America: Defending Our United Interests, (1983), 4.  The Joint 
Low Intensity Conflict Project (1986) describes the objectives of the Reagan’s comprehensive strategy 
towards El Salvador, 3-5 and 3-6. 
41 Schwarz, B. C. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 73. 
42 Schwarz, B. C. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 72. 
43 Schwarz, B. C. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 81.  
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Nonetheless, the diplomatic relationship between the United States and El 
Salvador evolved and improved over time. Influenced in large part by individual 
personalities, this relationship was also assisted by the ESAF’s open relationship with 
their US counterparts, the propagation of moderate political beliefs within the Salvadoran 
political system, and the insurgency’s inability to achieve large-scale popular support.44 
Only two years after the 1981 deployment of US Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), a 
focus by both US advisors and the El Salvadoran military on the need to use civil affairs 
measures to rebuild Salvadoran society and re-gain public trust had begun.45 With the 
help of US personnel, a National Campaign Plan (NCP) that analyzed Salvadoran 
military strategy, considered the economic aspects of the civil war, and focused on 
helping the civilian population had been developed by the Salvadoran government.46 
Despite continuous and sometimes tense diplomatic relations, the government of El 
Salvador slowly recognized and adjusted to its role in the service of the Salvadoran 
population. However, the social and military complexities of the civil war in El Salvador 
made it clear that democratic success at the political and diplomatic level would not be 
enough. The Armed Forces of El Salvador had traditionally been heavily involved in the 
corrupt and previously authoritarian political process. With the dawning of a civil war, 
the conventionally-minded ESAF faced more than American attempts to institute 




44 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005. Currently a senior officer in the US Naval Intelligence community, he served as chief of a 
technical analysis team upon reporting to El Salvador in 1987. Jose Eduardo Angel, Gen., Retired, 
interview with the author, San Salvador, El Salvador, 29 December 2004. Gen. Angel served as 
Commander of the Atlacatl Battalion until 1992 and was the Vice-Minister of Defense until his retirement 
from the Salvadoran Army in 2000. 
45 Valenzuela, A., Rosello, Victor. (2004, March-April). Expanding Roles and Missions in the War on 
Drugs and Terrorism: El Salvador and Colombia. Military Review, 28.  
46 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
Counterinsurgency. Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 53. 
Despite the fact that COL (Ret.) Waghelstein goes on to describe how the plan experienced very limited 
success, the NCP should be considered a solid example of how American military relations successfully 
resulted in providing both military and non-military assistance to their Salvadoran counterparts. 
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C. ESAF MILITARY CULTURE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS 
A review of available evidence concerning ESAF military culture and US military 
involvement in El Salvador during the civil war indicates that military-to-military 
relations were instrumental in training and modernizing El Salvador’s Armed Forces. The 
following paragraphs will discuss how US logistical, training and collaboration efforts 
with Salvadoran military personnel resulted in an increase in the ESAF’s combat 
effectiveness, and consequently, improved both US and Salvadoran intelligence 
capabilities. Research conducted in support of this case study has validated the previously 
documented fact that prior to the civil war, the ESAF was a predominantly garrison-
bound, moderately effective fighting force that lacked the motivation to look beyond a 
conventional warfighting strategy. Officers serving in the Salvadoran Army felt 
comfortable relying on large set piece maneuvers and artillery support during clashes 
with insurgent groups during the initial stages of the civil war. According to the “Report 
of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team (also known as “The Woerner 
Report”), “only dramatic restructuring and the adoption of more aggressive 
counterinsurgency tactics could turn the Salvadoran military into an effective fighting 
force.”47 More importantly, within the ESAF organization, there was little if any 
connection between intelligence gathering, combat operations, civic action programs, and 
winning popular support.48
From a logistical perspective and based on the initial unwillingness by several 
ESAF senior officers to “change,” US advisers created a parallel military establishment 
within the existing ESAF that was devoid of the prevalent conventional and 
institutionalized mentality.49 US military personnel, some of them still able to recall the 
counterinsurgency lessons learned during the Vietnam War, were quick to encourage 
senior ESAF counterparts to forego large-unit operations and adapt to operations in the 
 
47 Department of Defense, Report of the El Salvador Military Assistance Team (Draft), 16 November 
1981 
48 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
Counterinsurgency. Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 49. 
49 Cesar Sereseres, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 6 May, 2004 and 31 January, 
2005. 
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small, highly mobile units required to find and engage insurgent fighters. The progression 
of the ESAF under US military tutelage eventually culminated in the establishment of 
multiple, US trained and equipped counterinsurgency battalions. Trained by US Army 
Special Forces MTTs, these quick reaction forces were mobilized to fulfill 
counterinsurgency missions while the original Salvadoran forces were relegated to more 
static, infrastructure protection roles.50  
Despite the unrest in El Salvador from 1979 to 1981, the ESAF (which at the time 
numbered approximately 17,000 military and paramilitary personnel) had failed to 
address the need for an expanded officer corps and was only producing 25 to 45 officers 
per year.51 Therefore, in order to support a new counterinsurgency strategy that revolved 
around small unit operations, the ranks of ESAF commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers were strengthened. By 1984, the United States maintained a large training center 
east of the country’s capital city in order to provide Salvadoran recruits basic military 
training.52 US advisers gradually instructed their host-nation counterparts on the 
importance of defeating insurgent forces by military as well as civil means, emphasizing 
the importance of the winning popular support. Varying levels of American political 
support for the government of El Salvador at the diplomatic level routinely affected 
military-to-military relations throughout the civil war. For example, as a matter of policy, 
the American government tied the continuation of US logistical and financial aid to the 
ESAF’s observance and preservation of human rights. Similarly, periods of unpredictable 
or insufficient US funding resulted in ammunition shortages and training stoppages that 
caused established Salvadoran battalions to be overworked or, not work at all.53   
 
50 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
Counterinsurgency. Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 41. 
51 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
Counterinsurgency. Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 39. 
Corum, J.S. (1998, Summer). The air war in El Salvador. Aerospace Power Journal, 14. 
52 Schwarz, B.C. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 20. 
53 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
Counterinsurgency. Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 45. 
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However, despite obstacles in the development of a different military culture, 
strong military-to-military ties between the United States and El Salvador emerged and 
evolved. Through the efforts and perseverance of many US and Salvadoran military 
personnel, the political, cultural, and ideological differences were superseded by 
numerous training successes. The ESAF slowly gained proficiency in counterinsurgency 
operations, thanks to the development of units such as the Long Range Reconnaissance 
Patrols (known is Spanish as PRALs). These units were trained and equipped in Panama 
by the 7th Special Forces Group, accounted for hundreds of guerrilla casualties, and were 
instrumental in the collection of valuable tactical, operational, and strategic level 
intelligence. 54 Moreover, despite training and logistical shortfalls, the proficiency of 
pilots in the Salvadoran Air Force improved with the help of US Air Force advisors and 
was successful in keeping guerrilla forces dispersed.55 Today, former members of the 
ESAF now regard US human rights policies and the sensitivity training provided by the 
US personnel as responsible for humanizing Salvadoran forces during and after the civil 
war.56
The intent of this case study is not to focus entirely on the successes and failures 
that shaped the professional collaboration between US and Salvadoran forces, but to 
present the military-to-military relations formed during the civil war as instrumental in 
the development of improved intelligence capabilities. In order to better understand the 
US military’s challenging but successful development of military-to-military relations 
with ESAF personnel and the subsequent development of a better intelligence 
architecture, the structure and role of the US military adviser program must be discussed 




54 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
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55 Corum, J.S. (1998, Summer). The air war in El Salvador. Aerospace Power Journal, 15. Retrieved 
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D. US ADVISERS IN EL SALVADOR 
The decision by the United States to send military advisers to El Salvador during 
the early years of the civil war in El Salvador was proof of the US administration’s 
commitment to help the government of El Salvador defeat a Marxist insurgency. In 
addition to millions of dollars in financial and logistical aid, the US commitment to El 
Salvador included the assignment of mid-level and senior US military commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers to work directly with Salvadoran counterparts at various 
levels within the ESAF. Although this American detachment was predominantly 
composed of US Army personnel, it included members of every US service branch. With 
images of the increasing commitment of US troops during Vietnam, Congress arbitrarily 
placed a tacit 55-person limit on the number of military members that could be assigned 
at any one time to what became known as the US Military Group El Salvador 
(USMILGPES). 57 In El Salvador, as well as any other country where the United States 
chooses to commit advisers, the number of US personnel assigned is critical. Although 
several publications reviewed for this project state that the assignment of only 55 advisers 
to El Salvador precluded greater MTT deployments, others assert that the intent of 
maintaining a small number of US advisers was instrumental in minimizing the US 
presence while maximizing the opportunities for Salvadorans to solve their own 
problems.58 During the civil war, the number of US advisers in El Salvador commonly 
rose above the 55-member limit. This was due in large part to the constant arrival and 
departure of temporarily assigned personnel who, exempted by Congress from their 
mandated 55- person limit, participated in humanitarian missions, medical efforts, and 
military training teams. According to interviews conducted by the author of this case 
study, the total number of US advisers in El Salvador at any one time averaged 
approximately 200.  
Service tours for assigned US advisers varied in length but in general, averaged 
from 6 to 12 months. In addition to assignment duration, the linguistic capabilities and 
 
57 Valenzuela, A., Rosello, Victor. (2004, March-April). Expanding Roles and Missions in the War on 
Drugs and Terrorism: El Salvador and Colombia. Military Review, 29.  
58 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
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levels of expertise in Latin American affairs fluctuated among US personnel. This fact 
was not lost on senior ESAF officers who often questioned the US commitment to El 
Salvador based on the disparity of leadership experience, personal commitment, and 
professional behavior observed in their American trainers.59 Despite ideological 
differences concerning counterinsurgency doctrine and the ESAF’s prevailing military 
culture, initial Salvadoran perceptions of US interference in host nation affairs gave way 
to years of open and productive military-to-military interaction.60 US military advisers in 
El Salvador provided infantry, artillery, aviation, intelligence, counterinsurgency, and 
civil affairs training to Salvadoran counterparts located throughout ESAF headquarters 
and subordinate commands. Involvement of US advisers in the operations and 
intelligence sections in each one of the ESAF’s six infantry brigades generally motivated 
US-trained and equipped Salvadoran forces to leave their garrisons and proactively 
engage insurgent forces.61 The mission of American advisers in El Salvador was to 
support their Salvadoran counterparts in establishing training programs and to assist in 
decision-making processes regarding military, staff, intelligence, and operational matters. 
62According to Salvadoran officers interviewed for this thesis, US advisers (a.k.a. 
trainers) did not overtly appear to be involved in the planning of overall campaign. 
ESAF’s perception of a bilateral military relationship where US advisers remained 
focused on providing training and logistical support, while strategic planning was left to 
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USMILGPES’ role in establishing military ties with Salvadoran counterparts at 
multiple echelons was critical in an American struggle to professionalize, modernize, and 
train the ESAF to develop better intelligence capabilities. For example, the US decision 
to expand ESAF’s unconventional warfighting capability by creating BIRIs (Immediate 
Reaction Infantry Brigades), while simultaneously assigning advisers at the brigade level 
to assist and report on the process, proved to be one of the decisive factors behind the 
ESAF’s successful engagement of insurgent forces and subsequent collection of 
intelligence.64 The millions of dollars managed by USMILGPES and used to build 
facilities, train forces, and modernize the ESAF’s order of battle impressed Salvadoran 
military officers and removed many doubts concerning the seriousness of the United 
States commitment to El Salvador. According to the four US Army Colonels that wrote 
the report American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, “the 
Salvadoran case shows that the United States can broadly employ the leverage of security 
assistance to redirect behavior.”65  
The improvement of the ESAF’s capabilities and combat readiness as a result of 
USMILGPES’ sponsored training and support was impressive and readily apparent.66 
However, US military involvement in El Salvador was not without its difficulties and 
detractors. For example, despite the fact that both countries share a common hemisphere 
and many Western cultural traits, difficulties encountered by US advisers in trying to 
expand non-commissioned officers ranks or teach human rights underscored some of the 
difficulties encountered when trying to implement institutional changes. Dr. Benjamin 
Schwarz, author of a 1991 RAND report on El Salvador states that American policy 
during the civil war was hampered by the prospect of conditionality. According to 
Schwarz, the US would state publicly that it would withdraw support from the El 
Salvador government if it did not see reform, while continually affirming through policy 
 
64 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005.  
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statements that it would not allow an insurgency to achieve victory in El Salvador.67 The 
author states that the result of this “flawed” policy was evident in American advising 
efforts, which at times deviated from training intended to promote the importance of 
winning national popular support, in order to instill democratic ideals on Salvadorans 
who were content within an authoritarian and polarized society.  
Based on all of the verbal and written accounts reviewed for the purpose of 
compiling this case study, the US military adviser program in El Salvador is collectively 
categorized as a success. The operational vision of many US military personnel assigned 
to El Salvador filled a void created by the uncertainties of US foreign policy and 
established a mutually beneficial military-to-military relationship. Although a review of 
available literature reveals that American advisory efforts to reform the ESAF, convert 
selected Salvadoran forces into capable counterinsurgency units, develop successful civil 
affair programs, and increase intelligence capabilities often achieved mixed results, the 
fact that US advisory efforts also contributed to significant US policy victories cannot be 
denied. In 1981, over 10,000 political murders were committed and linked to units in the 
Salvadoran military and paramilitary forces.68 According to Schwarz report, in 1990 this 
was reduced to 108 such murders. The increasing human rights awareness exhibited by 
the ESAF throughout the civil war must be attributed in large part to the efforts of US 
advisers and should be considered a valuable legacy of the military-to-military relations 
established in El Salvador.69  
US Military Group El Salvador continued to operate until the signing of the peace 
accords in December of 1992.70 Despite language and cultural differences, differences in 
doctrine and military training, and Salvadoran perceptions that often qualified the 
American “can-do” spirit as arrogance, the performance of US advisers in El Salvador is 
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characterized by Former ESAF officers as professional, successful, and prudent. 
Interviews conducted in support of this compilation reveal that Salvadoran officers in 
retrospect feel that without the financial, logistical, and professional help of the United 
States, El Salvador would have fallen into Communist hands.71 The low-key presence of 
US advisers in El Salvador was due in large part to an attempt by the US government to 
limit the number US advisers in El Salvador as a way to avoid endangering American 
personnel and similarly “Americanize” the war. However, despite political and cultural 
constraints, many US advisers were able to recognize that operations in El Salvador had 
to be driven by intelligence, and determined that the ESAF could not develop a 
successful counterinsurgency strategy without the existence of a fully functioning 
intelligence sharing program.   
 
E. US INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION PROGRAMS IN EL SALVADOR 
Like their operational colleagues, US military intelligence personnel were 
assigned by US Southern Command to work directly with their Salvadoran counterparts 
at various echelons within the ESAF.72 US military intelligence personnel were tasked to 
oversee and manage intelligence support to the ESAF and their duties included the 
coordination of analytical efforts, daily briefs to the ESAF general staff, and continuous 
bilateral collaboration with ESAF intelligence personnel. The status of military 
intelligence capabilities of the ESAF were categorized as “grave” by American standards, 
based on the ESAF’s inability to collect, analyze, fuse, and disseminate intelligence.73 
Therefore, initial US intelligence efforts in El Salvador originated in both the Central 
American Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) located at the Pentagon, and US Southern 
Command Headquarters located in Panama. As with any multi-national, military 
operation, initial efforts to coordinate and share intelligence between the Pentagon, US 
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 41
                                                
Southern Command, US personnel in El Salvador, and intelligence personnel within the 
ESAF were difficult and inexpedient.74 An intelligence fusion process that involved 
distinct political and military organizations and a fluid insurgent situation often 
challenged these entities. Moreover, a lack of tactical intelligence, bureaucratized 
reporting and inefficient dissemination methods, often resulted in the production of 
intelligence with broad degrees of usefulness and accuracy.75 Nonetheless, the ability by 
US intelligence personnel to process large volumes of data using multiple technological 
means, and the open relationship steadily established between American and Salvadoran 
personnel, eventually resulted in the production of a common intelligence picture that 
focused on the FMLN.76  
By 1983, the CAJIT and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided target 
folders and aerial platform intelligence support from Panama and Honduras to 
Salvadoran military intelligence units on a regular basis through previously established 
bilateral military relations.77 The intelligence directorate within US Southern Command 
provided strategic intelligence to senior ESAF personnel, while US and Salvadoran 
intelligence personnel on the ground collaborated within advisory teams to support El 
Salvador’s director of military intelligence.78 Similar to operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the United States’ ability to combat unconventional forces in unfamiliar territory 
such as El Salvador was restricted by the US intelligence community’s over-dependence 
on technology. In reference to the limitations of technology in a dynamic combat 
environment, a former US Military Group Commander in El Salvador confirmed that 
“Early on, we [US military advisers] were very much intent upon using platforms almost 
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exclusively, but the effectiveness of those platforms was reduced considerably.”79 
Therefore, in El Salvador, US military intelligence personnel increasingly focused on the 
importance of working with the host nation to determine the methods and tools necessary 
to collect and exploit intelligence in the Salvadoran environment 80  
Based on the dynamics of a counterinsurgency, the intelligence architecture 
established in cooperation with the ESAF during the civil war was fluid but not without 
its flaws. The gradual importance assumed by human intelligence disciplines over 
numerous technological means demanded that experienced US military intelligence 
personnel constantly revise the ways in which intelligence was being collected to ensure 
that these methods remain effective, and more importantly, capable of producing useful 
intelligence.81 Personnel fluctuations within the US military intelligence cadre due to 
congressional limits and scheduled personnel rotations did not go unnoticed by 
Salvadoran counterparts, and made any efforts to maintain analytical as well as 
intellectual continuity within military relationships difficult and critical. Based on the 
unconventional and diffuse nature of the insurgency in El Salvador, initiatives that relied 
too heavily on signals and optical intelligence often achieved poor results.82 In some 
cases, intelligence successfully collected by US intelligence assets during the Salvadoran 
conflict still remained of little operational use, unless properly fused with other 
intelligence disciplines in order to build an accurate and timely intelligence picture.83 
However, according to interviews conducted in support of this project, initiatives such as 
the establishment of Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs) facilitated military-to-military 
relations and with time, proved to be more successful.  
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Regional Intelligence Centers were established by national intelligence agencies 
in specific areas throughout El Salvador and collocated with previously established 
military and law enforcement headquarters.84 Similar in function to present-day US Joint 
Intelligence Centers (JICs), RICs served as centers for the collection, analysis, fusion, 
and dissemination of intelligence. Based on a US need to train Salvadoran intelligence 
officers to carry out critical intelligence preparation of the battlespace and multi-
intelligence discipline analysis, RICs became the cornerstone in a valuable effort to 
develop actionable intelligence, extend intelligence efforts, increase intelligence 
capabilities, and support decision-makers. RIC operators provided valuable information 
that was disseminated throughout ESAF and US intelligence channels. In any military-to-
military relationship, trust between nations and credibility are paramount. RICs became 
places where Salvadoran and US personnel collaborated to produce intelligence that 
could be used at the tactical level quickly and without bureaucratic delay.85 Of note, the 
staffing of regional intelligence centers (RICs) and USMILGPES with US military 
personnel that belonged to the same military service and military occupational specialty, 
provided a common organizational and professional denominator, and unintentionally 
provided an additional link between strategic (USMILGPES) and operational (RICs) 
level military operations. The successful analysis conducted by US and Salvadoran 
intelligence units demonstrated the importance of validating and tailoring intelligence 
products to the ongoing conflict and the needs of the host nation counterpart.86 An 
analysis of the intelligence-sharing relationship between the United States and El 
Salvador shows that careless dissemination of intelligence products derived from 
technologically advanced intelligence platforms can often surpass the host nation’s 
capability to process these products. For example, the dissemination of imagery laden 
target folders to host nation counterparts by US personnel may at first appear to be 
helpful, but in the end, prove useless against a decentralized insurgency that does not 
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hold terrain or maintain an order of battle. In El Salvador, developing an intelligence 
program was only part of a successful intelligence cooperation solution; determining the 
use of intelligence once it was collected was the other part, and perhaps the most 
important part of addressing the needs of the Salvadoran forces.87 Every intelligence 
piece has value; the challenge is finding its usefulness and integrating it into its proper 
place. It is the successful combination of intelligence assets and customer needs in El 
Salvador that eventually exemplified the importance of tailoring the intelligence provided 
to the needs and capabilities of the host nation. Notwithstanding the high demand US and 
Salvadoran decision-makers placed on intelligence during the civil war, research also 
reveals that the military-to-military relationships within the RICs often surpassed 
strategic level, technology based, intelligence efforts by facilitating the attack of 
insurgents with fused and timely intelligence products at the tactical level.   
During the civil war in El Salvador, a majority of the US intelligence support 
provided to the ESAF originated from two strategic sources: US national intelligence 
agencies working within El Salvador and the CAJIT.88 At the tactical and operational 
level, personnel assigned to US national intelligence agencies operated within El 
Salvador as both the administrators and financial backers of intelligence collection 
platforms such as the AC-130 aircraft, the PRALs, and RICs with varying levels of 
success.89 Likewise, the CAJIT actively modified their targeting support and rearranged 
organizational structures to improve tactical situation reports and produce actionable 
intelligence products.90 The lengthy development of capable military-to-military relations 
appear to have taken its toll on attempts by multiple US national agencies to 
simultaneously develop a responsive intelligence architecture in El Salvador. Personal 
interviews conducted in support of this case study reveal that only after approximately 
five years following President Reagan’s 1981 commitment to the government of El 
 
87 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005. 
88 Cesar Sereseres, phone interview with the author, Monterey, California, 14 March 2005. Jose 
Eduardo Angel, Gen., Retired, interview with the author, San Salvador, El Salvador, 29 December 2004. 
89 Cesar Sereseres, phone interview with the author, Monterey, California, 14 March 2005. 
90 Cesar Sereseres, phone interview with the author, Monterey, California, 14 March 2005. 
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Salvador, were the rules governing the American-Salvadoran military relationship 
considered sufficiently modified by US military advisers to permit a welcoming and 
nurturing intelligence sharing relationship.91  
The intelligence sharing relationship established with the United States military 
personnel motivated ESAF personnel to eventually reject political rumors and 
unsubstantiated reports in favor of professional analysis. However, a constant supply of 
US intelligence support also inadvertently caused Salvadoran military personnel to 
become dependent on US intelligence support. In fact, within the military-to-military 
relationship established between the United States and El Salvador, the demonstrated 
capability of US intelligence products during the Salvadoran conflict became a new form 
of US political currency. Based on the ESAF’s growing dependency on US intelligence 
support, some US military advisers and politicians saw the control and disclosure of 
potent US intelligence products as a way to influence Salvadoran counterparts.92 The use 
of intelligence as a way to force change within the ESAF clouded the effectiveness of 
military-to-military relationships by unwittingly calling into question Salvadoran desires 
for reform. Fortunately, the use of intelligence by American advisers as a way to 
positively motivate Salvadoran counterparts to become more capable in the battlefield 
seems to have eventually become the norm.93 The improvement of means by which the 
United States provided strategic intelligence to the ESAF, the eventual establishment of 
rules governing bilateral agreements, and the proper administration of intelligence inside 
and outside El Salvador proved to be essential to American and Salvadoran cooperation 
and ultimately reinforced military-to-military relations. 
Enough research has been conducted in support of this case study to determine 
that military-to-military relations between the United States and El Salvador were a 
vehicle for improved intelligence sharing. An analysis of available classified and 
unclassified information demonstrates that through military-to-military relations, the 
ESAF significantly improved its military and intelligence infrastructure. Although the 
 
91 Cesar Sereseres, phone interview with the author, Monterey, California, 14 March 2005. 
92 Cesar Sereseres, phone interview with the author, Monterey, California, 14 March 2005. 
93 Cesar Sereseres, phone interview with the author, Monterey, California, 14 March 2005. 
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intelligence capabilities and procedures used by the United States in El Salvador 
frequently changed based on a dynamic military and political climate, the military-to-
military relationships established between US and Salvadoran military and intelligence 
professionals during the 1980’s and early 1990’s provided common ground and endured. 
The physical presence of US military personnel in ESAF operations centers and brigade 
headquarters was key and fostered the effective fusion of intelligence. This improvement 
in intelligence capabilities was also based on efforts by both US military intelligence 
professionals and their Salvadoran counterparts to maintain a direct and open working 
relationship.94 In fact, US intelligence personnel stationed in El Salvador during the civil 
war enjoyed great access within the ESAF once US motives and participation within the 
intelligence process were accepted by Salvadoran counterparts.95 The importance of 
defining the intelligence needs of the host nation, the value of proactively identifying a 
counterpart’s intelligence capabilities, and the benefit of a decent and open military-to-
military relationship are credited by those interviewed for this report as essential to US 
efforts during the civil war in El Salvador. The author of this project assesses that the 
application of these lessons to military-to-military relations today can increase the 
opportunities for US operational and intelligence success in the future.  
 
F. CONCLUSION  
For the United States, El Salvador’s legacy reappears in Iraq like the ghost of 
nation-building past, at a time when American instruments of policy once again find 
themselves actively supporting a government’s struggle against a violent insurgent force. 
El Salvador has been one of many stops along the contentious path of American nation-
building efforts. The parallels drawn by cases such as that of El Salvador can provide a 
pragmatic opportunity to analyze past, present, and future US military involvement in 
foreign soil, and plan for what appears to be a recurring nation-building mission. As  
 
 
94 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005. 
95 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005. 
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IV. COLOMBIA: INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 
SHARING IN THE PRESENT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
American foreign policy, the quality of a host nation’s military force, and 
operational security are several key issues that must be considered, often concurrently, 
when evaluating any military-to-military relationship and/or information sharing 
program. This case study analyzes the role of military-to-military relations between 
American and Colombian personnel as a vehicle for information sharing, in the context of 
Colombia’s battle against insurgent forces. Although open source reporting constantly 
refers to an intelligence sharing agreement between the United States and Colombia, 
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) officially describes its relationship 
with Colombian counterparts as a mutual sharing of information.96 For the purposes of 
this chapter, relations between the United States and Colombia will be referred to as 
either information or intelligence sharing agreements based directly on the terminology 
used by the referenced source. When not specifically citing a reference source, the 
relationship between the United States and Colombia will be cited as an information 
sharing agreement in deference to guidance set by the Foreign Disclosure Office 
USSOUTHCOM. A discussion of the military-to-military relationship between the 
United States and Colombia is limited by the security classifications associated with any 
type of active intelligence or information sharing agreement and the inherent sensitivity 
of ongoing political and military relations. Although these factors preclude the 
unclassified use of very detailed examples to describe relations with US host nations such 
as Colombia, enough research has been conducted in support of this case study to 
determine that military-to-military relations between the United States and Colombia 
have been, and continue to be, a vehicle for improving intelligence and information 
sharing.  
 
96  Interview of USSOUTHCOM Foreign Disclosure Office (FDO) personnel conducted by the author, 
USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005.  
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In situations where US personnel are limited in the amount of information they 
can share with host nation personnel due to security classification protocols, this case 
study advocates the use of military-to-military relations as a medium by which a host 
nation’s cooperation can be reciprocated. For example, US military personnel can 
acknowledge the information provided by their host nation counterparts by establishing 
programs designed to improve the host nation’s intelligence capabilities. The creation of 
programs in which host nation information sharing gestures are answered with programs 
that encourage military personnel from both countries to train and answer intelligence 
requirements together, fosters feelings of trust between counterparts and can lead to 
future and more meaningful exchanges of information. A review of US and Colombian 
military-to-military relations also demonstrates that US personnel can be in a unique 
position to recognize, and if necessary, sensitize Colombian counterparts to the counter-
productive nature of risk-averse behavior, and prevent this behavior from becoming an 
obstacle to better information sharing opportunities. As previously documented in the 
Salvadoran case study, military-to-military relationships between US and Colombian 
personnel have thrived when they have remained free from the effects of political 
agendas and when information was not used as currency to reward or punish non-
conformity to US policy. Finally, Colombia’s use of police forces as well as the existence 
of non-military, national security forces, and police officers in neighboring countries such 
as Costa Rica and Panama serve as a reminder that military-to-military relationships 
should not be limited to military entities. The following review of American and 
Colombian policies is designed to introduce the institutions involved in information 
sharing, and to later describe how the United States and Colombia can use military-to-
military relations, information sharing, and the recommendations listed above to mutually 
strengthen their ongoing security relationship. 
 
B. US POLICIES IN COLOMBIA  
Colombia is the fourth largest country in South America and its geography 
extends from remote jungle hinterlands to the lofty peaks of the Andes Mountains.97 The 
 
97  Compton’s Interactive Encyclopedia Deluxe, 1998, The Learning Company, Inc., Colombia. 
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primary insurgent threat in Colombia is attributed to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Over the years, these 
insurgent forces along with other illegally armed groups (IAGs) have targeted civilians 
for kidnapping, coerced coca-leaf growers into surrendering their illicit crops, and 
subjected commercial farmers to illegal taxation of their farming profits.98 Moreover, 
media reports detail how FARC and ELN forces routinely attack police stations, private 
and public enterprises, national infrastructure, and military installations throughout the 
country on a daily basis. In addition to the insurgent threat, an initially pro-government 
paramilitary force known as the Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) has been 
operating since the 1970’s. Originally established to protect the personal and financial 
interests of wealthy Colombian landowners, the AUC have now asserted themselves as a 
political and military force. Membership estimates for the FARC, ELN, and paramilitary 
army vacillate among official and unofficial sources. However, the combined combat 
power of these forces is consistently regarded by Colombian military sources and 
USSOUTHCOM personnel to be large enough to sporadically control multiple sectors of 
the country at any given time.99  
In 1989, the President of the United States George H. Bush promoted intelligence 
sharing as part of a broader militarization of America’s war on drugs.100 In an effort to 
eradicate a resilient drug trade and increase their combat capabilities, the Colombian 
government formally requested the assistance of the United States in February of 
1990.101 In a meeting with the President of the United States, the leaders of Bolivia, Peru, 
and Colombia agreed to exchange American economic aid for increased regional efforts 
 
98 Getting in Deeper: The United States’ growing involvement in Colombia’s conflict. Adam Isacson. 
February 2000. The Center for International Policy. ISSN 0738-6508, pp.3. 
99  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
100 U.S. Drug Policy & Intelligence Operations in the Andes. Michael L. Evans. June 2001. The 
Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Project. Reproduced courtesy of Foreign Policy in Focus—A Think Tank 
Without Walls. Retrieved August 26, 2004 from 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2001/body_v6n22andes.html  
101  Ratte, Jr, J.E. (2002). United States Drug Enforcement Policy in Colombia: Conflict of Priorities 
in Controlling the Flow of Cocaine to the United States. National Defense University, National War 
College. Washington D.C.: U.S., pp. 3. 
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to defeat the drug trade. Nonetheless, in the years following this meeting, US personnel 
working in cooperation with Colombian authorities were not allowed to transfer 
information on guerrilla activity if it was not specifically related to counter-drug 
operations. Terms like “Narco-Terror” and “Narco-Guerrillas” began to emerge, making 
it even more difficult for US personnel to consistently differentiate between counter-drug 
and counter-insurgency support. In 1993, the Presidential Administration of William J. 
Clinton published Presidential Decision Directive 14, which resulted in an Air Bridge 
Denial Program that since 1995 has used military intelligence and civilian assets to track 
suspect aircraft throughout the Andean region.102 According to Adam Isacson, author of 
an International Report detailing the United States’ growing involvement in Colombia’s 
conflict, a meeting between US Defense Secretary William Cohen and his Colombian 
counterpart in December of 1998 laid the groundwork for the expansion of joint military 
cooperation. Under provisions of the National Authorization Act, over thirty Special 
Forces teams deployed to Colombia in 1999 and were responsible for the training of over 
1,500 Colombian forces.103 During the same year, US guidelines were expanded to allow 
the dissemination of intelligence related to guerrilla activity within known drug 
producing regions.104  
General Peter Pace, Commander of USSOUTHCOM from 2000 to 2001, 
recognized the need to exchange information with other countries and testified before a 
congressional committee in March of 2001 that the ability to execute effective operations 
was hampered by restrictions on sharing data with our partner nations. Furthermore, he 
recommended that the United States should “streamline sharing procedures that are 
 
102  U.S. Drug Policy & Intelligence Operations in the Andes. Michael L. Evans. June 2001. The 
Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Project. Reproduced courtesy of Foreign Policy in Focus—A Think Tank 
Without Walls. Retrieved August 26, 2004 from 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2001/body_v6n22andes.html
103 Getting in Deeper: The United States’ growing involvement in Colombia’s conflict. Adam Isacson. 
February 2000. The Center for International Policy. ISSN 0738-6508, pp.5. 
104  U.S. Drug Policy & Intelligence Operations in the Andes. Michael L. Evans. June 2001. The 
Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Project. Reproduced courtesy of Foreign Policy in Focus—A Think Tank 
Without Walls. Retrieved August 26, 2004 from 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2001/body_v6n22andes.html
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currently used for time sensitive counter-drug information.”105 Following the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the political belief that drugs and 
terrorism in Colombia were a threat to hemispheric security intermeshed with an 
increased awareness by the United States of terrorism’s global reach.106 In the past, 
Congress had repeatedly resisted expanding the role of US forces in Colombia based on 
accounts of human rights violations by Colombian forces and reports of collusion 
between right-wing paramilitaries and the Colombian military.107 However, Colombian 
President Andres Pastrana’s labeling of the FARC as “terrorists” in February of 2002 
further compelled the US administration to contemplate an increased role in Colombia.108 
By spring of 2002, legislative efforts were underway at the behest of United States’ 
President George W. Bush to petition Congress for “expanded authority” to utilize US aid 
to Colombia as part of an American campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist 
activities.109 Based on the drafting of a new National Security Directive and after 
Congressional consideration, this re-definition of the Colombian conflict was approved 
under new guidelines governing the foreign disclosure of US intelligence and in support 
of efforts to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism.110 In addition, the FARC, ELN, and 
AUC were officially designated by the United States Secretary of State as Foreign 
 
105  U.S. Drug Policy & Intelligence Operations in the Andes. Michael L. Evans. June 2001. The 
Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Project. Reproduced courtesy of Foreign Policy in Focus—A Think Tank 
Without Walls. Retrieved August 26, 2004 from 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2001/body_v6n22andes.html
106 Scarborough, R. (2003 December 8). U.S. Helps Colombia Take Down Guerrillas. The 
Washington Times. Retrieved July 29, 2004 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/nationa/20031208-
123627-3411r.htm.  
107 DeYoung, K. (2002 February 22) Colombia to get Aid in Fighting Insurgents; U.S. Will Increase 
Intelligence-Sharing. The Washington Post, pp.A17. 
108 DeYoung, K. (2002 February 22) Colombia to get Aid in Fighting Insurgents; U.S. Will Increase 
Intelligence-Sharing. The Washington Post, pp.A17. 
109  Testimony of Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 
Department of Defense, April 11, 2002. Retrieved April 5, 2005, from 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02041104.htm and 
http://www.house.gov/internationalrelations/rodm0411.htm
110 Scarborough, R. (2003, December 8). U.S. Helps Colombia Take Down Guerrillas. The 
Washington Times. Retrieved July 29, 2004 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/nationa/20031208-
123627-3411r.htm.  
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Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).111 During his tenure as Commander of USSOUTHCOM, 
General James Hill labeled the activities of Colombian narco-terrorists as one of the 
threats against US national security and enemies of democratic reform.112 Following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and as it stands today, American foreign policy in 
Colombia reflects the ongoing effort of the United States to defeat terrorism worldwide.  
Despite the general desire by the Colombian Military (COLMIL) to bring the 
conflict to a decisive end, the national government struggles with limited resources due to 
ongoing budgetary constraints. The fight against crime and terrorism has bolstered the 
Colombian government’s quest for lasting peace and steady economic progress. Charges 
of corruption, human rights abuses, and paramilitary involvement against Colombian 
authorities have resulted in safeguards to insure that the dissemination of information 
generated from US/Colombia sharing agreements is carefully monitored. To the United 
States, American involvement in Colombia is seen as a way to safeguard military and 
economic interests within the Andean region, and more importantly the Western 
Hemisphere. Regardless of opinion or terminology, current US policy has recognized the 
overlap of Colombian drugs and terrorism, and in concert with the American 
commitment to destroy global terrorism, all but guarantees that the sharing of information 
between the US and Colombia will continue indefinitely.  
 
C. COLMIL CULTURE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY-TO-
MILITARY RELATIONS  
Research and interviews conducted in support of this case study reveal that, 
overall, the military-to-military relationship between Colombian and US military 
personnel has served as a very good medium to acquire and exchange information. 
Comments by General Bantz Craddock during his Senate confirmation hearing as 
Commander of USSOUTHCOM in 2004 demonstrated his commitment to “maintain and 
 
111 Sullivan, M.P. (2005). Latin America: Terrorism Issues (Congressional Research Service [CRS] 
Report for Congress Order Code RS21049). Washington D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress. 
112  US Southern Command (SouthCom) Struggles to Justify its Role in the War on Terror. Equipo 
Nizkor. September 2004. Retrieved on March 22, 2005 from 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/terror/counter.html. The analysis was prepared by Eleanor Thomas and 
Lindsay Thomas, COHA Research Associates, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington, D.C. 
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broaden our (US) consistent military-to-military contacts as means of irrevocably 
institutionalizing the professional nature of those militaries with which we have worked 
so closely over the past several decades.”113 The composition of the Colombian Army 
has in fact, changed rapidly over the last fifteen years and resulted in a more professional 
and more educated military organization.114 US personnel familiar with the COLMIL 
characterize it as comprised of conscripts who in some cases have surpassed challenging 
entrance requirements, succeeded in receiving quality training, and gradually earned 
better payment for their service.115 The Colombian Non-Commissioned Officer Corps 
has a centralized education system, and in 2005 implemented a Command Sergeant 
Major promotion system.116  
The increased professionalism of the younger members of the Colombian military 
forces has encouraged better military-to-military relations with their US counterparts. 
Nonetheless, many senior Colombian officers still cling to outmoded military traditions 
that socially and professionally segregate enlisted troops from officers. Interviews of US 
personnel directly involved in military-to-military relationships with Colombian 
counterparts state that sometimes operational tempo, inter-service cooperation and the 
sharing of information can be easily degraded by the selfish aspects of the old COLMIL 
culture.117 According to these sources, a desire to preserve situational status quo, existing 
turf battles, and competitiveness amongst service peers have been enough to prevent 
some Colombian personnel from sharing information with each other, and more 
importantly, developing and fusing the available information into intelligence 
 
113  US Southern Command (SouthCom) Struggles to Justify its Role in the War on Terror. Equipo 
Nizkor. September 2004. Retrieved on March 22, 2005 from 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/terror/counter.html  
114 Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim “Ranger” Roach, USA on April 10, 2005. 
COL Roach is a former commander of 7th Special Forces Group and was also assigned to Colombia as a US 
Defense Attaché from 1990-1992. Currently, COL Roach works in Colombia as a US Embassy liaison.  
115 Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim “Ranger” Roach, on April 10, 2005. 
116 Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim “Ranger” Roach, on April 10, 2005. 
117  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
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products.118 Notwithstanding, US personnel who have witnessed these types of relations 
consider themselves to be in a unique position to not just recognize, but if necessary, 
sensitize Colombian counterparts to the counterproductive nature of this risk-averse 
behavior, and the benefits of maintaining the lines of information exchange open.  
The execution of joint operations has also proven to be a challenge to the military 
culture of the continuously expanding COLMIL. The difficulties imposed by lingering 
inter-service rivalries have increased the level of difficulty already associated with joint 
operations and in some cases, hampered the free exchange of information between 
countries. Efforts to achieve joint interoperability are being made thanks to the 
reorganization of the COLMIL under President Alvaro Uribe Velez, a slow but self-
imposed shift in the Colombian institutional mindset, and the US sponsored enhancement 
of Colombian military and technological capabilities.119 For, example, Colombian 
military divisions and their staffs have been reorganized to accommodate the 
participation of the Colombian Army, Navy, and Air Force. Moreover, the Colombian 
military commander has also been directed to reorganize the COLMIL into more capable 
joint regional commands.120 As noted by William B. Wood, US ambassador to Colombia 
in 2004, “the cooperation and coordination between US and Colombian forces could be 
better, and within the COLMIL, rivalries between forces jeopardize efforts to coordinate 
operations and share resources.”121
 
D. US TRAINERS IN COLOMBIA  
The goal of American military trainers in Colombia is to empower their foreign 
counterparts with an ability to build up their country’s capabilities. It has been a process 
of long term engagement founded on a history of personal ties and relationships. 
 
118  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
119  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
120 Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim (Ranger) Roach, on April 10, 2005. 
121  Statement of William B. Wood, US Ambassador to Colombia during the retirement of Colombian 
Flag Officers on October 14, 2004. Retrieved on March 22, 2005 from 
http://usembassy.state.gov/colombia/wwws0076.shtml
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Presently, joint military cooperation and training seems to be aimed at the elimination of 
the insurgents and narco-traffickers residing in remote drug producing areas of Colombia. 
Since 2000, The United States government has provided the government of Colombia 
with approximately $2.6 billon dollars of logistical and financial aid within a foreign 
assistance package called PLAN COLOMBIA.122 A large majority of this aid has arrived 
in Colombia in the form of equipment and the military advice needed to combat narco-
traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries and resulted in the creation of three mountain 
battalions, two mobile brigades, twelve special forces anti-terrorist teams, three anti-
kidnapping squadrons, twelve rifle squadrons, and substantial increases in personnel 
serving within the Colombian military and police forces.123 A July 2004 article by 
Washington Times’ journalist Rowan Scarborough stated that the current US 
administration’s expanded role for military trainers in Colombia “has started to pay 
dividends with the capture and killing of senior guerrilla leaders in Colombia.” 124
Based on unclassified sources, the number of US military personnel maintaining 
an American presence in Colombia since the 1990’s has averaged between 250 and 300, 
consisting mostly of Army and Navy personnel. 125 In 2002, Congress passed a law 
expanding US involvement in Colombia. This legislation authorized an increase in the 
number of military trainers involved in support of Plan Colombia, from 400 to 800 by 
2004.126 These numbers did not include the participation of approximately 600 civilian 
contractors, US law enforcement personnel, and US Government Service employees.127 
 
122  Colombia: No Estamos Solicitando Tropas Extranjeras. Guarino Caicedo. March 2005. El Diario 
La Prensa On-line. Retrieved on March 18, 2005 from http://eldiariolaprensa.com/noticias
123  Colombia: No Estamos Solicitando Tropas Extranjeras. Guarino Caicedo. March 2005. El Diario 
La Prensa On-line. Retrieved on March 18, 2005 from http://eldiariolaprensa.com/noticias
124 Scarborough, R. (2003, December 8). U.S. Helps Colombia Take Down Guerrillas. The 
Washington Times. Retrieved July 29, 2004 from http://www.washingtontimes.com/nationa/20031208-
123627-3411r.htm.  
125 Getting in Deeper: The United States’ growing involvement in Colombia’s conflict. Adam Isacson. 
February 2000. The Center for International Policy. ISSN 0738-6508, pp.2.      
126  Interview with Major Jose Roodettes, USAF, conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 22 March 2005. Information also available in the online article US Southern 
Command (SouthCom) Struggles to Justify its Role in the War on Terror. Equipo Nizkor. September 2004. 
Retrieved on March 22, 2005 from http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/terror/counter.html    
127 Hearing from the House Government Reform Committee on The War, Drugs and Thugs: A Status 
Report on Plan Colombia Successes and Remaining Challenges, June 17, 2004, pp.34. 
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Much of the day-to-day military training of Colombian military elements is primarily 
carried out by the US Army’s 7th Special Forces Group based in Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina. Referred to as “instructors” and/or “trainers,” these service members train 
Colombian counterparts in counter-drug detection, reconnaissance, indirect fire, light 
infantry tactics, medical skills, human rights, and intelligence-gathering techniques.128
The United States Military Group in Colombia (USMILGROUPCO) administers 
USSOUTHCOM initiatives within Colombia and oversees operational, logistic, and 
training developments within the COLMIL on a regular basis, enjoying a close and well-
established relationship with its Colombian counterparts.129 The USMILGROUP 
Commander maintains relationships with US Embassy, USSOUTHCOM, and Colombian 
military headquarters personnel and is required to oversee the flow of people both 
visiting and on assignment to Colombia. US sponsored military training also occurs 
through Planning and Assistance Training Teams (PAT Teams). These operational teams 
are composed of experienced US military and civilian personnel and are tasked to help 
Colombian tactical-level commanders identify and resolve training deficiencies at the 
division level.130 In addition to deploying with host nation commanders and assisting 
them with the development of the training plans necessary to improve Colombian 
battlefield capabilities, imbedded PAT Team members and trainers are able to observe, 
analyze, and report first hand on the condition of the Colombian military system.131 In 
several Colombian departments, the reported cooperation between several American 
agencies and Colombian forces has resulted in the positive advance of an “important 
 
128 Getting in Deeper: The United States’ growing involvement in Colombia’s conflict. Adam Isacson. 
February 2000. The Center for International Policy. ISSN 0738-6508 P.5 and statement of General Charles 
E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander, US Southern Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 
March 2000. 
129  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
130  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
131  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
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campaign against numerous targets.”132 Reminiscent of the allocation of US personnel 
seen in El Salvador, the establishment of a US military group within the host nation, the 
deployment of mobile assistance teams, and the assignment of trainers at division and/or 
brigade levels within the COLMIL, has improved the ability of both Colombian and 
American military personnel to coordinate and exchange information.  
 
E. US INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAMS IN COLOMBIA  
The information sharing program between the United States and Colombia is 
described by USSOUTHCOM personnel as an American military and political effort to 
help Colombian military personnel help themselves. Through the years, this information 
sharing program has evolved to help Colombian personnel communicate better with each 
other and with other units in the field.133 A review of some of the initiatives and methods 
by which the United States and Colombia have shared information is useful to 
demonstrate the role of military-to-military relations in bilateral efforts to improve their 
strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence picture. 
An early showpiece of the US/Colombia intelligence partnership during the 
1990’s was the Colombian Joint Intelligence Center (COJIC). During its existence, this 
center operated in the FARC-contested area of Tres Esqinas, in the province of Caqueta, 
and was co-located with a US-trained counter-narcotics battalion and what is now 
designated as the 6th Colombian Army (COLAR) division headquarters.134 Despite the 
protests of people who saw its existence as a challenge to Colombian sovereignty, the 
COJIC supported Colombian authorities with real-time targeting information, terrain and 
weather analysis, force protection vulnerability assessments, and intelligence 
estimates.135 In statements made in March of 2000, the Commander of USSOUTHCOM 
 
132  Statement of William B. Wood, US Ambassador to Colombia during the retirement of Colombian 
Flag Officers on October 14, 2004. Retrieved on March 22, 2005 from 
http://usembassy.state.gov/colombia/wwws0076.shtml  
133  Interview of USSOUTHCOM Foreign Disclosure Office (FDO) personnel conducted by the 
author, USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005.  
134  Phone interview of Colombia Desk Officer, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pentagon, 23 March 2005. 
135 Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 March 2000. 
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General Wilhelm stated that the goal of the COJIC was to provide Colombian armed 
forces and police units with quality, integrated intelligence support.136 Following the 
reorganization of Colombian forces in recent years and based on a decision to operate 
against the FARC in other remote areas, the COJIC at Tres Esquinas was eventually 
closed. However, bilateral analysis continues, since most of its intelligence assets have 
been transferred to support operations at Colombian Joint Task Force (JTF) Omega and 
Colombian Army Regional Intelligence Center 8 (RIME 8) in Florencia, the capital city 
of Caqueta.137  
In early 2000, open source reports stated that five US radar facilities had been 
installed in Colombian territory to assist national forces with the detection of drug-
smuggling activity.138 US presence and assistance at these sites was reported to have 
been capable of providing “real-time” aerial tracking assistance to the Colombian 
authorities and was said to have been instrumental in the interdiction of drug smuggling 
planes since 1990.139 Thanks to the development of special intelligence handling caveats, 
the US Department of Defense through the National Geospacial Intelligence Agency 
provides detailed maps, while the National Security Agency monitors communications 
and electronic signals.140 If needed, operational planning, coordination and supervision 
can be carried out at SOUTHCOM or at Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-
SOUTH), which housed the now defunct Joint Southern Surveillance and 
 
136  Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 March 2000. 
137 Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim “Ranger” Roach, on April 10, 2005. 
138 Getting in Deeper: The United States’ growing involvement in Colombia’s conflict. Adam Isacson. 
February 2000. The Center for International Policy. ISSN 0738-6508, pp.2. 
139  Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee 7, March 2000. 
140 U.S. Drug Policy & Intelligence Operations in the Andes. Michael L. Evans. June 2001. The 
Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Project. Reproduced courtesy of Foreign Policy in Focus—A Think Tank 
Without Walls. Retrieved August 26, 2004 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2001/body_v6n22andes.html
 61
                                                
Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) and was responsible for the fusion and 
dissemination of aerial, ground, and radar intelligence.141
The information sharing relationship between the United States and Colombian 
military has not been without its problems. In an effort to mitigate deeper US 
involvement and American casualties, current US policy regarding Colombia defers to 
the host country’s security forces as the agents responsible for acting on any produced 
intelligence. This can result in a limitation on the amount of control the United States has 
on provided information and in the past has resulted in tragedy. In the spring of 2001, the 
Bush Administration suspended intelligence flights over Colombia after an air force jet in 
neighboring Peru, acting on US intelligence, fired on a civilian aircraft suspected of 
smuggling drugs, killing an American missionary and her daughter.142 However, by the 
end of 2003, Colombia had resumed a thoroughly vetted and robustly staffed Air Bridge 
Denial Program that in the last two years has been directly responsible for the seizure of 
over ten metric tons of cocaine.143 US military commitments abroad have put a greater 
demand on the limited US intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets normally 
assigned to track the increasing threat of terrorism and drug trafficking activity in 
Colombia. According to General Craddock, “the means to achieve persistent Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) presence throughout the entire area of operations 
(AOR) remains a concern.144 Critics of US involvement in Colombia see the ongoing 
drug and insurgent violence throughout Colombia as yet another opportunity to tie down 
already heavily committed American forces and capabilities. Moreover, accusations of 
inappropriate and irresponsible involvement of US personnel in Colombia continue to be 
 
141 U.S. Drug Policy & Intelligence Operations in the Andes. Michael L. Evans. June 2001. The 
Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Project. Reproduced courtesy of Foreign Policy in Focus—A Think Tank 
Without Walls. Retrieved August 26, 2004 from 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2001/body_v6n22andes.html   
142 Evans, M. (2001, April 23). Shootdown in Peru: The Secret U.S. Debate Over Intelligence Sharing 
with Peru and Colombia. The National Security Archive. Retrieved March 8, 2004, from 
http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB44/index2.html
143  Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Commander US Southern Command before the 
109th Congress House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2005. 
144 Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Commander US Southern Command before the 
109th Congress House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2005. 
 62
                                                
levied against American officials as reports that Colombian military and civilian 
individuals with established ties to US intelligence organizations have been found guilty 
of corruption, bribery, state-sponsored terrorism, and human rights abuses.     
The information cited above reveals a complex and gradually evolving security 
relationship in which Colombian President Uribe’s administration has risen to the 
counterinsurgency challenge, and the United States has been accepted as a committed 
ally. Recently, military-to-military relations between the United States and Colombia 
have been responsible for the establishment of training methods designed to increase the 
quantity and quality of information exchanged between the two countries.145 For 
example, military-to-military relations have been instrumental in the establishment of 
electronic collaboration networks and tools that allow Colombian and US forces to share 
information in faster and easier ways, across great geographic distances and throughout 
multiple command echelons within the COLMIL.146 Moreover, software programs such 
as Falcon View Mapping and efforts to develop imagery mapping indexes, have been 
identified by sources as systems that show potential to be of great utility to US and 
Colombian forces in the future.147
The global nature of the war on terrorism and the logistical limitations of US 
forces make it difficult for the United States to establish a significant military presence in 
multiple places at once for extended periods of time. Therefore, information sharing 
programs between the United States and Colombia as described above are notable 
examples of how military-to-military relations and subsequent information sharing 
practices can act as a force multiplier by addressing US foreign policy concerns at the 
source. However, in addition to politics and the quality of a military force, significant 
operational security issues must be considered when using military-to-military 
relationships as a vehicle for improved intelligence or information sharing. 
 
145  Interview of USSOUTHCOM Foreign Disclosure Office (FDO) personnel conducted by the 
author, USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005.  
146  Interview of USSOUTHCOM Foreign Disclosure Office (FDO) personnel conducted by the 
author, USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005 and statement of General Charles 
E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command before the Senate Caucus on 
International Narcotics Control, 21September 1999. 
147 Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim (Ranger) Roach, on April 10, 2005. 
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F. THE REALITIES OF AN ACTIVE INFORMATION AND 
INTELLIGENCE SHARING PROGRAM  
An information sharing relationship between the United States and any foreign 
country (to include Colombia) is dependent on many foreign disclosure laws, handling 
policies, and security protocols. The exchange of highly classified intelligence or 
sensitive information between two parties is always subject to compromise based on the 
risks inherent to the careless handling of the intelligence, the potentially corrupt nature of 
the individuals involved, and the possible use of shared information for unauthorized 
purposes. As a result, American willingness to support nations in distress such as 
Colombia is continuously put to the test when the bilateral flow of information within 
these military-to-military relations is frustrated by American inabilities to turn over 
information based on the security classification of the source. The foreign disclosure 
process managed by US intelligence agencies is notoriously complex and slow, and has 
been categorized in many cases by persons interviewed for this case study as an 
impediment to military-to-military relations. Therefore, in many cases the ability of US 
intelligence professionals to reciprocate the intelligence and information sharing gestures 
made by certain host nations must unfortunately be regarded as limited.    
Throughout the Colombian conflict, COLMIL personnel have experienced 
significant operational security problems and lapses.148 Therefore, US personnel are 
often unable to substantially reciprocate the host nation’s information sharing gesture due 
to restrictions correctly imposed by US foreign disclosure laws. These laws have been 
designed to prevent the compromise of sensitive intelligence materials due to 
carelessness, corruption, espionage, and ignorance.  Unfortunately, these limitations in 
many cases also prevent military-to-military relations from becoming truly bilateral, and 
complicate the development of trust associated with the delicate exchange of information. 
This stumbling block has been recognized by General Craddock, who in testimony before 
Congress, identified the United States’ inability to “share sensitive intelligence 
information with US interagency partners and with partner nations in a timely manner” as 
 
148 Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim (Ranger) Roach, on April 10, 2005. 
 64
                                                
a particular challenge.149 As previously stated in a discussion on new intelligence 
architectures, the current inability of US intelligence organizations to produce 
intelligence products that are accessible by not only US and coalition forces, but also 
available to willing state or non-state actors endangers the finite good will of current and 
future host nation counterparts.  
In recognition of these foreign disclosure laws, US trainers and their Colombian 
counterparts have created programs specifically geared towards the joint collection and 
dissemination of tactical information.150 For example, focused US mentorship and 
cooperation with the Colombian National Police’s Anti-Narcotics Division has resulted in 
the development of the unit’s own targeting capability and intelligence infrastructure.151 
This type of program empowers the host nation and mitigates foreign disclosure issues 
because intelligence and information is produced jointly, and not exchanged or requested 
from US assets. These programs also steer away from the centralized, top-down, 
dissemination of information and instead advocate decentralized planning and execution 
of operations by Colombians at lower echelons with access to US logistical support. The 
Colombian ability to share information with US forces at the tactical level by way of a 
program tailored to their specific needs proves that with planning, information sharing 
agreements and stringent US security requirements can coexist between US and host 
nations.152 Furthermore, interviewed sources confirm that, as previously documented in 
the Salvadoran case study, military-to-military relationships between US and Colombian 
personnel have thrived when they have remained free from the effects of political 
agendas and when information was not used as currency to reward support or punish non-
conformity to US policy. 153
 
149  Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Commander US Southern Command before the 
109th Congress House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2005. 
150  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
151  Personal electronic communication with COL (Ret.) Jim “Ranger” Roach, on April 10, 2005. 
152  Interview of USSOUTHCOM Foreign Disclosure Office (FDO) personnel conducted by the 
author, USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005.  
153 Interview of International Cooperation Division personnel conducted by the author, 
USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 22 March 2005. 
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US personnel involved in a relationship hampered by the inability to disclose 
classified information should also consider reciprocating partner nation gestures of 
cooperation with offers to help their counterparts develop the analytical skills necessary 
to enhance their military and intelligence capabilities. Colombian military intelligence 
has been characterized as unsophisticated by author Andres Villamizar, based on a 
reported lack of international or geopolitical experts that can effect true analysis, an 
inability to track external threats, and a failure to exploit open source intelligence.154 The 
reciprocation of a host nation’s cooperation with dedicated programs run by qualified US 
personnel and designed to teach counterparts how to collect and analyze their own 
intelligence can empower the host nation, increase the capabilities and situational 
awareness of both countries, and help integrate operations. Training host nation 
counterparts to fuse multiple intelligence disciplines, develop and understand intelligence 
collection plans, and carry out intelligence preparation of the battlespace can provide 
Colombian counterparts with the skills necessary to take analyzed information, 
successfully convert it to intelligence and increase a host nation’s military capabilities. 
Efforts by the Colombian government to develop imagery libraries, information 
databases, and better, more secure communication architectures with the assistance of 
experienced US personnel are examples of a host nation working within the boundaries 
of an established military relationship and foreign disclosure laws to recognize and 
improve technological and informational limitations. In Colombia, these improvements 
offer the hope of an even more capable and professional indigenous force.155
Countries which are co-located with Colombia in the southern part of the Western 
Hemisphere present another challenge within the proposal of establishing productive 
military-to-military relationships. Costa Rica and Panama, for example, do not maintain 
military forces, and this reality must serve as a caution against limiting military-to-
 
154 Villamizar, A. (2004). La Reforma de la Inteligencia: Un imperativo democratico, Colombia: 
Editorial Kimpres Ltda., pp.64. 
155  Interview of Colombia Military Branch and International Cooperation Division personnel 
conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
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military relationships to military circles.156 Despite a potential to occasionally be 
bureaucratic, military-to-military relationships prove to be an effective way to 
constructively engage host nation counterparts and their capabilities. Within 
USSOUTHCOM, a proactive plan to establish military-to-military relationships has been 
characterized by the development of a political and military relationship capable of 
interacting with military, civilian, and/or law enforcement units as responsible national 
security agencies. Although part of the United States’ $260 million dollars in aid to 
Colombia in 2003 supported the maintenance, training, and planning needs of Colombian 
military units, $150 million dollars were also allocated to support anti-narcotic operations 
conducted by the Colombian National Police.157 One-way military-to-military 
relationships in which strict US security protocols prevent information exchanges or 
where familiar western-style military hierarchies and forces are demanded will depict the 
United States as a self-serving hegemon. More importantly, it can disable or destroy 




Based on an ongoing Colombian conflict, similar geopolitical interests, and 
mutual cooperation, continued American logistical and financial assistance to Colombian 
military counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations appears to be assured. Ongoing 
threats from Colombian drug traffickers and insurgents highlight the value of the 
US/Colombia security relationship and shapes the extent and critical role played by 
information sharing. As the Global War on Terrorism widens, the importance of the 
security and stability of Colombia and other regional neighbors increases in the eyes of 
many American decision makers. Colombian and American security agencies currently 
work under the realization that in Colombia, drugs and terrorism have become one and 
 
156  Interview of International Cooperation Division Branch Head conducted by the author, 
USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 24 March 2005. 
157  Statement of William B. Wood, US Ambassador to Colombia during the retirement of Colombian 
Flag Officers on October 14, 2004. Retrieved on March 22, 2005 from 
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the same. The connection between drugs trafficking and terrorist activity, although 
considered tenuous by policy critics, cannot be ignored. The government of Colombia’s 
ability to remain stable and democratic has become a critical component in America’s 
strategy to secure its southern borders and preempt potential terrorist acts against US 
interests from weakened states within the Western Hemisphere. 
Enough research has been conducted in support of this case study to determine 
that military-to-military relations between the United States and Colombia have been and 
continue to be a vehicle for improved intelligence and information sharing. This 
overview of the American military involvement in Colombia reveals aspects of both 
military-to-military relations and intelligence and information sharing agreements that 
can help avoid intelligence shortfalls in future conflicts and establish future intelligence 
infrastructures in countries where one previously did not exist. For example, when US 
personnel are bound by the highly classified nature of US intelligence assets as is the case 
in Colombia, military-to-military relations can be used to reciprocate a host nation’s 
cooperation through other means. Attempts can be made to coordinate intelligence efforts 
or to exchange host nation information for an American commitment to improve host 
nation military information or intelligence gathering skills. Teaching host nation 
counterparts how to better analyze information and successfully convert information into 
intelligence can gradually increase levels of trust and the quantity and quality of 
information exchanges. US personnel can also be in a unique position to recognize, and if 
necessary, sensitize host nation counterparts to the counterproductive nature of risk-
averse behavior and prevent this behavior from becoming an obstacle to better 
information and/or intelligence sharing opportunities. Finally, the existence of non-
military, national security forces in places such as Costa Rica and Panama serves as a 
reminder that many countries do not deal exclusively with, or even maintain military 
forces. Therefore, military-to-military relationships should not be limited to military 
entities. 
Despite the obvious difficulties and risks inherent to the sharing of sensitive 
information between two nations, the quest for progress and mission accomplishment in 
Colombia continues. Former SOUTHCOM Commander, General Charles Wilhelm, 
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attributed many of the successes in the Colombian war against drugs and insurgent forces 
to intelligence and operational duties such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 
improved air ground coordination, and more effective command and control.158 
Therefore, stakeholders in the Colombian democratic process can only hope that the 
cooperation between the US and Colombia continues to improve, and that the victories of 
Colombian forces on the field will increase opportunities for peace in the future.     
 
 
158 Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander in Chief, US Southern Command 
before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 21September 1999. 
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V. AFGHANISTAN: AN INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
OPPORTUNITY IN PROGRESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, Afghanistan has been surrounded by politically unstable neighbors 
and deep tribal divisions. Its history is littered with numerous internal and external 
conflicts based on tribal rivalries, kinship, and a deep-seated opposition to outside 
intervention. The unsettled security situation throughout the country has increased the US 
military’s need to gain a better understanding of native socio-political customs and 
improve its ability to coordinate with Afghan military counterparts. As described in the 
paragraphs below, US and Afghan attempts to cooperate militarily have resulted in both 
intelligence successes and failures. The presence of US and coalition forces throughout 
numerous Afghan provinces is a daily reminder that the Global War on Terrorism is still 
being fought in Afghanistan. Accordingly, American forces have been directed by 
military commanders to work closely with Afghan forces to eliminate the residual 
terrorist threat and support the Afghan central government’s quest for a secure and stable 
environment.  
Based on the assertion that military-to-military relations can be a conduit for the 
establishment of better intelligence architectures, the following case study first 
demonstrates how military-to-military relations with Afghan indigenous forces prior to 
the fall of the Taliban regime allowed US Special Operations Forces to carry out 
intelligence duties. Second, this research effort reveals that a failure to continue to 
nurture these military-to-military relations following the defeat of the Taliban delayed the 
training of indigenous forces, and resulted in a security situation that was not conducive 
to the successful accomplishment of many US and Afghan policy goals. Finally, 
following a discussion of US military training and cooperation efforts in Afghanistan, an 
assessment of several obstacles to improving American and Afghan relations is presented 
in order to scrutinize ways in which military-to-military relations must transform to suit 
strategic objectives and optimize intelligence support to deployed personnel. This review 
of US military involvement in Afghanistan affirms that a relationship between US 
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military and indigenous forces continues to be of critical importance. Moreover, 
formalizing these military-to-military relations can result in mutually beneficial 
information and intelligence sharing opportunities that can overcome shifts in policy and 
nation building obstacles. 
 
B. US POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN  
Afghan public opinion regarding the involvement of the United States in 
Afghanistan is colored by previous American policy decisions, which as recently as the 
1980’s used Afghanistan as a geopolitical pawn to contain the Soviet Union and win the 
Cold War.159 Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, 
Pakistani, Saudi, and eventually Taliban forces filled the leadership vacuum left by the 
abrupt termination of American logistical support to Afghan fighters. In a culture that 
values honor and trust, the sudden abandonment of Afghan warriors by American policy 
makers spawned suspicions and a sense of betrayal that to this day, complicate the 
military-to-military relations between the United States and Afghanistan. The relationship 
between the Taliban, Afghanistan’s militant ruling faction, and Usama Bin Laden, leader 
of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, was established by the presidential administration of 
William J. Clinton prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 
2001.160 Nonetheless, neither the Clinton administration nor the subsequent presidential 
administration of George W. Bush considered Afghan opposition groups, collectively 
referred to as the Northern Alliance, to be capable enough to merit military assistance in 
their quest to remove the Taliban from power.161  
Following the attacks of September 2001, the Bush Administration proceeded to 
support the defeat of the Taliban regime based on its refusal to extradite Usama Bin 
 
159 Thomas H. Johnson, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 15 June 2005. Professor 
Johnson is currently an Associate Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.  
160 Katzman, K. (2004). Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and US Policy (Congressional 
Research Service [CRS] Report for Congress Order Code RL30588). Washington D.C.: Library of 
Congress, 6. 
 161 Katzman, K. (2004). Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and US Policy (Congressional 
Research Service [CRS] Report for Congress Order Code RL30588). Washington D.C.: Library of 
Congress, 6. 
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Laden and the administration’s goal to eliminate any and all state sponsors of 
terrorism.162 On October 7, 2001, a coalition of multinational and American forces 
launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The subsequent defeat of the Taliban 
regime weeks later was credited in part to an indigenous Afghan effort empowered by 
American military assistance and equipment. A political determination by the Bush 
administration to establish a stable Afghanistan has assured the involvement of American 
military personnel and resources in the region for many years to come. In the following 
sections, the interaction between US and Afghan military personnel is reviewed in order 
to establish the evolution of military-to-military relations before and after the fall of the 
Taliban regime. Similarly, these relationships are analyzed to determine the present and 
future status of military-to-military intelligence sharing between the United States and 
Afghanistan. 
    
C. MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE FALL OF 
THE TALIBAN REGIME  
The Taliban’s forceful consolidation of power in 1996 and the subsequent 
establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic government resulted not only in the 
international isolation of the Afghan government, but also caused government opposition 
groups to join forces and take up arms against the ruling government. In September of 
2001, the Taliban controlled approximately 75% of the country and most of the 
provincial capitals.163 United States government agencies contacted the Northern 
Alliance with the help of US intelligence and Special Forces personnel, and subsequently 
provided Alliance members with the on-demand tactical aviation support, enhanced 
communications equipment, and improved command and control capabilities necessary 
to defeat the Taliban. The desire to oust the Taliban and hunt for Al Qaeda members, 
along with the financial and logistical resources bestowed by American forces on the  
 
 
162 Katzman, K. (2004). Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and US Policy (Congressional 
Research Service [CRS] Report for Congress Order Code RL30588). Washington D.C.: Library of 
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 163 Katzman, K. (2004). Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and US Policy (Congressional 
Research Service [CRS] Report for Congress Order Code RL30588). Washington D.C.: Library of 
Congress, 8.  
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ground, not only motivated a majority of the warlords within the Northern Alliance to 
briefly set aside their personal agendas but also provisionally mitigated objections to the 
creation of a national government.  
Within this case study, Operation Enduring Freedom is characterized as an 
operation in which US Special Operations Forces (US SOF) guided accurate and 
persistent US air strikes on enemy forces in support of ground offensive operations by the 
Northern Alliance. American and British advisors characterized indigenous forces as 
large and capable enough to allow coalition personnel to reduce their international 
footprint within Afghanistan, minimize the perception of a coalition invading force, and 
empower Afghans to be the primary combat force.164 Basic military-to-military relations 
with Afghan indigenous forces prior to the fall of the Taliban regime allowed US Special 
Operations Forces to carry out intelligence duties in support of propaganda, targeting, 
bomb damage assessment, special reconnaissance, civil affairs, and direct action 
missions.165  
During the months of November and December, 2001, members of the U.S. 
Army's 5th Special Forces Group under the command of US Army Captain Jason 
Amerine, fought along side Afghan leader and future president Hamid Karzai in what 
eventually became characterized by US and Afghan leaders as a decisive defeat of the 
Taliban.166 Shortly after their arrival in the Oruzgan province, information regarding a 
convoy of multiple vehicles and approximately 300-500 Taliban fighters intent on re-
taking the town of Tarin Kowt was communicated to US SOF and Northern Alliance 
fighters by senior Pashtun tribal leaders. Actionable and perishable in every sense of the 
word, this human intelligence allowed US SOF to inform senior command elements, 
prepare the battlespace, organize defensive forces, set up overwatch positions, and 
 
164 Cordesman, A.H. (2003). The Lessons in Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force 
Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 
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165 Interview of US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Commander conducted by the 
author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 09 May 2005. 
166  Interview US Army Captain Jason Amerine, Commander of Operational Detachment Alpha 
(ODA) 574, conducted PBS Frontline on July 9 and 12, 2002. Interview retrieved June 27, 2005 from  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/amerine.html
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request coalition combat air support. During the Taliban advance towards Tarin Kowt, 
military relations between indigenous forces and US SOF personnel resulted in US access 
to a robust, indigenous intelligence network that encompassed the entire Pashtun tribal 
belt. These relations also allowed both US forces and the Northern Alliance to 
successfully direct military operations, and simultaneously coordinate the surrender of 
Taliban commanders via satellite telephones.  
Beyond Tarin Kowt and across Afghanistan’s rugged terrain, from the Shah-i-Kot 
Valley (site of Operation Anaconda) to eastern Afghanistan (the Tora-Bora region), to the 
isolated villages in the vicinity of Kandahar, US and Northern Alliance forces conducted 
additional combined operations in search of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces. In many 
instances and as previously demonstrated, air surveillance and attack support was based 
on information provided by Northern Alliance personnel and proved essential in 
determining enemy courses of action and prioritizing coalition objectives.167 However, 
other instances reveal that the relationship between Northern Alliance and US personnel 
was not always perfect. Interviews with American personnel present during the initial 
phases of OEF reveal that in many cases the validity of indigenous information was also 
questionable. Moreover, the security of planned operations was compromised by 
Northern Alliance personnel with ties to the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces they were 
supposed to engage.168 Consequently, evidence of a heavy reliance on Afghan forces of 
dubious loyalty resulted in sharp criticism from public media and government sources 
within the United States. 
Overall, military-to-military relations between US and Northern Alliance forces 
sufficiently transcended cultural, language, and social differences to allow the elimination 
of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces.169 When necessary, US military forces also paid cash for 
 
167 Sellers, P. (2004). Incorporation of Indigenous Forces in Major Theater War: Advantages, Risks, 
and Considerations (Center for Strategic Leadership, S04-05) Strategic Research Paper, US Army War 
College), 2.  
168 Interview of US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha Team Leader conducted by 
the author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 09 May 2005. 
169 Interview of US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Commander conducted by the 
author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 09 May 2005. 
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manpower, advice, protection, compliance, assistance, and intelligence.170 For the 
Northern Alliance, the Taliban represented a mortal enemy. For US and coalition forces, 
the Taliban was a shield for Al Qaeda terrorist cells. Rudimentary military relations 
between US and indigenous forces provided the means to an end. With the military and 
logistical support of the United States and the indigenous expertise from the Northern 
Alliance combat operations continued, and resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime by 
the end of November 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom denied Al Qaeda and Taliban 
forces the ability to hold terrain for extended periods of time, and forced them to abandon 
conventional operations against what they had hoped would be a debilitated Northern 
Alliance. On May 1, 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the 
transitional Afghan President Hamid Karzai, declared an end to major combat 
operations.171  
 
D. MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS AFTER THE FALL OF THE 
TALIBAN REGIME  
Training of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) began shortly after the fall of 
the Taliban regime. The effort was driven by a mandate from the Bonn II Conference on 
Rebuilding Afghanistan and mandated a 70,000 strong armed force.172 According to 
published reports, the hastily arranged training of the ANA by US, British, and French 
instructors began in 2002 at the under-funded and hurriedly renovated Afghan Military 
Academy in Kabul.173 Initially, the ANA was composed in large part of ineffectual 
recruits and weapons provided as a nominal gesture by the same warlords that had 
originally comprised the Northern Alliance. By comparison, ruling warlords maintained 
better-equipped and trained forces. Not surprisingly, ANA desertion rates during the first 
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phases of training ran as high as 50 percent due to poor motivation, low pay, corruption 
and hazing within the ranks.174 It is maintained within this case study that the failure to 
nurture military-to-military relations established with tribal, religious leaders and 
warlords following the defeat of the Taliban delayed the recruitment, training, and 
preparedness of the ANA. This delay contributed to the power vacuum caused by the 
sudden defeat of the Taliban regime and resulted in a security situation that was not 
conducive to the training of indigenous military personnel capable of assuming US 
military duties. In time, and as a result of intense training and retraining by US and 
coalition forces, the Afghan population has slowly begun to regard the ANA as a more 
competent force and a symbol of President Karzai’s efforts to bring about an Afghan 
central government.175 The newly established ANA launched its first military operation, 
Operation Warrior Sweep, in July of 2003 in response to reports of Taliban and Al Qaeda 
activity in the Zormat Valley region.176 Despite this and subsequent operations, public 
media reports and interviews with US SOF personnel confirm that the Afghan Army 
continues to be very dependent on US logistical support, and its members have had to 
sporadically contend with accusations of questionable and competing loyalties, low 
morale, and inconsistent performance.  
During its short existence, the ANA has been trained by an extensive and eclectic 
group of foreign institutions and reserve cadres in what many critics have referred to as a 
“token effort.” Based on the research conducted in support of this case study, it is 
believed that this type of fragmented training has hampered the development of a military 
culture within the Afghan Army. The effect of the inconsistent training of ANA elements 
on Afghanistan’s stability and the prospects of intelligence sharing between Afghan and 
American military personnel will be discussed later on in this case study. In the spring of 
2002, US Army Special Forces began training the first battalion of recruits for the 
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Afghan National Army.177 The establishment of a cohesive, multi-ethnic military force 
while trying to disarm a local militia estimated by open source reports to number in the 
thousands has become vital to the stability and security of Afghanistan. Since 2004, US 
SOF, in cooperation with French forces (responsible for training the ANA officer corps) 
and British military personnel (responsible for training the ANA non-commissioned 
officers) are training Afghanistan’s first national army.178 A national police force is also 
being trained by representatives from the United States and Germany. 179 Personnel and 
equipment shortages due in large part to a lack of support from Afghan warlords continue 
to plague the ANA’s ability to develop and maintain its presence throughout Afghanistan. 
Moreover, religious and ethnic tensions have intensified the challenges of military life 
expected to bond ANA soldiers who as “civilians” were accustomed to fighting along 
tribal and regional lines. Traditionally, the military experience of ANA soldiers has been 
divided between Afghan officers who gained their military experience in the Soviet-
styled Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Army, and the jihadi, who gained their 
experience in ad hoc units of various guerrilla factions.180 Based on a complex history of 
tribal and autonomous tendencies, a dislike for the central government runs deep within 
the Afghan countryside, and the government’s control beyond the capital has proven to 
be difficult and limited. 
The ANA does not have a monopoly on legitimate use of force and Afghan 
warlords regard the ANA as a competition to their own loyal forces. Moreover, many of 
the US forces currently operating in Afghanistan have their own indigenous security 
force. These forces, funded as separate “anti-Al Qaeda” units, are often deceptive 
concerning their loyalty to regional warlords, are recruited independently of efforts to 
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form the ANA, and act as American proxies during counter-insurgency operations.181 
This practice undermines the development of a unified ANA, complicates its search for 
legitimacy, and hampers efforts to develop a coordinated intelligence effort. Internally, 
the ANA cooperates very well within itself and based on several published reports, 
appears to have begun gradually accepting its role in coalition counterinsurgency 
operations.182 However, as previously mentioned, tribal and training challenges have 
caused military-to-military relations to develop slowly during a time when they are 
needed the most. Having reviewed the positive and negative nuances of previous 
relations between US and Afghan military personnel, the following section will analyze 
ongoing American advising and training efforts in Afghanistan to better establish the 
current and future status of military and intelligence relationships. 
 
E. INVOLVEMENT OF US ADVISERS-TRAINERS IN AFGHANISTAN      
While deployed to the Kabul Military Training Center during the fall of 2002, six 
US Army Special Forces Operational Detachments successfully trained six ANA 
battalions despite considerable logistical and cultural challenges.183 Since then, the senior 
leadership of the ANA has “shadowed” US Special Forces performing humanitarian 
assistance missions so that Afghan leaders can witness examples of mission execution, 
and subsequently gain the capability to properly plan military civic action missions on 
their own.184 Based on the literature reviewed in preparation of this case study, these 
training efforts appear to be having gradual success, leaving long-term successes to be 
determined by the security situation and the level of commitment from the ANA, the 
United States and Afghan government. In an effort to address long-term training 
deficiencies, US military personnel plan to organize additional follow on training courses 
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which will allow the new forces to develop necessary “real world” skills.185 
Unfortunately, as will be described in the paragraph below, well-meaning training 
objectives do not guarantee that the program will be designed to include or empower the 
necessary indigenous government organizations.   
In December of 2002, the United States Department of Defense introduced the 
concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a way to provide and enhance 
regional security and train personnel involved in Afghan reconstruction efforts. 186 PRTs 
supposedly endeavor to establish regional enclaves that foster the conditions necessary 
for reconstruction and are prohibited from combat or offensive operations. Following the 
operation of PRTs in northern Afghanistan, the UN-driven International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed operational control of PRTs in the west last year 
(2004), while US military personnel maintained responsibility for the operation of PRTs 
in southern Afghanistan.187 The proponents of this international effort hoped that a great 
part of Afghanistan’s tribal integration could occur with the help of US and Afghan 
military personnel working at the provincial level. However, ANA personnel have yet to 
participate in or carry out any PRT missions.188 If PRTs are being developed to promote 
reconstruction efforts, allow military forces to establish personal relations with local 
Afghan leaders, and reduce insurgent influence in the region, why is the ANA not 
allowed to participate?  
PRT efforts must be considered opportunities to cooperate militarily and share 
intelligence. More importantly, they should be executed as civic action missions in which 
the ANA can be empowered to serve the population directly, in order to establish the trust 
that is necessary to facilitate the exchange of information. Based on the political, 
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logistical, training and reconstruction challenges encountered by US and ANA forces 
within Afghanistan both before and after the fall of the Taliban, the situations and 
programs associated with coordinating and exchanging information and intelligence in 
Afghanistan must be reassessed and stabilized. In the following section, examples of US 
and Afghan intelligence efforts and capabilities will be discussed in an effort to identify 
how to sustain and improve current and future intelligence sharing relationships.  
    
F. US INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN AFGHANISTAN  
Based on US nation building efforts in Afghanistan, several examples of 
intelligence sharing between Afghan and US forces can be cited at the unclassified level. 
Intelligence sharing efforts in Afghanistan began to be publicly recognized by senior US 
military officers shortly after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom and revolved 
around the successful integration of groups of anti-Taliban fighters in Afghanistan with 
US Special Operations units specially trained in intelligence work.189 With the help of 
Afghan indigenous forces, these teams were able to carry out intelligence duties in 
support of propaganda, targeting, bomb damage assessment, special reconnaissance, civil 
affairs, and direct action missions.190 The establishment of these relations during initial 
US and coalition military operations in October of 2001 led to basic but successful 
intelligence sharing efforts between Afghan and US military counterparts. These 
arrangements were difficult for involved military personnel based on cultural, language, 
and technological differences, yet were also critical to the success of US and Afghan 
operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  
During OEF, the US military’s ability to develop and communicate targeting 
intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical level was complemented by the 
presence of friendly indigenous forces that supported US SOF air strike requests, re-
strike, bomb hit and even bomb damage assessments. Early cooperation with Northern 
Alliance units during OEF allowed US Special Operations units to conduct special 
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reconnaissance (SR) and target development missions that supplemented limited 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting systems. Moreover, these 
coordinated efforts helped to mitigate the religious and politically sensitive collateral 
damage concerns of coalition and US forces.191  In Afghanistan, the benefit of having 
human eyes on a target continues to be significant, based on the numerous types of terrain 
within the battlespace and the fact that many technical sensors are not suitable for fixing 
high value targets in time and/or space. At the operational and strategic level, interviews 
with US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment commanders describe the 
valuable help provided by Northern Alliance members in support of coalition target 
identification, target development, and once again, battle damage assessment. Therefore, 
the Afghan conflict demonstrates that the combination of a precision air-to-ground strike 
capability with a terrain-savvy ground forces element can result in a powerful targeting 
intelligence system.  
Initially established in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and sporadically 
continuing to current nation-building operations, intelligence sharing practices between 
the United States and Afghanistan have been affected by vast cultural and language 
differences. A significant American unfamiliarity with Afghan social, religious, and 
political elements has also resulted in difficulties for US personnel when trying to 
conduct detailed intelligence collection and analysis of the Afghan insurgent threat. 
Moreover, cultural differences have also obscured the intelligence analyst’s ability to 
identify enemy indications and warnings. In spite of, or perhaps because of these 
difficulties, US military and intelligence professionals have, in many cases, actively 
sought out opportunities to work with indigenous forces. Northern Alliance and ANA 
personnel possess the cultural knowledge necessary to develop the intelligence needed by 
US and coalition personnel to carry out critical civil affairs missions. For example, based 
on the interaction between ANA leadership personnel and US military counterparts 
during joint missions, members of US Special Forces and supporting elements have been 
able to complete personality assessments of ANA participants and local leaders at 
 
191 Cordesman, A.H. (2003). The Lessons in Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force 
Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Control. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 
(Executive Summary). 
 81
                                                
multiple mission locations.192 This type of tribal human intelligence and situational 
awareness can prove to be instrumental in avoiding situations such as those seen in Iraq 
in the spring of 2004, when the US intelligence community encountered difficulties in 
assisting military officials with the vetting of potential leaders of the Falluja Brigade due 
to a lack of ground-level information and background on Iraqi military personnel.193
Regardless of success, civil affairs missions between certain US military units and 
Afghan military forces have on occasion served as the unifying factor between necessary 
joint US and Afghan military operations and mutual intelligence cooperation.  According 
to Major Robert Redding, a member of the 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, 
forming partnerships with members of NGO’s operating within Afghanistan allowed US 
and Afghan military personnel to gather the necessary “ground truth” from agencies that 
had been working in the area for several years.194 In Afghanistan, identifying indigenous 
social, religious, and political leaders that accurately represent the demographics of a 
specific area has proven to be critical and difficult unless it is done with the support of 
civilian entities that reside in the area.  Although the importance of having architectures 
that can release intelligence products to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has 
already been discussed, US operations in Afghanistan demonstrate conversely the 
importance of also being able to accept properly vetted information from these less 
conspicuous but equally important civilian entities.  
Elements of US military intelligence are actively helping the newly formed 
Afghanistan National Security Directorate build its capabilities to monitor threats to the 
new government, including those posed by regional militias and local commanders.195 
For example, April of 2005 was marked by the graduation of the first group of Afghan 
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Counterintelligence Directorate officers from the US Office of Military Cooperation-
Afghanistan’s (OMC-A) Basic Counterintelligence Course.196 Described as six-month 
course on intelligence fundamentals, the curriculum consisted of training Afghans on 
security classification levels for information and documents, personnel security, and 
interview techniques.197 US Army military intelligence professionals instructed and 
mentored ANA counter-intelligence officers on the basics of counterintelligence to 
include special operations, counter intelligence analysis, personnel security and foreign 
disclosure.198 These skills will prove to be useful to both ANA and American 
counterparts who continue to be dependent on information from indigenous sources and 
must first must be interviewed, vetted, and tested. Moreover, military-to-military 
relations established between US and host nation personnel during training evolutions 
can eventually develop into relationships based on trust, and ultimately, develop into 
possibilities to exert mutual influence.  
Within the targeting cycle, the most significant and least controllable variables in 
the targeting process are the intelligence-dependent processes of searching for the target 
and the decision of whether or not to strike it.199 In places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 
high value targets operate in decentralized groups and their ability to move and operate 
within multiple territories and populated areas can create dynamic targets of opportunity 
in a matter of minutes. In one instance during Operation Enduring Freedom, a tip 
concerning the location of a high value target was relayed to higher headquarters within 
hours, but then took several days to vet.200 Therefore, the consequences of being able to 
leverage intelligence requirements through even basic military relations such as those 
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initially seen in Afghanistan is very significant. The successful development of target 
intelligence to enhance targeting capabilities in Afghanistan must also be considered an 
example of how an intelligence architecture can use military-to-military relations to 
provide the intelligence support needed to facilitate the efficient and effective use of 
special operations forces.  
Based on previous efforts by US Special Forces during OEF and current efforts of 
OMC-A personnel, the training of indigenous forces in Afghanistan has resulted in the 
development of an indigenous counterintelligence capability and the collection of 
intelligence regarding personality assessments, indigenous demographics, and kinetic as 
well as non-kinetic targeting. As a byproduct of established military-to-military relations 
between US military and Afghan personnel and the sharing of information at the tactical 
level, decision makers have been able to gain the situational awareness necessary to 
determine and develop mission tasks and objectives. In the past, these efforts have 
resulted in joint military maneuvers such as Operation Warrior Sweep, which can be 
regarded by both US and Afghan military personnel as evolutions of considerable 
military, training, and confidence-building value. The fact that US and coalition tactical 
successes during Operation Enduring Freedom were assisted by intelligence from 
indigenous sources must be instilled in US military personnel and in the training of new 
Afghan intelligence professionals. However, despite the intelligence sharing examples 
listed above, there are still obstacles that hamper the sharing of intelligence between US 
and Afghan forces and therefore endanger the security and stability of Afghanistan. As 
discussed in the following section, certain obstacles can complicate military-to-military 
relations with indigenous personnel and undoubtedly hinder the knowledge and 
perspective needed by both US and ANA forces to carry out future intelligence efforts. 
 
G. OBSTACLES TO STABILITY AND THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 
IN AFGHANISTAN  
Warlordism, drug trafficking, ongoing insurgencies, and the coalition’s disjointed 
training of the ANA have long hampered Afghanistan. Within this case study, these 
realities have been assessed to be obstacles to the sharing of intelligence between US and 
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Afghan military personnel. The manner in which American and Afghan military and 
intelligence entities organize and plan to support operations will fail if these obstacles are 
not eventually removed. The specific discussion of these four obstacles can provide a 
sample of the challenges that American and Afghan intelligence personnel are facing and 
will continue to face in a state building future. More importantly, this discussion 
identifies ways in which military-to-military relations can optimize intelligence support 
to deployed American and host nation personnel in the future.  
 
1. Warlordism  
Following the fall of the Taliban, senior US military planners did not fully 
understand the value of a longer-term military-to-military relationship with Northern 
Alliance personnel. Warlords, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, are considered by US and 
Afghan representatives to be the main cause of instability in Afghanistan. In July of 2004, 
President Karzai cited warlords and their factional militias as the key threat to Afghan 
stability.201 Ironically, many US personnel continue to rely on them for help hunting 
down terrorist and anti-government threats.202 Many of the former leaders of the 
Northern Alliance now thwart government efforts to unite the country and buy legitimacy 
by trafficking in drugs, weapons, and regional influence. Regional leaders who remain 
provincially independent and function in an environment of misinformation and tribal 
rivalries, are often complicit in multiple criminal enterprises, maintain continued local 
authority over militias, and present a threat to Afghanistan’s ability to function as a state. 
In many cases, local warlords negotiated surrenders that enabled high value Al Qaeda 
targets to escape, and complicated US and coalition targeting efforts.203  
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From a theoretical perspective, the fact that yesterday’s Northern Alliance allies 
are today’s warlords can be used as an example of how the nature of the conflict should 
be allowed to dictate the type of intelligence support required. As previously discussed, 
the arrival of US forces in Afghanistan during the fall of 2001, marked the beginning of 
basic military-to-military relations between US and indigenous Afghan forces. This 
period also marked the beginning of an intelligence sharing phase in which US forces and 
members of the Northern Alliance exchanged intelligence directly with mixed results. In 
many cases, intelligence products were pushed from the tactical to the strategic levels 
(bottom-up) because they were driven by indigenous human sources within an 
unconventional conflict and technical intelligence assets were unable to provide the 
necessary level of detail. The collapse of the Taliban regime marks what in this case 
study will be described as a separate intelligence sharing phase in which conventional US 
military forces became acquainted with former northern alliance fighters and demanded 
top-down, operational level intelligence products in support of conventional military 
operations. The election of President Karzai marked the beginning of another distinct 
intelligence sharing phase. In this phase, US and Afghan strategic goals to install a 
central government and carryout state-building operations have demanded both bottom-
up and top-down intelligence products that can support the rebuilding of government 
infrastructures, facilitate tactical efforts to apprehend high value targets, and assist with 
the demobilization of provincial warlords. The return of many Northern Alliance fighters 
to their traditional roles as regional powerbrokers is not only an obvious example of the 
importance of maintaining indigenous relations, but also an example of the way in which 
strategic objectives and therefore intelligence relationships and requirements are driven 
by the nature of the conflict. 
Afghan warlords are currently in a power struggle against the central government. 
Any strategy that directly confronts their power and influence could incite war. In a very 
simplistic way, the warlord’s power can be described as a product of cultural tradition 
and the well-armed troops, employed and funded by their control of local trading and 
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smuggling routes.204 Although several of these warlords have made public gestures and 
statements in support of the Afghan central government, efforts by some spoilers to 
disarm and participate in the new governmental process have been scarce. Deciding 
between legitimate information and erroneous leads that result from local score settling 
has also been an ongoing problem for US operations in Afghanistan.205 The contention 
for potential recruits and resources, along with tribal desires for increased status and 
greater material wealth, has hampered effective and consistent combined military 
operations. Particularly in the context of warlordism, the Afghanistan case study 
demonstrates the importance of remaining engaged and aligned with host nation partners 
before, during, and long after the end of hostilities in order to properly develop and 
establish a military and intelligence relationship that can survive inevitable shifts in 
strategy. Once a record of combined military success is established, military-to-military 
relations between Afghan and US personnel can be the conduit for information and 
intelligence regarding future civilian leaders, military commanders, and enemies of the 
state, thereby empowering the host nation to choose its leaders wisely. Therefore, a 
military and subsequently an intelligence sharing relationship between the United States 
and Afghanistan is proposed as a way to empower a host nation with the tools necessary 
to discredit the crime and factionalism offered by warlords and promote the unity and 
protection offered by a national government.  
 
2. Drugs  
The cultivation, manufacture, and sale of drugs are a dominant feature of Afghan 
society. US officials believe that about $2.3 billion -- half of Afghanistan’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) -- is generated by narcotics trafficking.206 The opium crop was 
estimated to be close to 4200 metric tons in 2004, resulting in a 17% increase from the 
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previous year and maintaining Afghanistan as the leading producer of opium 
worldwide.207 Heroin poppy growth in Afghanistan is rampant, taking place in 28 of the 
32 provinces.208 Both the current presidential administration and many members of 
Congress have called for US military involvement in supporting or participating in 
eradication operations with Afghan forces. However, experts agree that a unilateral US 
counter drug policy in Afghanistan could undermine the current counterinsurgency 
campaign.209 According to published media reports, senior US military and civilian 
leaders believe that “enmeshing U.S. troops in drug fights… would alienate many 
Afghans -- some of whom have become useful intelligence sources -- and also divert 
attention from core US military missions of combating insurgents and aiding 
reconstruction.” 210 This type of attitude is reflective of the fact that many US decision 
makers do not realize that drug, insurgency, and reconstruction issues in Afghanistan are 
intertwined, and that a stable Afghanistan cannot be attained without the empowerment 
of a central government and a representative military. Profits from illicit drug trafficking 
are predominantly funding and extending anti-government and anti-American efforts in 
Afghanistan. As a result, British and American forces in Afghanistan are assisting in the 
training and logistical support of Afghan drug interdiction forces in the hopes that 
gradual eradication will prove to be more effective over time.211  
Intelligence sharing arrangements in which US military personnel proactively 
train and assist ANA forces to develop the analytical and intelligence skills necessary to 
carryout anti-drug public awareness campaigns could result in the advancement of a long 
but necessary eradication process within a more permissive environment. An intelligence 
sharing relationship that goes beyond the apprehension of farmers and the destruction of 
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poppy fields and identifies the critical nodes and high value targets of the Afghan drug 
network is necessary to achieve strategic success in Afghanistan. A slow and difficult 
mentoring process to be sure, but eventually, a great security leap forward for both the 
United States and Afghanistan if this very complex process is treated with the care it 
deserves. 
 
3. The Ongoing Insurgency  
US military personnel and their various Afghan counterparts continue to operate 
in Afghanistan in a search for remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives. These military 
operations have revealed the US military’s limited cultural awareness and its difficulty in 
containing a decentralized insurgent movement. These shortfalls can be expected to 
encourage many US adversaries to develop or improve similar asymmetric capabilities 
today and in the future. Based on enemy observations of coalition troops in Afghanistan, 
it is likely that remaining terrorist and criminal elements will adapt to US intelligence 
gathering methods by constructing smaller, more concealed terrorist training camps that 
cannot be located by American intelligence satellites.212  
A continuous exchange of information such as the one established in the fall of 
2001 and the one fostered through basic US military and intelligence training programs 
can provide a long-term security plan that can insure that Afghanistan never again 
becomes a sanctuary for terrorism. According to General Norton A. Schwartz, Joint Staff 
Director of Operations, “Our main struggle is for information dominance, and our needs 
are often best met by tapping into information that can only be provided by the local 
populace... [The United States] must improve our ability to understand and effectively 
interact with our environment.”213 Once participants and sources are vetted, intelligence 
support provided through military-to-military relations can be discrete, involve a small 
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number of personnel, and could be sustained for the period of time necessary to defeat the 
remaining terrorist networks. It is hereby proposed that a well-established military-to-
military relationship can provide unconventional intelligence regarding an adversary’s 
personality, education, and motivation, which in today’s Global War on Terrorism, can 
be more important than the need to know his current order of battle.   
    
4. Fragmented Training  
The ANA has been trained under a fragmented, confusing and potentially 
counterproductive training process. Initial international efforts to build a new Afghan 
army were led by ISAF in Kabul.214 Nonetheless, in April 2002, the US Department of 
Defense directed the deployment of 150 US Army Special Forces troops to begin training 
a professional Afghan military force.215 In June of 2003, the 124th Regional Training 
Institute who are National Guard soldiers from Vermont arrived in Afghanistan to join 
ANA training efforts led by personnel from the 10th Mountain Division units.216 By 
November of 2003, following the departure of the 124th National Guard and other 
assigned forces, the 45th Brigade of the Oklahoma National Guard assumed the 
responsibility of training multiple elements of the ANA. In July of 2004, the 45th Brigade 
was eventually relieved by the Indiana National Guard’s 76th Brigade, as part of an effort 
to anchor a multi-state task force formed to train the ANA.217 Upon arrival, the 76th 
Brigade was directed to coordinate ANA training efforts with militaries from the United 
Kingdom, France, Romania, Mongolia, Bulgaria, and Germany.218 According to their 
Public Affairs Officer “there’s no specific Army unit that exists to do this job… the new 
 
 214 Anja, M., Singer, P.W. (2002). A New Model Afghan Army. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved May 9, 
2005 from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020701faessay8519/anja-manuel-p-w-singer/a-new-model-
afghan-army
215Tyson, A.S. (2002). Pentagon Challenge: Build an Afghan Army. Christian Science Monitor. 
Retrieved May 9, 2005 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/training/0411afg.htm 
 216 Williams, T.M. (2004). Vermont National Guard Trains Afghan Army Trainers. American Forces 
Information Services News Articles. Retrieved May 9, 2005 from 
http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/jan2004/a010704b.html  
 217Hefling, K. (2004). Troops to take over training of Afghan National Army. The Free Lance Star. 
Retrieved May 9, 2005 from www.fredericksburg.com and http://tfphoenix.omd.state.ok.us/news.htm  
 218 Hefling, K. (2004). Troops to take over training of Afghan National Army. The Free Lance Star. 
Retrieved May 9, 2005 from www.fredericksburg.com and http://tfphoenix.omd.state.ok.us/news.htm
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concept here is (sic) building an Army, which is not something that is normal for us to 
do.” 219 In December of 2004, the US Department of Defense announced that the Florida 
National Guard’s 53rd Infantry brigade would be deployed and involved in the training of 
the ANA.220 The rotation of these and other US National Guard units has been 
coordinated and directed by Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) Phoenix. This CJTF is 
comprised of National Guard units from more than 20 states and the contingents from 
seven countries, and has been tasked to execute the broad-based training, mentoring, and 
assistance programs needed to enable the ANA to field a mission ready central corps.221  
Information regarding CJTF Phoenix, while limited, depicts the organization as 
very capable of providing the training, command and control necessary to conquer the 
challenges inherent to what in Afghanistan has become a multinational Foreign Internal 
Defense effort. Therefore, the citation of CJTF Phoenix’s role in rotating reserve units 
through the ANA training program is not intended to criticize. Military training that is 
fractured by the constant turnover of instructors and units can be considered necessary 
due to operational commitments, scheduled rotations, and manpower shortages. 
However,  regardless of the reason, a quantity over quality approach to the training of the 
ANA that does not allow for mission continuity decreases and may even eliminate any 
opportunities for the establishment of military-to-military relations with ANA 
counterparts.  
A “revolving door” training policy which constantly introduces and removes 
trainers to satisfy rotation schedules or includes a wide variety of multinational military 
influences can hamper US efforts to identify and begin to establish operational and 
intelligence relations with personnel at the grassroots level. Military culture takes years to 
build and efforts that continuously rotate the nationality, level of experience, and number 
of trainers can collectively distract the ANA from its introspective development of a 
 
 219 Hefling, K. (2004). Troops to take over training of Afghan National Army. The Free Lance Star. 
Retrieved May 9, 2005 from www.fredericksburg.com and http://tfphoenix.omd.state.ok.us/news.htm  
 220 US Department of Defense News Release No. 1289-04. DOD Announces OEF/OIF Rotational 
Coverage. December 14, 2004.  
221 GlobalSecurity.Org (2005) Coalition Joint Task Force Phoenix. Retrieved June 13, 2005 from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtf-phoenix.htm
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military identity. Military-to-military relations based on the trust that is essential to share 
intelligence and subsequently exert influence cannot be developed via this type of 
rotation. Organizational stability and time are needed by US and indigenous forces to 
develop the appropriate vetting techniques necessary to maintain operational security, 
corroborate information, and evaluate intelligence collection abilities and needs. It is 
incumbent upon the United States Armed Forces to identify unique ways in which 
indigenous forces can be approached and invited into a stable military-to-military 
relationship that in time, will maximize the effectiveness of US forces and their allies on 
the battlefield. In order for an intelligence sharing relationship to be successful, 
continuity during the training of host nation counterparts is key.      
 
H. CONCLUSION   
Currently, the establishment of a capable, cohesive, ethnically balanced national 
army in Afghanistan is essential to isolate the population from the insurgency and 
increase the legitimacy of the government. The Afghan government must train a national 
army, battle an ongoing insurgency, decrease drug trafficking, and persuade Afghan 
warlords to give up the power derived from maintaining a militia and accept the power 
awarded for being part of a democratic government. This is a monumental task and one 
that by no means can be achieved by only establishing a military-to-military relationship 
and sharing intelligence. However, Afghanistan is an intelligence sharing opportunity in 
progress. The fluid political and military situations before and after the fall of the Taliban 
regime must be a reminder that in Afghanistan, even primitive military-to-military 
relations have served as a mutual conduit for cultural appreciation, increased situational 
awareness, and increased intelligence capabilities. In many cases, the failure to nurture 
military-to-military relations established with Afghan tribal, religious leaders and 
warlords following the defeat of the Taliban have delayed the recruitment, training, and 
preparedness of the ANA. However, according to US military personnel assigned to law 
enforcement or military training duties in Afghanistan, there are still “ample 
opportunities” to establish formal and informal military and intelligence sharing relations 
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with host nation counterparts, making the ability to capitalize on these opportunities a 
critical skill.222  
The probability of once again deploying US forces to a country that willingly or 
unwillingly becomes unable to contain and defeat a terrorist threat is not remote. 
However, it is important to remember that although the conflict in Afghanistan may share 
similarities with other failed states, each scenario is different. This case study reveals that 
a failure to maintain military-to-military relations before, during and after a conflict can 
deprive US and host nation personnel with the stability and continuity needed by military 
professionals to furnish decision makers with the intelligence and analysis needed to 
support changing policy objectives. Conversely, the establishment of committed and 
long-term military-to-military relations can be instrumental in building the confidence 
and infrastructure necessary to foster the successful sharing of intelligence. In 
Afghanistan, state building continues to be a challenge to the Afghan and American 
governments and the role of intelligence as a decision-making tool is critical. Although 
multi-ethnic collaboration and cooperation in the current security environment may often 
be difficult, it can also represent the beginning of an opportunity to enhance American 
and Afghan intelligence sharing capabilities.  












222 Personal electronic communication with US personnel assigned to OMC-A Directorate of Police 
Sector Reform (Afghanistan) on June 6, 2005. 
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VI. ARGUMENTS, COUNTERARGUMENTS, AND IRAQ  
Any soldier or Marine in the field will tell you that he gets virtually all of 
his useful intelligence by walking the beat and talking to citizens in order 
to build trust (and occasionally making a back-alley payoff to find and kill 
terrorists). I asked one brigade commander what sort of intelligence he 
received from high-level "networked" products and he replied succinctly: 
‘week-old PowerPoint slides.’223
 
A. INTRODUCTION     
In recent years, the emphasis placed by the United States government on national 
security and stability both at home and abroad has risen exponentially due to the 
significant threat to the United States from illegal immigration, ongoing international 
criminal enterprises, and transnational terrorism. In an effort to establish the value of 
military relationships as a way to improve intelligence architectures in areas of present 
and future American interest, this thesis has analyzed aspects of US political and military 
involvement in Iraq (the initial backdrop for the introduction of this thesis premise), El 
Salvador, Colombia, and Afghanistan. This thesis has also presented unclassified 
examples of the successful and unsuccessful implementation of intelligence sharing 
measures between each country and the United States during the course of established 
joint military training and combat operations. Lessons learned from the review of these 
cases can help US and host nation military personnel develop intelligence and 
information sharing programs correctly, in conjunction with military training 
relationships, and in support of current and future US stability and security policies.  
Based on research conducted in support of this thesis project, it is asserted that 
well-established military relationships and subsequent intelligence and information 
sharing agreements can support long-term US security policies in countries of current and 
future interest. In the following text, the purpose, scope, and methodology of this thesis 
are reviewed as a preamble to a final analysis of the hypothesis and research questions 
originally presented in the introductory chapter. Thesis arguments are detailed as part of a 
 
223 Scales, R. (February 3, 2005). Human Intel vs. Technology. Washington Times, 21. 
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discussion of the reasons in favor and against the use of military-to-military relations to 
improve intelligence capabilities. Both this chapter and thesis conclude with a re-
assessment of US involvement in Iraq. It is proposed within this chapter that one of the 
reasons why military intelligence sharing between US and indigenous military personnel 
has not effectively developed and matured in Iraq is the ongoing but incomplete effort by 
US and coalition forces to successfully train a professional and self-sufficient Iraqi 
security force. Another reason why military intelligence sharing between US and Iraqi 
military personnel has not thrived in Iraq is the absence of strong military-to-military 
relations between US and Iraqi forces. Although military relationships have been a 
foundation for the establishment of new or enhanced intelligence and information sharing 
agreements and security efforts in countries such as El Salvador, Colombia, and 
Afghanistan, an application of many of these lessons to Iraq must wait until Iraqi security 
forces have established a more stable environment with the help of properly trained and 
equipped personnel. It is assessed that once Iraqi forces become a capable military 
institution, the guidelines presented following this chapter can improve American 
intelligence sharing capabilities by way of committed military-to-military relations; in 
effect, help the United States and the host nation successfully and locally train an army of 
intelligence analysts. 
 
B. THESIS PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to further US national interests abroad 
and improve American training of foreign militaries for current and future conflicts. 
Within this thesis, it is proposed that US national interests can be strengthened by 
emphasizing the value of military relationships as a way to improve intelligence 
architectures long-term. Thesis findings are presented as a set of guidelines on how to 
successfully develop and enhance information and intelligence sharing programs, and are 
made available to help decision makers improve intelligence capabilities through the use 
of international military-to-military relations. The sharing of information and/or 
intelligence, even in its most basic forms, can provide US military and host nation 
counterparts with the knowledge necessary to achieve policy objectives, identify 
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indications and warnings, and provide war fighters with the proactive intelligence support 
needed to plan and execute appropriate military options. An emphasis on the importance 
of training current and future allies while fostering long term intelligence efforts will 
increase the scope of US policies by empowering allied partners and successfully 
accomplishing mutual national objectives. This thesis and accompanying guidelines are 
submitted for use as a concept for current and future operations and should be considered 
useful in establishing intelligence architectures that can successfully support operations at 
the tactical, operational, and strategic level based on military-to-military relationships 
that have been nurtured over time. 
 
C. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
This research project has been conducted to prove or disprove a hypothesis which 
affirms that the United States military can mitigate intelligence shortfalls by learning 
from previous US military involvements in El Salvador, Colombia and subsequently, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The number of countries selected for review was limited to four 
based on pre-determined time constraints. The selection of these specific countries is 
motivated by the thesis author’s desire to document and investigate US military and 
intelligence sharing efforts in the Latin American and Middle Eastern regions. Within the 
case studies of the specified four countries, background concerning the conflict which 
incited US military involvement has been provided, along with discussions on applicable 
US policies, pre-existing military-to-military relations and conditions, the role of US 
advisers/trainers, existing information or intelligence sharing programs, conflict status 
and/or resolutions and specific research findings. The external validity of each case study 
has been demonstrated through a documentary review and the use of organizational 
references and subject matter experts. The analysis of specific characteristics within this 
sample of international conflicts has been carried out in order to better determine how the 
US military can establish an intelligence architecture in future areas of interest or conflict 
using different levels of military-to-military relations.  
Many of the boundaries and circumstances in which military relationships can be 
developed to achieve mutual intelligence goals are identified and discussed in a set of 
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guidelines that can assist host nations to successfully train intelligence professionals. 
These guidelines are a compilation of research results derived from the specified case 
studies and offer US military forces a way to proactively engage host nation military 
personnel as key terrain. To add clarity to the arguments presented, terms such as “host 
nation,” “indigenous,” “architecture,” and “model” have been defined and referenced 
where and when appropriate. Rather than discussing the effectiveness of multinational 
training, this thesis discusses the value of military-to-military exchanges because, as first 
discussed in the case study of US involvement in El Salvador, the value of intelligence 
must not be measured in the context of American political and military interests alone.   
 
D. THE ARGUMENTS       
In addition to the previously stated hypothesis, three associated questions were 
developed and researched as part of this thesis project. Both the hypothesis and all the 
research questions have been individually addressed in the paragraphs below.  
 
Hypothesis: The United States military can mitigate intelligence shortfalls by 
training foreign armies using an El Salvador/Colombia training and intelligence-
sharing model.  
 
For purposes of this thesis, a model is defined as an example, pattern, exemplar, 
or ideal set before one for guidance or imitation.224 An “El Salvador/Colombia training 
and intelligence-sharing model” can therefore be defined as the pattern of American 
military and political policies used by the United States government during its 
involvement in El Salvador and Colombia, respectively. Within this thesis, the complete 
imitation of the policy patterns used in El Salvador, Colombia, or any other country must 
be discouraged because each conflict is unique and set in a specific socio-political and 
military context. These factors notwithstanding, it is affirmed that the United States can 
mitigate intelligence shortfalls in areas of future conflict not by imitating, but by learning 
from these two training and intelligence-sharing models.  
 
224 Merriam Webster. (1983) Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Massachusetts: Merriam-
Webster.  
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Case studies of El Salvador, Colombia, and even Afghanistan and Iraq reveal that, 
although the underlying causes of conflict and subsequent reactions by the United States 
and host nations differ greatly within the context of time and place, commonalties within 
each case can be identified and referred to for guidance. In these case studies for 
example, the use of highly sophisticated intelligence assets and logistical support as a 
policy tool has been commonplace during political and military efforts by the United 
States to professionalize military personnel in less sophisticated countries. Although, 
within this thesis many of these policies are categorized as poor models for the use of 
military relations and the improvement of intelligence capabilities, commonalities have 
been analyzed to glean valuable lessons. These lessons are presented as recommendations 
to help the United States military train foreign armies in a way that can mitigate 
intelligence shortfalls in the future. The establishment of military-to-military relations 
between US and host nation personnel can open the lines of communication by revealing 
mutual goals such as the defeat of an insurgency, the reduction of criminal enterprise, and 
the establishment of a central government. The guidelines provided at the end of  this 
thesis are intended to serve as a tool that can be useful to US military decision makers, by 
providing guidance on how to learn from previously successful and unsuccessful political 
and military decisions, and how to leverage military relations as a way to minimize 
current and future intelligence shortfalls.   
    
Is the nature of a training relationship fertile ground for the conception of an 
intelligence architecture? How can training be used as a vehicle?   
 
When available, military relations such as those established in El Salvador and 
Colombia can be fertile ground for the establishment of an intelligence architecture by 
first facilitating the exchange of logistical assistance, technical expertise, knowledge, 
background, trust and the confidence necessary for mutual intelligence or information 
sharing agreements. Second, military relations can also be used to assess host nation 
intelligence capabilities prior to, during, and after the initiation of an intelligence sharing 




                                                
US and host nation personnel transcend intricate and distinct military and political phases 
and can become the basis for the distinct intelligence requirements and capabilities 
necessary to defeat a mutual enemy.  
Military training programs and relationships can facilitate information and 
intelligence relationships in diverse ways. For example, the American willingness to treat 
military counterparts with decency and respect proved to be critical in countries such as 
El Salvador. During the Salvadoran civil war, the existence of personal rapport between 
US and Salvadoran service members was noted by select personnel to be instrumental in 
the development of the trust necessary to have a mutual intelligence relationship.225 
Within different levels of classifications and to varying extents, relationships between US 
military personnel and indigenous personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq, El Salvador, and 
Colombia have frequently provided an intelligence fidelity that is often beyond the reach 
of sophisticated US intelligence assets. As described in the case study of US involvement 
in El Salvador, military-to-military relations have provided a forum in which the utility of 
US intelligence support can be determined and evaluated. The case study of US 
involvement in Colombia demonstrates how training initiatives via military-to-military 
relations can be instrumental in the reciprocation of host nation cooperation when foreign 
disclosure programs and operational security prevent the direct exchange of information 
and/or intelligence. Deliberate, proactive, military-to-military exchanges such as those 
described by US trainers in Colombia has provided insight into the Colombian doctrinal 
development process, sensitized Colombian counterparts to the counterproductive nature 
of risk-averse behavior, and emphasized the benefits of maintaining the lines of 
information exchange open.  
Military-to-military relations in countries such as Afghanistan have revealed the 
existence of military personnel who possess personal agendas that are contrary to US and 
 
225 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005. Currently a senior officer in the US Naval Intelligence community, he served as chief of a 
technical analysis team upon reporting to El Salvador in 1987. Jose Eduardo Angel, Gen., Retired, 
interview with the author, San Salvador, El Salvador, 29 December 2004. Gen. Angel served as 
Commander of the Atlacatl Battalion until 1992 and was the Vice-Minister of Defense until his retirement 
from the Salvadoran Army in 2000. 
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host nation policy goals and hamper both internal and transnational political efforts.226 
Similarly, in Iraq, despite numerous advancements in the military training of Iraqi 
defense forces, training policies and programs that appear more concerned with the 
quantity of recruits graduated rather than the quality of the training provided must raise 
concern within the discerning reader. Factors such as conflicting agendas and policies 
that favor short-term training versus long-term qualitative goals are critical to military-to-
military relations because intelligence sharing programs such as those developed in El 
Salvador and Colombia have depended, according to research conducted during the case 
studies, on the professionalism and trust developed following comprehensive US military 
training.227 Not surprisingly, inadequate military-to-military training relations can also 
hamper attempts to improve intelligence infrastructures if the relations do not strive for 
continuity or if they are excessively disrupted by temporarily assigned personnel. 
Therefore, based on the contention that a military-to-military training relationship is 
fertile ground for the conception of an intelligence architecture, US military personnel 
and their host nation counterparts must be challenged to confront political and logistical 
realities and accept them as one of many factors that will gradually shape the depth and 
breadth of established military relations. Political and military agendas will always exist. 
Nonetheless, the trust enabled by sincere military-to-military relations can help 
understand, recognize, and work through US and host nation agendas to secure vital 
common ground.    
 
Can a systematic approach be deduced from the training and intelligence 
models described in the case studies that could help current US operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan? Other countries?  
 
The decision to study seemingly disparate conflicts in El Salvador, Colombia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq is justified given that these countries have been united for one brief 
moment in time by a need to empower indigenous security forces amidst crisis, a bilateral 
 
226 Interview of US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha Team Leader conducted by 
the author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 09 May 2005. 
227 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005. Jose Eduardo Angel, Gen., Retired, interview with the author, San Salvador, El Salvador, 29 
December 2004.  
 100
requirement to establish or improve intelligence capabilities, and the desire to protect US 
and host nation strategic interests. Nonetheless, the deduction of a “cookie-cutter” 
template that can be placed over training and intelligence efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
is not feasible because these conflicts exist as independent entities fueled by unique 
social, political, and military precursors. The equipment shortages, lack of leadership, 
poor military skills, absence of appropriate training facilities, and limited intelligence 
skills discussed in the El Salvador and Colombia case studies can be considered 
reminiscent of those currently experienced by American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 
since the fall of the Taliban government and the Saddam Hussein regime. However, 
drawing conclusions, systematic or otherwise, based on four completely different 
conflicts is unwise and therefore not recommended.  
Conversely, an analysis of the political, military, training, information and 
intelligence sharing characteristics in each one of these country scenarios has revealed 
important commonalities and resulted in the extrapolation of very useful and inclusive 
guidelines on how to generally use joint military training as a vehicle to build better 
intelligence capabilities and mitigate intelligence shortfalls. For example, guidelines that 
advise against the use of intelligence as political currency and warn against the mass 
production of generic intelligence products complement guidelines that encourage the 
advancement of indigenous training continuity, the periodic evaluation of US intelligence 
support, and the use of intelligence training to reciprocate host nation cooperation. Based 
on an analysis of the identified case studies, these guidelines identify factors that have 
positively and negatively affected military-to-military relations and mutual intelligence 
capabilities in the past and present, and could mitigate intelligence shortfalls in countries 
such as Afghanistan and Iraq in the future. 
 
Can the US better prepare for future conflicts with a long-term commitment 
that emphasizes intelligence as a by-product of training rather than with current short-
term nation building efforts?  
 
This thesis has analyzed both successful and unsuccessful American attempts to 
develop military-to-military relationships as a way to secure mutual intelligence gains at 
the strategic, operational, and tactical level. Long term military and logistical 
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commitments by US military personnel in countries such as Colombia and El Salvador 
have been difficult and expensive. However, over time, commitments to stability and 
security in Latin America have proven to be more beneficial to US and host nation policy 
goals than short-term, short-sighted training and equipping operations, which in countries 
such as Iraq placed the emphasis on a quota of uniformed military personnel and 
subsequently resulted in large scale desertions.228 Research in support of this thesis 
reveals that countries such as El Salvador and Colombia, which possessed limited 
military and economic means, were predominantly unprepared to combat unconventional 
threats. In these countries, the precursors for socio-political instability were ignored, and 
insurgency movements thrived based on the long period of time required for the training 
and preparation of personnel qualified to effectively combat anti-government efforts. 
However, military-to-military relations eventually became a conduit for US efforts to 
improve situational awareness, attempt to empower indigenous forces, address civil and 
military strategies, and even contend with unpredictable US funding practices. 
The intent of this thesis is not to compare one conflict against another. In Iraq, US 
military personnel did not initially have the opportunity to take advantage of military-to-
military relations with Iraqi counterparts. In any of the countries and conflicts analyzed 
within this thesis, relationships between American military personnel, indigenous forces, 
and the civilian population have, at one time or another, been tenuous at best. Moreover, 
based on many political, military, cultural, and situational factors, American difficulties 
in understanding the human terrain persist. In these types of situations, essential elements 
of information can remain unspecified and intelligence requirements can go unanswered. 
Case studies of US involvement in both El Salvador and Colombia -- which in each case 
lasted over a decade -- and of the relatively recent involvement of US forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan support policies that advocate the deployment of military intelligence assets 
long before the commencement of hostilities. The proactive development by intelligence 
professionals of the cultural, social, political, and military baselines which proved to be 
 
228 Filkins, D. (2004). Biggest Task For US General is Training Iraqis to Fight Iraqis. New York 
Times,1. Colonel J. Durrant, USMC (Ret.), Interview with the author, Monterrey, California, 24 January, 
2005. Colonel Durrant was assigned as Director, Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group in July 
2003; and directed 1st Marine Division Iraqi Security Forces training activities throughout the Anbar 
Province, Iraq from May to December 2004.  
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useful in countries like El Salvador, and remain elusive in Iraq, can not only identify the 
precursors of an insurgency, but also assist in establishing long-term commitments that 
emphasize intelligence as a by-product of training.  
Today, the United States can begin to implement long-term security commitments 
through indigenous and military relationships that will last throughout the duration of the 
conflict (unlike Afghanistan), and can challenge US counterparts to produce intelligence 
that is of value (as in El Salvador) and support mutual national objectives (as in 
Colombia). A decreased American military presence and the conception of a democracy-
based government in places like Iraq can be further insured through the security provided 
by a capable indigenous defense force and an effective intelligence architecture.               
 
E. THE COUNTERARGUMENTS 
The enhancement of intelligence capabilities through the establishment and use of 
military-to-military relations could be considered ineffective and even inappropriate for 
several reasons. First, military-to-military relations could be considered vulnerable to 
fluctuating and competing US and host nation government policies. Second, military-to-
military relations could be seen by critics as subject to powerful external forces like 
individual self-interest, strong native allegiances, and mistrust of American involvement. 
Third, every conflict and set of military and intelligence requirements associated with the 
conflict is different, based on unique underlying political, social, and religious 
circumstances. Finally, independent from the environment, the development of military-
to-military relations is considered by many critics to just take too much time. 
Nonetheless, as previously stated, military-to-military relationships have long been 
established by US military personnel with different levels of success over varying lengths 
of time. The following paragraphs will discuss the four counterarguments listed above in 
greater detail. 
Military-to-military relations have indeed proven to be vulnerable to variable and 
sometimes unpredictable government policies.  During the civil war in El Salvador, 
American policies to modernize Salvadoran institutions often clashed with diplomatic 
efforts to reform the country’s social infrastructure, and antagonized local political 
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factions eager to gain or maintain political control. Similarly, American government 
policies often tied the continuation of US logistical and financial aid to the Salvadoran 
Army’s observance and preservation of human rights. Periods of unpredictable or 
insufficient US funding often resulted in ammunition shortages and training stoppages 
that caused established Salvadoran battalions to be overworked or, in many cases, not 
work at all.229  Nonetheless, despite continuous and sometimes tense diplomatic 
relations, the government of El Salvador slowly recognized and adjusted to its role as a 
servant of the Salvadoran population. Conversely, in Afghanistan, the multiple 
transformations of the insurgent threat and the emergence of a central government have 
forced susceptible US policies and intelligence products to transform and keep up with 
the dynamic security situation.230 Finally, in Colombia, unrestricted flow of information 
between US and Colombian forces is often hampered by strict US government disclosure 
laws limiting the exchange of information with foreign nationals.  
Regardless of the country or situation, it is clear that US military-to-military 
relations with host nation counterparts must change and adapt based on the dynamic 
nature of US government and host nation policies. When repeated changes in political 
and military policy must unfortunately be considered the only situational constant, US 
military personnel should accept the volatility of government policies and establish 
military-to-military relations as a thread of continuity that is capable of keeping the lines 
of communication open and eventually, foster bilateral intelligence sharing.  
US military personnel in Afghanistan have experienced first-hand how military-
to-military relations can be controlled by powerful external forces.  During the initial 
phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, the validity of indigenous information was 
questionable and/or compromised by Northern Alliance personnel with ties to the Al 
Qaeda and Taliban forces they were supposed to engage.231 In Iraq, US forces have been 
 
229 Waghelstein, J.D. (1985, January) El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in 
Counterinsurgency. Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 45. 
230 Thomas H. Johnson, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 15 June 2005. Professor 
Johnson is currently an Associate Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.  
231 Interview of US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha Team Leader conducted by 
the author, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 09 May 2005. 
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in combat for over two years and have yet to eliminate the insurgency’s ability to 
terrorize indigenous forces and the civilian population.232 In Colombia, interviews with 
US trainers reveal that operational tempo, inter-service cooperation and the sharing of 
information can be easily degraded by the selfish aspects of the old Colombian military 
culture.233 The US military’s difficulty in establishing strong military-to-military 
relations with indigenous forces can in many cases indicate a failure to conduct the 
intelligence preparation of the battlespace necessary to identify important social 
networks, tribal loyalties, language barriers, and the centers of gravity of any existing 
bilateral military relationship. An American inability to deal with the effects of 
individualism, ethnic allegiances, and often well-deserved mistrust of American 
involvement can also indicate a US military refusal to acknowledge institutional biases or 
a failure to successfully grow indigenous capabilities.  
Every conflict, and therefore every set of military and intelligence requirements 
associated with the conflict, is in one way or another different. Violent and ongoing US 
military involvement in several Middle Eastern countries has reminded American policy 
makers that distinct cultural aspects that were previously unknown or considered 
unimportant by US military forces can become great obstacles to military-to-military 
relations. For example, the United States government has continuously and publicly 
stated that US forces will only be able to return from Iraq when Iraqis come together to 
handle their own security.234 However, within American efforts to place Iraqis in charge 
of their own security and government, it has become apparent that Iraqi soldiers possess a 
national ethos that revolves around tribes, family, and ethnicity instead of national 
unity.235 Can the United States modify the Iraqi soldier’s fighting philosophy? How 
could this be accomplished? For years, countries like El Salvador, Colombia, and 
 
232 Colonel J. Durrant, USMC (Ret.), Interview with the author, Monterrey, California, 24 January, 
2005.  
233  Interview of Colombia Military Branch personnel conducted by the author, USSOUTHCOM 
Headquarters, Miami, Florida, 23 March 2005. 
234 Logan, Lara. (Correspondent). (February 23, 2005). Training Iraqi Teams in Mosul [60 Minutes]. 
CBS Broadcasting Inc. Retrieved February 27, 2005, from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/23/60II/main675912.shtml
235 Filkins, D. (2004). Biggest Task For US General is Training Iraqis to Fight Iraqis. New York 
Times, 1. 
 105
                                                
Afghanistan have conducted intelligence preparation of the battlespace in accordance 
with the level of sophistication that is unique to their military intelligence capabilities. 
Without advanced intelligence architectures or highly trained intelligence professionals, 
these intelligence organizations suffer from an inability to conduct in-depth analysis, 
track external threats, and exploit open source intelligence.236  How can military-to-
military relations help? 
In countries where situational and professional differences place US and host 
nation political and military goals at odds, or in which security personnel rely on what US 
military and intelligence professionals would consider “outdated” methods (second hand 
information, oral history, and personal knowledge), military-to-military relations can be 
used to assess host nation military capabilities prior to the initiation of information or 
intelligence sharing agreements. Among other things, these assessments can identify 
important cultural and geopolitical differences, identify if US and host nation personnel 
share common causes and interests, and reveal the level of sophistication within the host 
nation’s intelligence architecture. As discussed in the adjacent set of recommended 
intelligence sharing guidelines, a bilateral assessment of the intelligence sharing 
relationship between the host nation and US intelligence personnel when performed 
periodically and throughout the duration of American involvement, can help determine if 
US and host nation requirements are being satisfied correctly and efficiently.   
Finally, the development of military-to-military relations as a way to enhance US 
intelligence capabilities can be considered by critics as a process that just takes too much 
time. This view is easily supported by any of the conflicts reviewed in support of this 
thesis. Whether in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan, or Iraq, deployed US military 
personnel have been often hampered by diplomatic considerations, bureaucratic 
infighting, disparities in both human and military culture, and complex US and host 
nation institutional obligations and military roles. The resolution of these types of 
obstacles within military and political relationships takes time, and as already stated, can 
strain the development and quality of any military relationship. Nonetheless, the 
 
236 Villamizar, A. (2004). La Reforma de la Inteligencia: Un imperativo democratico, Colombia: 
Editorial Kimpres Ltda., pp.64. 
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investment of time when developing military-to-military relations can produce long term 
benefits, not when relationships are reactively coerced to mitigate unfavorable events 
already in motion, but when time will allow US and host nation counterparts to reach a 
consensus in matters that can potentially damage military and political outcomes.  
As an example, one such potentially damaging outcome is described by journalist 
Gary Leech, who in a recent article warned that American efforts to establish a more 
professional and capable army in Colombia today, could result in the implementation of 
paramilitary strategies and a dirty war against the Colombian population in the future.237 
This point of view is supported by organizations who believe that countries in the Latin 
American region have yet to reach the level of solid commitment to democratization 
necessary to insure abuses will not occur.238 Whether this type of scenario is considered 
likely or not, a lengthy time commitment by the United States, Colombia, and other Latin 
American countries engaged in military-to-military relations and intelligence sharing 
agreements can mitigate these types of scenarios by allowing US military personnel not 
just to train, but to remain engaged in relationships while host nation forces mature 
democratically. Military-to-military relationships should not be considered as the primary 
short-term solution to intelligence shortfalls due to a pre-requisite need to first establish 
trust. However, as demonstrated in the preceding case studies and chapters, although the 
establishment of the trust and analytical skill sets necessary to successfully share 
intelligence with host nation counterparts usually does take an extended period of time, 
the potential benefits of this investment can prove to be substantial. 
Having reviewed the arguments and counterarguments of using military-to-
military relations as a way to enhance US and host nation intelligence architectures, the 
focus of this thesis is finally turned to US involvement in Iraq. As stated in this thesis’ 
introductory chapter, Lieutenant General David Petraeus described efforts to train foreign 
 
237 Leech, G. (2004, August 2) Washington’s Paramilitary Game in Colombia. Colombia Journal 
Online. Retrieved June 28, 2005, from http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia191.htm
 238 US Southern Command (SouthCom) Struggles to Justify its Role in the War on Terror. Equipo 
Nizkor. September 2004. Retrieved on March 22, 2005 from 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/terror/counter.html  
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troops on a reduced timeline as “building an airplane in flight.”239 At this time, US and 
Coalition forces involved in the training of Iraqi military forces continue to build this 
“airplane” amidst a dynamic and very deadly security situation. Ongoing and as yet 
incomplete efforts to train professional and self sufficient Iraqi military personnel, along 
with the absence of strong military-to-military relations between US and Iraqi forces will 
be cited in the following section as the major reasons why military intelligence sharing 
between US and indigenous military personnel has not fully developed and matured in 
Iraq. Despite this assessment, the set of guidelines developed following a review of 
military-to-military relations and intelligence sharing agreements in El Salvador, 
Colombia and Afghanistan is put forward for use in Iraq once Iraqi defense forces are 
firmly established and take responsibility for the security of their own country; in effect, 
once the airplane has been built. 
 
F. IRAQ 
More than two years after the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, an 
indigenous military institution that is willing and able to engage in wide-ranging military-
to-military relations with US forces in Iraq does not exist. In the following paragraphs, 
US policies and intelligence sharing agreements in Iraq will be analyzed at an 
unclassified level to describe some of the political and military shortfalls that continue to 
contribute to this unstable situation. During these discussions, ongoing deficiencies in the 
training of Iraqi forces and a lack of mutual trust between US and Iraqi military personnel 
will be put forth as major reasons why military intelligence sharing between US and Iraqi 
military personnel has yet to fully develop. Although military training relationships have 
been a vehicle for the establishment of new or enhanced security agreements and 
improved bilateral security efforts in other countries, an application of many of these 
lessons to Iraq must wait until indigenous security forces have secured a more stable 
environment with the help of properly recruited, trained and equipped personnel. It is 
assessed that once Iraqi military forces are fully and capably instituted, they will be better 
 
239 Norland, R. (2004, July 5) Iraq’s Repairman. Newsweek. Retrieved June 28, 2004, from 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5305713/site/newsweek/
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prepared to work with US and coalition forces to develop the trust necessary to apply 
many of the results and conclusions of this thesis project. 
The US military’s conventional capabilities, which were demonstrated during the 
initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and brought about the fall of the Saddam 
Hussein regime, have been subsequently challenged by a highly determined insurgent 
movement. Information provided to US policy makers and military planners prior to the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq from sources such as former Iraqi leader Ahmad Chalabi 
proved to be false in many cases, were motivated by an intent to inform as well as 
influence. Following the invasion of Iraq, fact finding organizations like the Iraqi Survey 
Group were deployed overseas by members of the Coalition but directed to focus on the 
search for weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi connections to Al Qaeda, and the location 
of possible American prisoners of war from Operation Desert Storm at the expense of 
emerging US military shortfalls in tactical, human, and communications intelligence.240 
After the fall of Baghdad, Iraqi elements of control, administration, structure and safety 
were found to be in complete disarray by troops on the ground following years of war, 
international sanctions, mismanagement, and corruption. Nonetheless, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority proceeded to disband the Iraqi government and armed forces under 
a policy of de-Bathification. This decision further plunged the US military into a 
protracted war against former regime elements and complicated the achievement of 
publicly-stated American efforts to create a democratic government in Iraq. Over two 
years after the invasion of Iraq by US and Coalition forces, US efforts to incorporate Iraqi 
security forces into a security plan that is sensitive to both US and Iraqi national interests 
continue to be complicated by an unstable and violent security situation. More 
importantly, violent attacks by insurgents and the loss of human life continue on a daily 





240 Member of the Iraqi Intelligence Task Force, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 19 
March 2005.  
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1. Intelligence Sharing in Iraq 
Since the fall of Baghdad, intelligence programs have been established in support 
of both US and Iraqi military personnel. However, during both the initial and current 
involvement of US military forces in Iraq, US intelligence efforts have supported the 
fighting without winning the war. For example, and according to a report published by 
Reuters in July of 2005, the US Army has decided to launch a Joint Intelligence 
Operations Center in Iraq as part of a drive to improve its ability to fight insurgents, 
coordinate different intelligence networks, and improve access to classified data.241 The 
report also details the Army’s intention to add 3,000 intelligence officers in Iraq through 
fiscal year 2009, in response to what has been publicly described as a need to manage and 
disseminate “vast amounts” of intelligence.242 Meanwhile, the additional establishment 
of “Tactical Fusion Centers” and “Fires Effects Coordination Centers” has already been 
hailed by US military planners as a functional way to bring together US analysts and war 
fighters in an effort to sort out critical information and rapidly disseminate it to forces 
engaging the enemy.243 However, despite these significant efforts, it is important to 
ponder if these intelligence sharing measures are the type of solutions needed to go 
beyond just fighting an insurgent movement and actually begin winning the war. How 
will the addition of 3,000 analysts who may or may not understand a two year-old 
insurgency problem help the tactical commander? After all, a media report quoted by 
RAND analyst Bruce Hoffman states that even though the CIA station in Iraq is now the 
largest in the world, senior intelligence officers have admitted that during 2004 the CIA 
“had little success in penetrating the resistance and identifying foreign terrorists involved 
in the insurgency.”244 Significant difficulties in managing and disseminating data in Iraq 
have stemmed from the fact that US sensor-based intelligence systems are currently 
configured to handle queries that are far removed from the dynamic nature and urgency 
 
241 Shalal-Esa, A. (July 1, 2005). US Army Seeks to Improve Intelligence Work in Iraq. Reuters Alert 
Net Foundation. Retrieved July 7, 2005, from http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N01640168.htm. 
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 243 Grossman, E. (2005). US Forces In Iraq Face Obstacle In Getting Intelligence They Need. Inside 
The Pentagon.1. 
244 Hoffman, B. (2004)). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 4.  
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of ongoing counterinsurgency operations.245  These shortfalls, when combined with a 
violent and dynamic situation on the ground and a bureaucratic US chain of command 
have resulted in the creation of intelligence staffs that are generally relegated to simply 
report information rather than provide analysis.”246
In order to defeat an insurgent threat, intelligence efforts cannot be focused solely 
on achieving measures of effectiveness and reporting on the nearest threat. Intelligence 
efforts must also be directed towards understanding the indigenous population. Countries 
like Iraq need intelligence architectures that acknowledge tribalism, transnational 
influences, and the complexity and multi-dimensional aspects of the insurgent threat. 
Analysis of these areas requires time due to the complex cultural issues, significant 
language barriers, difficulties accessing the populous, and the lack of vetted human 
intelligence sources. In Falluja, the setting in which this thesis premise was initially 
introduced, American troops did not arrive until two weeks after the fall of Baghdad.247 
According to journalist Michael Gordon, constant troop rotations in the area and the 
limited number of forces caused the responsibility for the city to constantly shift and 
subsequently hampered American efforts to form ties with the residents and collect useful 
intelligence.248 Since then, while public media sources have continued to report on US 
military efforts to manage immense amounts of electronic data in Iraq, writers such as 
retired Major General Robert Scales continue to assert that the war in Iraq can only be 
won by establishing personal relationships, building trust, and developing the exceptional 
ability to understand people, their culture and their motivations.249  
 
245 Grossman, E. (2005). US Forces In Iraq Face Obstacle In Getting Intelligence They Need. Inside 
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248 Gordon, M. (2004). Catastrophic Success’: Road to War. New York Times. 1. 
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2. Obstacles Towards the Application of Provided Guidelines 
As previously discussed, the successful military training of indigenous personnel 
by US forces is critical because joint training fosters military-to-military relations. 
However, the way in which the United States and coalition forces are training Iraqi forces 
continues to be reviewed and revised by Multinational Security Transition Team Iraq 
(MNSTC-I) and Multi-national Corps Iraq (MNF-I) in a tenuous security situation. It has 
also been proposed within this thesis that close military-to-military relations in the past 
can gradually foster the trust necessary to establish intelligence sharing programs. In Iraq, 
cultural and security concerns continue to undermine the enormous effort to establish a 
new national security force. Critics can argue that effective intelligence sharing programs 
between US and Iraqi military forces have been and continue to be in place. Nevertheless, 
successful and continuous insurgent attacks throughout Iraq dispute their effectiveness, 
by continuing to hamper US and Iraqi efforts to provide the indigenous population with 
the safe and secure environment it needs. In order to defeat the Iraqi insurgent threat, 
intelligence efforts must be focused on the people of Iraq, not just on combating 
insurgents.  
Ongoing and as yet incomplete efforts to train professional and self-sufficient 
Iraqi security personnel are one reason why military intelligence sharing efforts between 
US and Iraqi military personnel have not completely evolved and matured. Although 
numerous examples of successful Iraqi-led military operations can be cited, the successes 
have been infrequent and deficient at tactical, operational, and strategic levels when 
viewed by American commanders eager to have competent Iraqi forces take over security 
responsibilities. Research conducted on US training efforts in Iraq reveal that many of the 
problems encountered during the establishment of new Iraqi forces can be traced back to 
poor recruitment practices, inadequate logistical support, insufficient training, 
intimidation by enemy forces, and low troop morale. In certain Iraqi sectors, American 
officers have attributed many of the problems with Iraqi units to a lack of competent 
leadership and the understandable but detrimental desire by Iraqi recruits to merely 
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receive their promised monthly pay.250 Despite publicized political optimism, Americans 
working with Iraqis in the field believe that it will take several years before new Iraqi 
forces will be able to act against insurgents independently.251  The United States 
government has spent $5.7 billion to train and equip new Iraqi forces, graduating soldiers 
in increments of battalion-size classes composed of 1500 troops.252 According to 
American sources quoted in the previously referenced New York Times report, there are 
now 107 battalions of Iraqi troops and paramilitary police units totaling approximately 
169,000 men. However, further research reveals that during the course of 2005, only 
three Iraqi battalions are actually rated operational by US forces and many others fall 
short in manpower, training, and equipment.253
As seen in the previously reviewed case studies, joint, continuous training 
between US and host nation personnel facilitates close military-to-military relations. 
However, in Iraq, available recruits and the time necessary to train them are in short 
supply.254 According to the Carnegie Endowment, a non-governmental organization, 
Pentagon figures show that the gap between the total number of Iraqi security forces and 
the total required in 2005 is now twice the size of the gap reported by the US government 
in January of 2004.255 These assertions are supported by the former head of Iraqi security 
force training, Major General Paul Eaton, who in a recent interview declared that in Iraq 
“it hasn’t gone well, [US training efforts] had almost one year of no progress.”256 
Following Iraqi elections in January of 2005, Coalition commanders admitted that among 
125,000 trained Iraqi soldiers and policemen, the desertion rate has been as high as 40 
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percent.257 Even accounts that positively narrate the gradual accomplishments of newly 
trained Iraqi forces in cities such as Mosul, decry the compressed time schedule under 
which indigenous troops must be trained and the inevitable lack of experience witnessed 
by US trainers in the field.258 In some instances, Iraqi recruits receive only two weeks of 
training before they are deployed, resulting in indigenous forces that may be efficient, but 
definitely not proficient.259
The absence of strong military-to-military relations between US and Iraqi forces 
is another reason why military intelligence sharing between US and Iraqi military 
personnel has not fully developed and matured. In order to establish intelligence sharing 
programs, military-to-military relations that are based on trust are essential. The Iraqi 
people should be expected to take a skeptical attitude towards US attempts at defense 
reform based on Iraq’s previous experiences with foreign occupiers such as the British 
during the early and mid-1900’s.260 In addition, any agenda that currently attempts to 
rebuild indigenous military capabilities is potentially considered by many Iraqis as 
tainted and/or dominated by Israeli geopolitical and American oil interests.261 Likewise, 
American soldiers privately question the loyalties of trained Iraqi forces and are 
suspicious that some of their recruits have been, and continue to be, sympathetic to 
insurgent causes.262 According to newspaper reports, in regions sympathetic to insurgent 
forces, Iraqi military personnel have performed poorly based on their contempt for 
American forces and continuing support for Saddam Hussein.263  
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It is not unreasonable to ascertain that military cultures throughout the Middle 
East or any other region of the world are under the constant influence of surrounding 
environments and societal influences. Therefore, as seen with Salvadoran, Colombian, 
and Afghan military personnel, Iraqis have unique military styles and customs that 
contrast sharply against US military problem-solving attitudes. For example, one of the 
major cultural obstacles uncovered by US and coalition forces during the training of Iraqi 
forces has been the enduring legacy of Saddam Hussein’s military culture, which equated 
rank with privilege rather than responsibility, and valued ethnic loyalties.264 During the 
regime of Saddam Hussein, risk aversion on behalf of field officers was widespread and 
even officers who had proven to be trustworthy did not appear to posses the desire to lead 
or skills necessary to successfully conduct operations.265 Therefore, the existence of a 
lack of confidence between US and Iraqi military personnel, an apparent Iraqi 
unwillingness to lead, and an ongoing concern by US military personnel regarding a lack 
of resources and time to train indigenous forces appear to be poised to repeatedly defeat 
efforts to establish the trust needed to establish a bilateral intelligence sharing 
relationship.  
 
G. CONCLUSION  
Within the last years, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Donald 
Rumsfeld, showed evidence of a more proactive vision within the US government by 
directing the US military to develop units that can “build partnerships with failing states 
to defeat internal terrorist threats.”266 Within this context, the United States would seek to 
deploy military forces early to confront “guerrillas before an insurgency can take root and 
build popular support.”267 In addition to efforts underway in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Robert D. Kaplan of the Atlantic Monthly writes that, under a program titled The Pan 
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Sahel Initiative, US Marines and US Army Special Forces are already training local 
militaries in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad in order to offset the infiltration of Al 
Qaeda within Sub Saharan Africa.268 The US Marine Corps has begun to form foreign 
military training units to help countries improve their armed forces and teach them civil-
military operations using newly acquired language skills and cultural awareness from 
foreign militaries.269 Meanwhile, back in Iraq, US Forces have already created military 
transition teams composed of US soldiers to work with indigenous security troops, and 
there are plans for up to 10,000 Americans to be assigned to Iraqi units at multiple levels, 
reportedly from division to battalions and companies, with up to 10 US personnel at the 
battalion level and 2 personnel with each company.270 In his address to the nation on 
June 28th, 2005, United States President George W. Bush substantiated these media 
reports by stating that US forces are embedding Coalition "Transition Teams" inside Iraqi 
units who live, work, and fight together with their Iraqi comrades and provide them with 
battlefield advice and assistance with important skills such as urban combat, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance techniques during and after combat operations.271
Developments such as the ones listed above are encouraging because the Global 
War on Terrorism demands that American and coalition forces deploy professional 
military cadres that resist the desire to conduct reactive, conventional operations and 
instead collaborate with each other and host nation counterparts in order to facilitate the 
specific type of combat needed to defeat the enemy. These efforts also appear to be 
geared towards the empowerment of Iraqi security forces and will be essential in 
preventing tribal and social unrest following the eventual departure of US and Coalition 
forces. However, the fact remains that in Iraq, establishing a capable and vetted security 
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force is currently the highest and perhaps most elusive priority.272 Therefore, although 
this thesis demonstrates the value of establishing future intelligence architectures using 
military-to-military relations through case studies of US military involvement in El 
Salvador, Colombia and Afghanistan, it is asserted that the period in which successful 
application of the enclosed guidelines will be most effective in Iraq begins once Iraqi 
security forces have been successfully developed and trained.  
This thesis has analyzed aspects of US political and military involvement in El 
Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan and Iraq in an effort to establish the value of military 
relationships as a way to improve intelligence architectures in areas of present and future 
American interest. This thesis has also presented examples of the successful and 
unsuccessful implementation of intelligence sharing measures between these countries 
and the United States during the course of established joint military training and combat 
operations. Based on the research conducted, it has been asserted that well-established 
military relationships and subsequent intelligence and information sharing agreements 
can support long-term US security policies in countries of past, current, and future 
national interest. The guidelines provided in the following pages explain how to use 
military-to-military relations as a vehicle to a better intelligence infrastructure and can 
help in the establishment or development of enhanced intelligence sharing agreements. 
These guidelines have been extrapolated from an analysis of political, military, cultural, 
and intelligence sharing characteristics in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
and are presented to help the US and host nation personnel develop better intelligence 
capabilities through the training of host nation military forces; in effect, locally train an 
army of intelligence analysts. Successful tactical, operational, and strategic outcomes 
resulting from the relationships established between US and host nation military 
personnel gradually breed a sense of mutual trust. Military-to-military relations are more 
than just a means to exchange information. Military-to-military relations have been 
presented as a way to develop the trust necessary to conduct coalition operations in areas  
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of current and future US national interest, at a time when increased bilateral cooperation 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 119
                                                
VII. GUIDELINES: HOW TO TRAIN AN ARMY OF 
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
International military-to-military relationships must be considered essential to the 
establishment of long term intelligence sharing agreements between the United States and 
the governments of current and future areas of conflict. These relationships offer a 
vehicle by which the United States and host nation military and intelligence personnel 
can collaborate to defeat threats to mutually held interests and policies. It has been 
correctly hypothesized that the United States military can mitigate intelligence shortfalls 
by cooperating and training with foreign counterparts using the lessons learned during the 
involvement of United States military personnel in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq. Therefore, the value of establishing better intelligence architectures through 
military-to-military relations and the ongoing training of host nation military forces 
should not be ignored.273  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a list of guidelines that, based on specific 
case studies, can establish or improve American intelligence sharing capabilities by way 
of international military-to-military relations; in effect, help the United States and host 
nations successfully and locally train an army of intelligence analysts. Guidelines 
characterized as a “General Thesis Finding” are inspired by the intangible lessons 
gathered from interviewing subject matter experts and researching how military-to-
military relations have or have not been a vehicle for intelligence sharing in the host 
nations listed above. The following guidelines should be used to identify and define the 
boundaries in which military-to-military ties are developed, and to facilitate the creation 
of mutually beneficial intelligence architectures. As always, US personnel engaged in a 
military-to-military relationship must be mindful of the need to protect US intelligence 
 
273 For purposes of this thesis, an intelligence architecture is defined as an organized intelligence 
apparatus, a structured environment in which intelligence disciplines, capabilities, and procedures are 
deployed in support of selected civilian and/or military requirements. 
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capabilities while simultaneously interacting with host nation counterparts in an honest 
and open-minded manner.274  
 
Getting Started (General Thesis Finding) 
When available, military-to-military relations can and should be used to openly 
assess host nation intelligence capabilities prior to the initiation of an intelligence sharing 
agreement. An assessment can: 
• Identify important host nation cultural and geopolitical factors. 
• Determine if US intelligence assistance is welcome by host nation 
counterparts. 
• Identify where US and host nation personnel share common goals and 
interests. 
• Reveal the level of sophistication within the host nation’s intelligence 
architecture. 
• Determine the level and extent of US intelligence assistance required.  
• Specify the kind of help US intelligence personnel can or should provide. 
• Identify what US and host nation intelligence personnel expect from each 
other. 
• Determine the kind of intelligence assistance a host nation needs versus 
the kind of intelligence the host nation wants.  
An assessment of the intelligence sharing relationship between the host nation and 
US intelligence personnel must be performed periodically throughout the duration of 
American involvement. US personnel must continuously ask themselves if US and host 
nation intelligence requirements are being satisfied correctly and efficiently.   
 
Be Flexible, Stay Flexible (General Thesis Finding) 
In fluid and convoluted environments such as those common to combat situations, 
socio-political unrest and counterinsurgency operations, military-to-military relations and 
intelligence sharing can often be facilitated not by design, but by circumstance. 
Therefore, a constructive attitude and an adaptable outlook that is capable of adjusting to 
a dynamic environment is recommended in order to successfully take advantage of any 
 
274 The term “host nation” is used throughout this text to generically describe the origins of foreign 
military and intelligence personnel. The use of this term does not imply that the United States should only 
engage in intelligence sharing relationships with officially recognized nations. Governing and opposition 
groups within organizations, states, non-states, and even failing states must be considered as potential allies 
in current and future conflicts and when necessary, actively sought as partners in intelligence sharing 
agreements. 
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opportunity to improve  the flow of information and/or intelligence within military-to-
military relations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  
 
Decency, Professionalism and Trust (General Thesis Finding) 
Treating host nation personnel with decency and professionalism fosters the trust 
necessary to develop a successful and productive intelligence sharing relationship. This 
type of relationship can be helpful when trying to determine what kind of intelligence 
platform or product best supports bilateral policies and goals. Behavior that may appear 
arrogant, omnipotent, or insensitive must be avoided at all costs, and replaced with offers 
to assist in exchange for nothing in return. Within a military and intelligence sharing 
relationship, professionalism and credibility are valued, mutual trust is nurtured. 
 
Let the Conflict Be Your Guide 
In Afghanistan, different types of military operations have been carried out by 
conventional and unconventional forces in theoretically distinct phases.  From the initial 
ad hoc support of the Northern Alliance, to the deliberate planning in support of large 
conventional maneuvers following the collapse of the Taliban, to the long-term mutual 
goal to establish a national army following the election of a central government, dynamic 
policy objectives have resulted in the need to maintain different levels of military 
cooperation and generated specific intelligence requirements.275 Therefore, participants 
in a military-to-military or intelligence sharing relationship should always allow the 
phases of the conflict to determine the development of those relationships and to guide 
the format of intelligence products that will best support the war fighter.  
 
Host Nation Capabilities and the Application of US Intelligence   
As discussed within the case study of military-to-military relations between the 
US military and the armed forces of El Salvador, US personnel engaged in a military-to 
military relationship must constantly ask themselves if host nation personnel are capable 
of properly exploiting and understanding US intelligence products. Simply “throwing” 
 
275 The term “indigenous” is not only used to refer to officially sanctioned military forces  within a 
host nation, but to also refer to any organized group, regardless of sophistication, which can be rallied to 
support US an coalition objectives. 
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intelligence at host nation personnel who are unable to understand US intelligence 
products or capabilities can lead to the misinterpretation of intelligence, place fielded 
forces in danger, and damage the credibility of intelligence professionals involved in a 
military-to-military relationship. Military-to-military relationships can provide a vehicle 
in which qualified US intelligence professionals can help host nation counterparts 
improve their ability to understand intelligence products and insure their proper and 
effective application.  
 
Unconventional Intelligence  
US personnel must be willing to explore new and unconventional ways to provide 
intelligence support. In some cases, tough foreign disclosure laws did not stop US and 
Colombian military personnel from instituting joint collaboration, collection, and 
information dissemination programs. These programs have mitigated foreign disclosure 
issues because information and intelligence is produced jointly, and not exchanged or 
requested from US assets. Military-to military relationships should be considered as an 
opportunity for professional innovation based on the established nature of the 
circumstances. US and host nation personnel must think inside and outside the 
“intelligence cooperation box.” 
 
Usefulness: The True Value of Intelligence  
The usefulness of intelligence should not be measured in the context of US 
interests alone. Through the use of military-to-military relations, US intelligence 
personnel working in El Salvador eventually realized the benefit of regularly questioning 
host nation counterparts on whether the intelligence products provided continued to be 
useful.276 Moreover, US personnel also realized the importance of independently 
determining whether their intelligence platforms had something useful to contribute to 
the decision-making process. US personnel and their host nation counterparts must 
always be honest with each other concerning the value of the US intelligence provided. 
 
276 US Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer, interview conducted by the author, Monterey, California, 26 
January 2005. Currently a senior officer in the US Naval Intelligence community, he served as chief of a 
technical analysis team upon reporting to El Salvador in 1987. 
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US personnel involved in an intelligence or information sharing relationship must be 
knowledgeable of intelligence capabilities and limitations in order to properly educate 
host nation partners, avoid misleading intelligence consumers, and unnecessarily raise 
political and military expectations. US personnel must assess and reassess the intelligence 
products provided and ask themselves if host nation counterparts are receiving the right 
kind of intelligence support. 
 
Temporarily Assigned “Wonders” and the Revolving Door 
Personnel continuity is a serious challenge to intelligence support and mission 
success. Military-to-military relations thrive on a two-way exchange of information that 
must be as seamless as possible and provides continuous military and intelligence 
support. Once qualified personnel are identified and assigned to an intelligence sharing 
program, they must be deployed for an amount of time that will guarantee maximum 
continuity of effort. Standard rotations consisting of ninety days or six months are often 
not enough to develop the personal relationships and intelligence protocols necessary to 
achieve mutual policy goals. To host nation counterparts in countries such as El Salvador, 
the length of US personnel deployments often symbolized the level of US commitment to 
the mutual cause. In Afghanistan, a “revolving door” training policy which constantly 
introduces and removes trainers to accommodate rotation schedules or includes a wide 
variety of multinational military influences has hampered US efforts to establish 
continuous operational and intelligence relations with host nation personnel at the 
grassroots level.  Military culture takes years to build and efforts that continuously rotate 
the level of experience, origin, and number of trainers can collectively distract the host 
nation’s introspective efforts to develop a military identity. In order for an intelligence 
sharing relationship to be successful, continuity during the training of host nation 
counterparts is key.      
 
The Use of Intelligence as a Commodity  
A constant supply of US intelligence support can cause foreign military 
counterparts to become dependent on US intelligence capabilities. As demonstrated in 
countries such as El Salvador and Colombia, the availability and demonstrated capability 
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of US intelligence products and information can become a commodity, which correctly or 
incorrectly, can be used as a way to influence host nation counterparts. The improper use 
of intelligence as a way to force policy changes within a country appears to obscure the 
transparency of a military-to-military relationship by unduly calling into question the host 
nation’s commitment and/or priorities. Although the use of intelligence as a way to 
influence and motivate host nation counterparts to become more politically compliant or 
battle ready seems to have yielded positive results in the past, the use of intelligence as a 
commodity remains a technique that should be considered fraught with peril.  
 
Manning Military Relations and Intelligence Sharing Agreements  
Aside from carefully reviewing the level of experience held by the personnel 
assigned to train and mentor host nation intelligence professionals, consideration must be 
given (when possible) to the staffing of US military positions with personnel that share 
common military service bonds. In El Salvador, the staffing of regional intelligence 
centers (RICs) and the military group (USMILGP-ES) with US military personnel that 
belonged to the same military service and military occupational specialty provided a 
common organizational and professional denominator, and unexpectedly provided an 
additional link between the strategic USMILGP-ES and the operational level of the RICs. 
Whenever possible, US and host nation personnel must look to establish common internal 
and external service and occupational bonds in an effort to strengthen military and 
intelligence sharing relationships.       
 
Military-to-Whom Relations  
Colombia’s use of police forces in what American personnel may consider 
military missions, as well as the existence of non-military, national security forces in 
neighboring countries such as Costa Rica and Panama serves as a reminder that military-
to-military relationships should not be limited to military entities. As stated in the chapter 
dedicated to the development of new intelligence architectures, the development of 




enforcement organizations fulfilling responsible national security roles is critical to 
establishing and maintaining successful political, military, and intelligence sharing 
relations today and in the future. 
 
Teaching as a Way to Say “Thank You”  
In situations where US personnel are limited in the amount of information they 
can share with host nation personnel due to security classification protocols, the case 
study of US involvement in Colombia advocates the use of military-to-military relations 
as a medium by which a host nation’s cooperation can be compensated. The reciprocation 
of a host nation’s cooperation with dedicated programs run by qualified US personnel 
and designed to teach counterparts how to collect and analyze their own intelligence can 
empower the host nation, increase the capabilities and situational awareness of both 
countries, and strengthen military-to-military cooperation. Training host nation 
counterparts to fuse multiple intelligence disciplines, develop and understand intelligence 
collection plans, and carry out intelligence preparation of the battlespace can provide US 
counterparts with the analytical skills necessary to successfully convert information to 
intelligence. Moreover, it can foster feelings of trust between counterparts and can lead to 
future and more meaningful exchanges of information. The teaching of analytical skills to 
host nation counterparts can be an intelligence capability multiplier. 
 
Before, During, After …and Beyond        
The United States military must understand the value of longer-term military-to-
military relationship with host nation personnel and maintain them through out the 
duration of the conflict. The failure by US personnel to nurture military-to-military 
relations following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan delayed the subsequent 
recruitment, training, and preparedness of the Afghan National Army because yesterday’s 
Northern Alliance fighters became today’s provincial powerbrokers. The establishment of 
military-to-military relations before, during, and after a conflict can provide the United 
States and host nation counterparts with the stability and continuity necessary to carry out 
long-term strategic plans. Conversely, the establishment of committed military-to- 
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military relations that span and go beyond the length of the conflict can be instrumental 
in building the confidence and infrastructure necessary to foster the prolonged sharing of 
intelligence.  
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